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Introduction1
Blind Spots of Knowledge
in Shakespeare and His World
Subha Mukherji

Blind Spots: A Concept and Its Typology

W

HEN, IN KING LEAR, the old man refuses to leave Gloucester
despite his bidding, because Gloucester “cannot see [his] way,” the
blind Gloucester replies, bitterly reflecting on his earlier failure to recognize his sons morally:
I have no way, and therefore want no eyes.
I stumbled when I saw. Full oft ’tis seen,
Our means secure us and our mere defects
Prove our commodities ...
(F, 4.1.18–21).2

What do we see when we cannot see, or see defectively? How do our blind
spots prove our commodities? By extension, what happens when seeing and
knowing are prised apart? What is the epistemic purchase of unseeing? In the
same play, Lear questions the familiar sensory hierarchy of Aristotelian epistemology, where “sight best helps us to know things,” a privileging also familiar
from the Platonic tradition where knowing is a kind of seeing.3 Learning the
cost of his emotional and ethical misrecognitions with each passing moment,
he ironically severs the function of seeing from that of knowing oneself, and
even from being known and knowing the other: “Doth any here know me?
This is not Lear: / [...] Where are his eyes? / [...] Who is it that can tell me
who I am?” (1.4.246–50). As John Berger writes, “it is seeing which establishes our place in the surrounding world,” but “the relation between what we
see and what we know is never settled.”4 He posits seeing as a more complex,
more active, more mobile activity than a purely optical function, “a question
of mechanically reacting to stimuli”: “It can only be thought of in this way
if one isolates the small part of the process which concerns the eye’s retina.”5
Yet even the internal processes of the retina are more dynamic and less
“settled” than—literally—meets the eye, which sees more than it sees “through
means secure.” The assumed relation in social discourse between ocular vision
as vehicle and perception as tenor is unsettlingly reversible. So the optical
metaphor remains functional, and has an unexpected synergy with the social,
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psychological, and interpretative acts of seeing to which Berger has trained
us to be attentive. The “blind spot” is a part of the retina—the optic disc or
nerve-head—which lacks photoreceptor cells. Hence, no vision is detectable
at this spot in the visual field. But, by a curious process of readjustment, the
brain “reads” the blind spot by interpolating it with information from the surrounding field, including the other eye: so the blind spot itself is not visible
to the eye to which it belongs. But, because of its invisibility in the “normal”
sense, it induces an optically inventive way of seeing, activating tools of perception not ordinarily in use. It is, thus, analogous at once to a particular point
in a larger picture that, for different possible reasons, we fail to see and to a
mental act of seeing that makes up for what is off-scene by seeing indirectly,
inferentially and imaginatively. But there is a further twist in the paradoxical
reach of the blind spot as metaphor: in a digital photo of the retina, it looks
dazzling. Thus, it is at once blind in that it cannot see, or be visible to vision,
and blindingly bright in its dense, nerve-packed opacity when imaged.
It was not till 1660 that the French physicist Edmé Mariotte—
sensationally—discovered and documented the blind spot, as noted by
Supriya Chaudhuri in this volume. Yet the perceptual implications of the
scotoma in any given monocular field of vision were understood, and in
productive use, in the cultural imaginary of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries: a contrapuntal strand in the dominant ocularcentrism
of its texture. Shakespeare, for one, seems to have “known” the blind spot
of the eye and the mind well before it floated within the ken of science.
The viewing relations and optical agencies implicated by its “blindness”
inform and structure his explorations of the forms, processes, and intersubjectivity of knowing, our possible engagements with it, and the business
of representation—making visible and thereby knowable. The love-juice
with which Puck streaks the lovers’ eyes in A Midsummer Night’s Dream,
from which the dream of the night arbitrarily ensues, engendering at once
“hateful fantasies” and unlikely “[enthralments]” (2.1.258; 3.1.116), makes
the Platonic optics of love run helter-skelter—a playful send-up of what
George Hakewill (and Stuart Clark, after him) call “the vanity of the eye”:
the assumptions of the rationalism and primacy of sight.6 But the imperfections of the eye had particular applications in drama, not least because of the
ontology of the early modern theatre which relied on activating modes of
seeing what could not be shown: routinely asking the audience to see with
“parted eye.”7 Shakespeare picked up on the theatrical potential of this condition as well as its demands, enjoining his viewers to see Dover cliff while
looking at flat ground, or the vasty fields of France within the wooden O
of the stage. But he also tuned into the affective, ethical, perceptual, and
mimetic scope of blindness, blind-spotting, and indeed blind-spot-spotting,
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pushing the implications of seeing what is not visible, and not seeing what
is, by deploying his medium. Shakespeare’s works are our focus, but not
our horizon. This volume, likewise, is an indicative probe rather than an
exhaustive exploration. We hope that it will thematize an internally complementary process, between text and hermeneutics, and make it available for a
wider range of works in the early modern period.
In common parlance, a blind spot is an obstructed view, or an instance
of partial or partisan perception, or even a localized lack of understanding,
its meaning sliding from the physical to the cognitive to the epistemological. Integral to Shakespeare’s recreation of human reality, both individual and
relational, this function determines the first kind of blind spot in his works,
which repeatedly stage moments of unmastered and unmasterable knowledge, whether it is because characters cannot or will not “know” it. This can
take the form of a perceptual failure or denial within the fiction that can exact
a devastating cost, as when Emilia in Shakespeare’s Othello—and perhaps
Gertrude in Hamlet, especially the Folio text—resist knowledges about their
own agency and their husband’s designs that are accessible, but emotionally unaffordable.8 Obscured by the psyche, they surface like spectres at key
moments of re-cognition—as when Emilia mutters, on learning of Iago’s villainy, “I thought so then; I’ll kill myself for grief ” (Othello 5.2.192). As Berger
says, “to look is an act of choice”; so is not to look.9 Or think of The Winter’s
Tale when Leontes—with doomful shades of Oedipus—not only declares
the oracle void of truth, but perversely refuses to see the corrosive damage
his jealous fury is wreaking on his loved ones, and interprets Mamillius’s
reactive sickness in the light of the only knowledge in his sight: “Conceiving
the dishonour of his mother! / He straight declin’d, drooped, took it
deeply, / [...] / And downright languish’d” (The Winter’s Tale 2.3.13–17).
Looking the obvious in the face, Leontes fails to see it. His vision is so skewed
by his “too much [belief ]” in his “own suspicion” (3.2.151) that he forgets
the sanity of seeing at its simplest, most lucid level as he declares its irrelevance in proving his wife’s assumed guilt:
...     Camillo’s flight,
Added to their familiarity,
(Which was as gross as ever touch’d conjecture,
That lack’d sight only, nought for approbation
But only seeing ...
(2.1.174–78).

Cognitive blind spots can show us how precariously close suspicion is to
conviction, and how hopelessly entangled knowledge is with the force of
belief, for better or for worse.10
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But let us take a more layered example—an instance of a blind spot
of knowledge which slides from mimetic content to representational concern, operating not only at the threshold between the self and the other,
but also between the text and the reader. Significantly, it is a scene of viewing. As the raped Lucrece laments at length before disclosing her plight to
her husband in the narrative poem, The Rape of Lucrece, she comes to face
a tapestry (or panel-painting ) depicting the siege of Troy. In a crowded
canvas, her eyes fasten on one detail, “a face where all distress is stelled”
(line 1444): this is “despairing Hecuba” (line 1447), a passive sufferer with
whom she can identify. “[Throwing] her eyes about the painting round,”
she extends her lament to “who she finds forlorn” (1499–1500), all other
figures and themes being (as it were) invisible to her eyes. But then she
pauses on “the perjured Sinon” (line 1522)—in her mind, the cause of
Hecuba’s grief, having been the direct instrument of the siege of Troy.
Indignant that he should have “so fair a form,” “with a mind so ill,” her
outrage mounts to destructive rage as she identifies him with her rapist
Tarquin who had a similarly deceptive exterior:
Here, all enraged, such passion her assails,
That patience is quite beaten from her breast;
She tears the senseless Sinon with her nails,
Comparing him to that unhappy guest
Whose deed hath made herself herself detest.
(lines 1562–66)

In her fit of passion, she fails to see that the painted Sinon is “senseless”
and ends up destroying the artwork. Soon enough, she herself registers the
hysteria, indeed almost ridiculousness, of her naïve response as a quieter
maturity dawns: “At last she smilingly with this gives o’er: / ‘Fool, fool,’
quoth she, ‘his wounds will not be sore’” (lines 1567–68). In a poem much
engaged with the affect and ethics of response, especially to pain, Lucrece’s
empathy may seem to qualify her to give the voiceless Hecuba’s grief a
tongue, unlike Marcus’s rhetorical, aestheticizing, over-eloquent attempt
to speak for the raped, tongueless Lavinia in the other work Shakespeare
wrote about rape and representation around the same time as the poem:
Titus Andronicus. Marcus’s dissonant address feels, even if it is not, emotionally detached from its subject, while Lucrece is not only both reader
and writer, but subject as well as object. Yet Lucrece’s extreme identification makes her blind to the fundamental difference between art and life,
if only for an extended moment. So here is a blind spot that confronts us,
through textual inscription, with our own relation to works of art. Do we
need to unsee the affective reality and subjecthood of characters within a

BLIND SPOTS OF KNOWLEDGE   5

fiction, to be sophisticated consumers of art? What are the limits of empathy in aesthetic response? Can identification—infeeling—be the blind spot
which, instead of helping, closes the critical distance that empathy actively
needs as material for reaching across, as space for bridging ? Dipping
back, for a moment, from reflexive art into inset life, we might consider
how Titus forgets basic distinctions in his ludicrously disproportionate
railing against Marcus for killing a fly: “How if that fly had a father and
mother?” (Titus Andronicus 3.2.60). Pace the blind spot of certain strands
of ecocritical readings of a seamless continuum between human and animal life in such moments, the theatre audience invariably laugh and share
Marcus’s incomprehension—“Alas, my lord, I have but kill’d a fly”—even
while they register the extremity of grief that makes Titus overidentify with
any infinitely suffering thing (Titus 3.2.59). The tradition of archly witty
exercises in the disproportion between a literary genre and its small subjects (and tropes) was established enough to provide a playfully parodic
context to the fly-killing scene—from Lucian’s encomium “In Praise of a
Fly,” to Spenser’s “Muiopotmos, or the Fate of the Butterflie,” and Donne’s
“The Flea.”11 The faintly ironic frames or overtones of these moments in
Shakespeare refract our vision. A character’s encounter with a fly, no less
than another’s with the painting of an epic war, raises questions about the
blind spots of aesthetic encounter. What excesses of its own does tragedy
tend not to acknowledge, which outsiders to the high tragic culture—
a Moorish Aaron, say, “[prying ] ... through the crevice of a wall” at the
Roman Titus’s hand being swapped for his sons’ heads—would laugh at
till their “eyes were rainy like to his” (Titus 5.1.114, 117)? In the 1590s,
Shakespeare’s “crannied [holes]” tend to figure apertures through which
one genre refracts into another, making us see in a different key. So the
comic Bottom “as” the tragic Pyramus pleads to his “lovely wall”: “Show me
thy chink, to blink through with mine eyne” (Dream 5.1.156; 174).
Another instance of a blind spot presenting itself as an encounter in the text that invites a recalibrated encounter with the text is the
double report of Brutus’s wife Portia’s death in Julius Caesar. Anyone
who was taught by the late Tony Nuttall will have been faced with this
puzzling re-occurrence in the Folio and asked to make sense of it. Is it
another textual error or corruption? A repetition that someone—maybe
Shakespeare—forgot to take out during some sort of process of revision? There are potential indications in the relevant section—not least in
the variety of speech headings for Cassi/Cas/Cass, and the unique stage
direction of “Boy” to replace Messala—of incomplete revision and interpolations at two stages of composition.12 Here is the anomaly. Cassius and
Brutus have uneasily made up after an angry altercation, but, when Brutus
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intimates a hinterland of heart-struck sorrow—“O Cassius, I am sick of
many griefs”—Cassius cannot resist a last jab: “Of your philosophy you
make no use, / If you give place to accidental evils” (4.1.145–46). This
prompts Brutus to reply, slightly defensively, “No man bears sorrow better.
Portia is dead” (4.1.147), and leads him to disclose the terrible manner
of her suicide. Cassius is suitably mortified, as this is a far stronger justification of Brutus’s disturbed state of mind than his own poor excuse of
a “rash humour” his mother gave him (4.1.120) for his own ill temper.
The impact of the revelation seems about to be helpfully defused by the
entrance of Lucius, and then of Messala and Titinius, allowing Brutus to
stop Cassius from harping on the unbearable subject: “No more, I pray
you” (4.1.166). But Messala leads up, through probing questions, to the
subject of Portia’s death. Trying and failing to throw him off track, Brutus
realizes he has to engage and pretends he has not heard anything: “Now,
as you are a Roman, tell me true.” Messala comes right back at him on his
terms: “Then like a Roman bear the truth I tell, / For certain, she is dead,
and by strange manner” (4.1.186, 4.1.187–88). Brutus “reacts” with what,
to Cassius, is at once duplicity and an astonishing display of fortitude:
Why, farewell, Portia: we must die, Messala.
With meditating that she must die once
I have the patience to endure it now.
(4.1.190–92)

Messala observes, with hushed admiration, “Even so great men great losses
should endure” (4.1.193). Cassius, more knowingly, remarks:
I have as much of this in art as you,
But yet my nature could not bear it so.
(4.1.194–95)

Are we to assume, because it lacks immediate coherence, that the double
announcement must be an oversight? Or should we read the duplication as a
dramatic shape, inducing us into a way of seeing what cannot be owned within
the parameters of the Rome that these characters inhabit: the parallel processes of a keenly felt challenge to Brutus’s Roman identity; the inseparability
of this identity from the ethic of Stoicism—the “philosophy” Cassius alludes
to; the distance between Brutus’s private, emotional self and his public, political persona; and the high Stoic manner as the stuff of performance, and the
affective repressions and evasions it demands? If we had the second report
alone, we might have found Brutus’s response almost inhuman—exemplifying the static model of Stoicism as a freedom from emotional disturbance.13
If we had the first alone, we would only have seen his fragility. Together, they
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show us the dynamic arc from a bleak, all too human bereavement to a formal,
willed control of emotions. This is also an insight into the half-lit cognitive
crevices and bypaths of the intense relationship between Brutus and Cassius.
Nuttall suggests that this textual crux—which has divided editors—invites
us to step out of the “customary canons of art” by probing the tautness of
the moment in terms of the emotional life of the characters, to read nature
into art.14 This feels right. And such redirection of attention is, typically, a
function of our encounters with blind spots in artworks.
The implication of recasting seeing distinguishes a range of
Shakespearean blind spots, often combining with other properties. The
recalibration that is so central to the optical functions of the blind spot
models a hermeneutic encounter where the conventional processing of
information is disrupted and diverted. When inscribed in the action, this
has the potential to be tragic: think of situations where characters misread
from circumstantial evidence, supplementing what is invisible or obscure
by bending their gaze, reading inferentially from a semiotic neighborhood. Typically, this variety of oblique reading operates in an evidentiary
dramatic structure. When Diana in All’s Well that Ends Well enargeically presents a ring to incriminate Bertram—“O, behold this ring”—the
Countess is convinced that she is his wife and, further, that he has murdered his wife: “That ring’s a thousand proofs” (All’s Well 5.3.191, 199).
Yet, as the plot unravels, it turns out to prove, rather, the manipulative
potency of visual tokens presented as synecdochic parts of an invisible scenario. We also see the ironic susceptibility of a defendant to a counter-use
of over-freighted signs, as Bertram stakes his honesty on the same object:
If you shall prove
This ring was ever hers, you shall as easy
Prove that I husbanded her bed in Florence ...
(5.3.124–26)

In the event, the ring does prove he had meant to sleep with Diana, but
not with any intention to marry her, and that he had in fact slept with his
lawfully wedded wife—showing how evidential inference from sensible contiguous signs can be a slippery index to both deed and thought.15 Emotional
situations dominated by sexual jealousy tend to focus such processes with
particular imaginative force, for, in the grip of passionate suspicion, we make
the world we see, though we take our cues from the visible world around us:
Othello “wear[s]” his eyes to watch his wife but images what is not through
his mind (3.3.198). Cymbeline offers a paradigmatic example in Posthumus’s
disastrous mis-seeing of Iachimo’s vividly visual evocation of “corporal [signs]” of his supposed enjoyment of Imogen’s body, backed up with
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visible material tokens from the alleged scene of “incontinency” (Cymbeline
2.4.119, 127). But the foregrounded and dilatory jouissance of Iachimo’s narrative recreation, both when he convinces Posthumus and when he recounts
the bedroom scene again by way of confession, manifests Shakespeare’s
acute alertness to the potential non-congruence of enargeia with evidence:
an equation derived from the Latin rhetorical tradition and, more specifically, its translation of enargeia as evidentia.16 Their assumed identity is
undercut as rhetorical temptation is shown to outstrip legal necessity. So, in
the Shakespearean theatre, enargeia becomes the blind spot of the judicial
imagination, with rhetoric at once shaping, and helping us deconstruct, the
temptations and errors of the mind’s eye.
Yet, in an almost chiastic move, precisely such cognitive diversions
can take a productive form when the text demands a reorientation of our
position as the knowing subject to the object of knowledge. In Troilus and
Cressida, faced with a Cressida he cannot recognize by his unitary code
of human nature—“This is, and is not, Cressid”—Troilus muses on “the
spacious breadth of this division” which “admits no orifex for a point as
subtle / As Ariachne’s broken woof to enter” (5.2.146; 150–52). There
is an obvious wobble in the text here, which the Riverside editors call
“Shakespeare’s error for the name of Arachne, who, according to Ovid ...
was turned into a spider by Pallas.”17 But the designation of “error” may
be a blind spot refusing to see around this fracture in the text, this visible obscurity, to find the luminousness of Shakespeare’s conflation. For
if he is half-remembering Arachne’s spiderweb in talking of Ariadne’s
thread, given to Theseus to help him out of the Cretan maze, that would
be a glimpse of how the tremor of a single image can capture the closeness
between the sinister labyrinth that traps and the clue that guides.
If Shakespeare’s own errors are acts of mingled memory opening up
a corridor of knowingness that “correct” rendering—or seeing straight—
would have left closed, his characters’ mistaking eyes seem, often, to similarly
defer the closure of a text. Sometimes this can take the opposite form to seeing “double” (Dream 4.1.190): collapsing persons and identities that should
be distinct. Even as he correctly sees Polixenes’s features in his son, Florizel,
who presents Perdita as his wife, Leontes fails to recognize his long-lost
daughter. The truancy here is deeper and darker than mere sensory failure.
When Florizel says that his father, Polixenes, would “grant precious things
as trifles” at his old friend Leontes’s bidding, Leontes immediately replies
that in that case he would “beg [his] precious mistress / Which he counts
but as a trifle.” If this is a joke, its uneasiness is sealed by Paulina’s reprimand:
“Sir, my liege, / Your eye hath too much youth in’t,” reminding Leontes of
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Hermione’s superior mature beauty even at the time of her death. Leontes
replies hastily: “I thought of her / Even as these looks I made” (The Winter’s
Tale 5.1.222–27). This moment was bound to call up, in Shakespeare’s
theatre, the incestuous passion of the father for the daughter in the
Shakespeare’s source text, Greene’s hugely popular prose romance Pandosto
(1588).18 Indeed, it anticipates that other glimpse of kink through a literary
prehistory—Ovid’s Pygmalion and his sex-doll—at the moment when
Leontes moves to kiss the supposed statue of Hermione and Paulina restrains
him, saying that the paint is still wet. Miscognition in the plot, here, acts as a
productive distortion of the intertextual lens, generating new interpretative
possibilities. The mischief written into such errant seeing could be seen to
work at the expense of the characters’ sense of self, but as aesthetic capital,
if played with suitable authenticity on stage. Somewhat similarly to Troilus
and Cressida, blind spots of knowledge at moments such as these could
enact the ironic variance between the mimetic reality of the characters’
emotional lives and their helplessly pre-scripted status in literary history. Yet,
at the same time, blind spots have a way of teetering on the verge between
almost alienated subjecthood and subjective emotional lives. For Leontes’s
encounter with the grown-up Perdita is not just a hint of incestuous attraction drifting in from the genetic past of the text, but also a deep longing for
her to be Hermione in the living moment, just as that later moment of a
near-kiss embodies a heartrending desire for the return of love. These oddly
disruptive moments of temporal telescoping are little puncta in “the optical unconscious”—to borrow Rosalind Krauss’s term—opening not only
into corridors of intertextual and psychosexual memory, but also into wellsprings of affective fantasies that are unutterable except through indirection
because they are so extreme in their improbability.19 They fray the surface of
the text to make us see both beneath, and beyond, what can be shown.
Blind spots such as these are also, potentially, a generic threshold.
The glimpse of the buried knowledge of the father–daughter story in The
Winter’s Tale is also the pivot on which genres turn: it contains in a single
event the translation of Pandosto’s suicidally tragic passion into a tragicomedy of restoration, as if allowing desire to transit from repression to
wish-fulfilment. “What you know, you know,” says Iago, in an ultimate
defiance of evidential epistemology and propelling an unbearable tragedy
to its unyielding end in Othello (5.2.303). But the words his line echoes
most closely are from Dromio of Ephesus, in the early comedy The Comedy
of Errors: “I know what I know” (3.1.11). Are cognitive blind spots—
faced or fashioned—generically Janus-faced? Or do they face us with
the contrivance of generic structures by pushing the bounds of one genre
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towards another? To reclaim a responsible relation with its living material, for example, comedy forges a language that works against the grain of
its own conventional underpinnings: witness Hermione’s anguished but
sharp question to Leontes when he first erupts with jealous fury: “What
is this? Sport?” (The Winter’s Tale 2.1.58); or Beatrice’s seemingly disproportionate and generically out-of-place demand of Benedick, in Much
Ado About Nothing, after his friend emotionally kills hers: “Kill Claudio”
(Much Ado 4.1.289). In the final moments of the Folio tragedy of Lear,
on the other hand, Lear’s blind spot and ours come together as opposed
generic affects brush against each other. With the dead Cordelia in his
arms, Lear glides from recognition—“Thou’lt come no more” (5.3.281)—
to possible misrecognition, dying on these words: “Do you see this? Look
on her, look, her lips, / Look there, look there” (5.3.284–85). The range of
ways in which directors, actors, editors, and indeed readers want to interpret, and have rendered, these lines mirrors the blind spots in our own
imagined vision of tragic ending, tragic magnitude, and tragic knowledge.
The agency of the theatre vis-à-vis textually open and indeterminate moments brings us to the blind spot of embodiment. Shakespeare’s
“open silences,” to borrow Philip Maguire’s phrase, become an operative
counterpart to what cannot be shown. 20 What cannot be heard, no less
than the invisible, directs our attention to the ways in which performance
can forestall closure. On occasions, like the errors in or of the text, these
mark portals into textual prehistories and reach for information in the
“backward and abysm of time.”21 In North’s Plutarch (1579), Shakespeare’s
source text for Coriolanus, Tacita is the Roman goddess of silence:
“[Numa] taught the Romans to reverence one of them above all the rest,
who was called Tacita, as ye would say Lady Silence.”22 As with the affective
translation of Ovid and Greene in The Winter’s Tale, so here, the narrative source is made to speak its silence on stage. On the triumphant return
of Coriolanus to Rome in Act II, his greeting to his wife Virgilia turns
the spotlight on her eloquently speechless presence: “My gracious silence,
hail!” (2.1.175). Prefiguration helps cast silence as an island of sacrosanct
intimacy and tenderness in a clamorous scene; it also makes Virgilia’s
inwardness shimmer—intimating its reality but not giving away its substance. The blind spot of the play text, in examples such as this, intimates a
model of memory and marks a type of literary interrelation between past
and present.
The other kind of non-verbal gap—the one explored by Maguire—
consists of features that determine the meanings of speechless moments
by drawing on the emotional environment around them. The mutilated
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Lavinia in Titus, speechless from Act 2 scene 4 onwards, in a different context is the most vivid presence on stage; the theatre has to decide how to
mediate, or make known, her inner state through action. But, if this is a
moment that can draw both horizontally and vertically (so to speak) from
the affective neighborhood in the play as well as from its Ovidian past,
the silent Isabella facing the duke’s uneasy speech at the end of Measure
for Measure presents a gap in the fabric of the action which can only take
shape in performance, out of the extratextual resources of the play itself:
I have seen as many interpretations as there are Isabellas on stage. The
play text, here, acts as the retinal nerve sheet, where moments of silence
are openings for actors and director to fill in, just as the eye—helped by
the brain—fills in the cavity where the optic nerve enters with information from the adjoining field. These blind spots, then, create an interface
at which choices need to be made. Barthes talks of the distance between
crude knowledge and subtle life as one that is “corrected” by literature, just
as the brain corrects the visual void of the blind spot.23 Yet the model is
less stable than “correction” when it comes to performance. Such choices
in the theatre need to negotiate the mobile boundary between knowledge
as lived experience within the fiction and what the text knows, and, in
turn, between both of these and what—and how much—the text would
have the reader or viewer know. These imbrications create an ecology of
knowledges that is never entirely predictable or fixable.
Irreducibility takes several forms. The Other is a foreign country,
as so many plays show: witness Othello or The Winter’s Tale, or, in a more
metaphysical key, Troilus. But sometimes, so is the self. The inevitable partiality of self-knowledge is a trigger for the undoing of Lear, who “hath
ever but slenderly known himself ” (1.1.292–93); this in turn makes him
blind to the difference between rhetoric and intention, between the effusive Regan or Goneril and the reticent Cordelia. But the unknowability
of the self can take stranger forms. Early on in Troilus, Cressida uses the
construct of an unknowable interior as a defence against the threatening
ability of a world of men to exhaust her, and her identity, through their
desire: “Then though my heart’s content firm love doth bear, / Nothing
of that shall from mine eyes appear” (1.2.254–55). But in a painful twist,
when she does perhaps, finally and desperately, want to make herself known
in a letter to Troilus, her intentional self is rendered unknowable as the
play stops her mouth; Troilus shreds and scatters the letter, unread, declaring, “Words, words, mere words, no matter from the heart” (5.3.108).
The inexpressible becomes hopelessly entangled with the unknowable in a
failed act of communication.
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There are cultural contexts in which such irony has particular resonance in the period’s literature. Despair at the inability to make one’s
heart legible becomes the tragedy of the actively repentant conscience
in the providentialist play A Warning or Fair Women. 24 When Anne
Sanders, who stooped to folly and sought concealment of her guilt earlier, yearns to make her inward state visible and knowable to the world,
the optative mode of her expression inscribes transparency as a fantasy:
“... were my breast transparent, / That what is figured there, might be
perceiv’d / Now should you see the very image of poore / And totter’d
ruines, and a slain conscience ...” (Warning 2654–57). In Troilus, a play
where reading—of others and of texts—is endless and endlessly relativized, the abortion of Cressida’s attempt to make and make known her
own meaning has a wider philosophical dimension. Part of the play’s
way of being true to this is to translate the author’s (real or feigned)
cognitive aversion in Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde—“Men seyn, I not,
that she yaf him hir herte” (1050)25—to the text’s own reticence, which
takes over a character’s reticence, at once denying her agency in the lived
situation and, possibly, preserving the mystery and indeterminacy of
her selfhood at the aesthetic level. Even though Cressida cannot speak
back and control or correct possible responses to her, Troilus’s epistemologically arrogant verdict mediating the unread letter to the audience is
bound to be placed in the context of this hyper-mediated play’s by-nowirreversible ironizing of mediation. She remains the blind spot in the
visual field of the dramatic action that the audience view, but the play
itself has turned this field into a treacherous repository of corrective or
supplementary information by this time. Blind spots such as these make
unknowability unmissable, just as they often represent the limits of representation—as in scenes of sex and/or murder, whether in Othello or in
Macbeth. Consider the optically framed discovery scene in Heywood’s
A Woman Killed with Kindness, where the defining sight is only evoked
by its undemonstrability, as we see the probative husband enter his
inner sanctum with a prayer to heaven to “keep [his] eyes,” to find his
wife and her lover in bed and rush out crying , “O, O.” 26 The unseen
bedchamber is foregrounded as ocular proof, while the “dark lantern”
with which he enters is an evocative object as well as a trope for making invisibility glow. The defiant obscurity of the inaudible and invisible
textual moments we address incites and lures interpretation by their very
conspicuousness. Could we, then, talk of translucency as an emergent
representational idiom in these knowing texts, locating opacity between
construction and happening?
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How, then, are we to know when not to fill in the gaps? What are the
limits of translation? Performance can forestall closure, yes; but individual
performative events—narrative or theatrical—can also push particular
meanings towards preservation. What do the cognitive witholdings of
texts and authors tell us about the event of knowledge, or of the motives
of knowing informing the hermeneutic act? The ending of Ivan Turgenev’s
narrative adaptation of Shakespeare’s Lear, “King Lear of the Steppes,”
brilliantly plays with the possibilities and mirrors our own desires back
to us, along with our disowning of them.27 But the reader’s expectation of
Turgenev’s narrative is also overlaid by recognition—rooted in a knowledge of the Lear story, its unmistakable referent—just as the Folio play
of Lear itself plays with the audience’s knowledge of the sentimental
providentialism of the old play, The True Chronicle History of King Leir
(1594). At the end of the tender, quasi-pastoral reunion scene between
Lear and Cordelia, Lear pleads with his daughter: “Pray you now, forget
and forgive” (4.6.77). This is the same Lear as the one who comes out with
the dead Cordelia’s body in his arms and declares that he has killed the
slave that was “a-hanging” her (F, 5.3.248)—a far cry from the tediously
pious Leir. In Turgenev, Harlov—the Lear character—is on top of his
own house, which he had unwisely given away to his daughters, destroying it brick by brick and about to collapse with it, when Yvlempia—a
complex “Cordelia”—tries to turn the wheel: “Forgive us. Forgive me”
(162). In a reworking of the prison scene in Lear, she tenderly urges him
to come down and live with her “as in Christ’s own bosom” and pleads
in a “caressing” voice, “forget the past. [...] Now forgive us” (163). But,
inexorably, he topples down with the house, his heavy frame crushed by
the beam of the roof. As he lies hallucinating, his eyes fix on Yvlempia and
“he [utters], barely audibly: ‘Well, daughter ... It’s you I won’t for ...’.” His
fracture is revealed by his autopsy, but the intended final words remains
a mystery. The first-person narrator, a young boy at the time, is haunted
by it: “What did he want to say to her as he died? I asked myself the
whole way back home on my horse: ‘It’s you I won’t for-get ...’ or ‘It’s you
I won’t for-give ...’? [...] I decided in the end that he’d wanted to forgive”
(266–67). In this wishful rewriting, what stares back at us is the epistemological spuriousness of the closure we want, as well as a human need
for it that is both experiential and aesthetic. The strand of primal vengefulness that is sporadically visible in Shakespeare’s Lear forms the texture
of the weave in Turgenev’s conception of Harlov; the familiar, canonized,
and more readily acknowledged dimensions of love, reunion, and forgiveness in the father–daughter plot of King Lear are evoked to be relocated,
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with wistful gentleness, in fantasy. But while the knowledge we choose (or
“decide” on) is fictive, the knowledge the narrative holds back, like Harlov’s
feelings—and perhaps unlike Iago’s constructed interior—is “the signature
of its plenitude.” Like Barthes’s “classic text,” it remains pensive: “replete
with meaning ... it still seems to keep in reserve one last meaning, which it
does not express, but whose place it keeps free and signifying. [...] Just as
the pensiveness of a face signals that this head is full of language held back
... like the visage, the text becomes expressive ... blessed with interiority.”28
And we, on our blind-spotting tour, are left musing on the relation between
the inexpressible and the unexpressed.

Blind-Spot-Spotting: An Adventure
Blind spots in Shakespeare, as we have seen, not only straddle mimesis
and poiesis, but bring them into dialogue. Focusing on a range of different moments, and levels, of apparent obscurity, this book puts methods,
motives, and the ends of knowing in the spotlight—rather than simply
the condition of knowledge—and shows how this provocation emerges
organically from the matrix of Shakespeare’s works. It is alert both to
inscribed acts of blind-sighting within the texts and to the text or action
blind-sighting the reader or spectator—and what insights such blindness
might offer. Obscurity has a hallowed genealogy in literary traditions, both
creative and critical. Narratives hold on to their secrets, luring interpreters to navigate the precarious waters between what Frank Kermode calls
the “the latent” and “the manifest” in his provocative essay on hermeneutics: his “interpretation of interpretation.”29 This is a zone that our volume
seeks to probe, even if charting it might be a contradiction in terms. The
aim is not so much to resolve, or dissolve, the mystery—though unveiling
may sometimes be a by-product—as to grasp the process by which literary
works invite and induce unsuspected ways of perceiving that go beyond
mere seeing. To an extent, this is about finding ways of accessing inaccessibility as a productive textual artifact that trains us to be receptive to more
than the primary sense, and opens us up to knowledges that lurk beneath
the verisimilar surface, resisting reducibility.
Philip Weinstein, in Unknowing: The Work of Modernist Fiction, offers
a brilliant explication of modernism as a reaction against, and undoing of,
the epistemic project of realism in post-Enlightenment fiction.30 Focusing
on Proust, Kafka, and Faulkner as his indicative examples, Weinstein shows
these artists embracing unknowing as a route into a different kind of knowing from the one premised on realist narrative’s denials: its denial of its own
emplotments, its disowning of its own manipulation of the unknowable,
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and its fabrication of the fantasy of a fit between the knowing subject and
the knowable object, whether the latter is the self or the other or the world.
Modernist fiction’s refusal of such fantasies, Weinstein argues, “releases
narrative from the failed project of knowing”; its engagements must be understood not as knowing but as acknowledgment, eschewing epistemological
control and commodification (p. 5). Weinstein identifies this liberation as
a response to realism inspired by two centuries of Enlightenment and its
project of knowing, though he gestures back towards Bacon’s observational
procedures and Descartes’s formulation of the knowing subject as he glances
en passant at the prehistories of the Enlightenment narrative (p. 3). Yet
Bacon, the oft-cited progenitor of the long Enlightenment, understood the
limits of knowing: in the context of the knowledge of God, or of excellence,
he can only speak of “no knowledge, but wonder, which is nothing else but
contemplation broken off, or losing itself.”31
Many of the textual moves Weinstein locates in modernist prose fiction are noticeable in the early modern period, perhaps most notably in
Shakespeare. As Stephen Orgel brilliantly intuited, there is “a poetics of
incomprehensibility” written into Shakespeare’s drama which we owe it
to the works not to reduce “to our own brand of common sense.”32 Yet, in
the almost three decades since then, criticism has still mostly focused on
trying to make sense of Shakespeare and his contemporaries, rather than
feeling its way through their non-sense. This book attempts to rectify that
blind spot of criticism. What settled hermeneutic positions might such
recalcitrance be reacting to? Or are such resistances more embedded in
early modern approaches to knowledge, but elude existing paradigms? The
formal translations here are distinct, but the probing of unknowing, intimations, obstructed knowledge, or indirection, as conditions of a reoriented
and recalibrated attention, is an integral part of Shakespeare’s dramatic technique and his vision of how we represent and relate to the world around us.
Theseus, the rationalist, mocks “apprehension” and champions “cool reason’s
comprehension.” But, as Hippolyta intuits, the shared perceptual errors—
pertinently, the result of a “hateful imperfection of [the] eye”—that might
seem to do anything but bring clear knowledge, “grows to something of great
constancy / But, howsoever, strange and admirable” (4.1.63; 5.1.26–27).
The double adversative—“but, howsoever”—captures precisely the paradox of distorted vision as a productive artifact. When Posthumus asks, at a
critical moment in the final scene of Cymbeline, “How come these staggers
upon me?” (5.2.233; my italics), the sense is one of cognitive tottering and
bewilderment, given the context of multiple revelations of misrecognitions—
which Belarius names “error” (5.5.260)—and “recognitions” dizzyingly
piled on one another; from this excess of “matter” (5.5.243), a distilled
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knowledge is gleaned when Posthumus and Imogen embrace in reunion and
reify and embody the tree image encoded in the riddle on the tablet Posthumus
discovered on his bosom on waking from his dream of Jupiter: “Hang there
like fruit, my soul, / Till the tree die” (5.5.263–24). As the soothsayer proceeds, shortly after this moment, to offer his “construction” of the tablet
(5.5.434–45), his explication feels redundant, for its truth—at least for the
audience—has already been absorbed visibly into felt experience. Posthumus’s
distinction between “collection” and “construction” at this point (432, 433) is
significant, as they gesture towards two modes of knowing, in a play that keeps
positing the affective language of the theatre audaciously against interpretation and explication, as a less definable but more vivid and capacious cognitive
alternative. It is a mode of knowing that works through staggers, a feeling of
déjà vu, or a sense of disorientation, through barely grasped but nonetheless felt
traces: a dreamlike haunting which is, notwithstanding, “like” “the action of
[one’s] life” (5.4.149). In a different key, what are the implications of the games
of knowledge that Edgar plays with his blind father, or (in a comic context)
Lancelot Gobbo with his, and Malcolm with Macduff, setting up false trials of
their own? These perplexities in the plot do not fit established epistemic narratives; we do not quite know how to make sense of them. When Polonius talked
about how we, in our reach for wisdom, “with windlasses and assays of bias /
By indirections find directions out,” his immediate context is strategic—
imagined as “a bait of falsehood that takes the carp of truth” (2.1.62–63; 60).
This pompous old man’s own pleonastic circuitousness as he expounds on the
acuity of round-about routes to knowing raises a smile. But the image has a
wider resonance for Shakespeare’s own textual strategies, as he characteristically subjects them to gentle mockery. A windlass is a winch—usually in a
ship—which hauls an object or a weight up through cranking, but it is the
context suggested by the OED which is perhaps more relevant here—its original reference to a maneuver of interruption in a game of hunting. “Assays of
bias” are circular moves, curving rather than direct, by which, in a game of
bowls, the player brings the ball round through bias rather than trying to aim
directly at the Jack.
The essays in this volume are all, in one sense or another, blindspot-spotters. They make us look hard at the things that go bump in the text
or in systems of knowledge: small things that do not fit, are not what they
seem, which throw us, but lead us to worlds elsewhere—to what Bottom
calls “deep things”—if we know how to outstare them. Such are the seemingly nonsensical linguistic knots in Twelfth Night that Adam Zucker
points us to: once we are jolted to look differently, they bristle with sense.
The “baffles” of this play are apparently obstructive mechanical levers,
like Polonius’s “assays,” making us gaze intensely where our eyes would
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normally glaze over. Like the device that acts as a “problem-solving [barrier]”
in the making of rockets, these inscribed linguistic obscurities are shown by
Adam to be an inset figure and analogue for the hermeneutic challenges produced by the distance of time and cultural context in our encounters with
the play(s); they push us to forge new reading strategies in response to the
unsettling of assumed knowledges and temporal alienation.
Gil Harris’s essay links up with Adam’s in zooming in on things
that seem foreign, literally and epistemologically, and then making wonder seem familiar by showing how they act as a contact zone between
worlds divided by time and space. His focus is Shakespeare’s “nuts,” and
his hinterland the blind spots in Shakespeare’s own understanding of these
threshold spaces. In the process, he provocatively gestures at new, twentyfirst-century approaches to Shakespeare, informed by critical positions
that accommodate global and multicultural translations. Located in the
“edible contact zone,” the nutty protagonist of Gil’s narrative identifies
somatic agency as the blind spot of ethnography and cultural criticism.
Cutting right to the heart of the physiological metaphor, Supriya
Chaudhuri’s essay offers a perfect example of how blind spots in the text
induce a diversion of normal routes of seeing. Through a phenomenologically layered argument, she demonstrates how Othello’s inferential and
understood knowledge, derived through mis-seeing what is not there to be
seen, is taken by him to be “ocular proof.” The optical process of supplementation from off-scene (or obscene) information is, here, shown to find a
catastrophic analogue in a character’s incapacity to see what makes him see.33
This may prompt the further question of the relative agencies and motives of
such circumstantial information-gathering, for, in this analogy, the manipulative Iago is the operative counterpart of the brain’s act of automatic visual
compensation, with no human choice involved. What does the crafty epistemic agent in a play do to what Supriya illuminates as the impotency of the
audience as knowing subjects? At the heart of her discussion is the overvaluation of a single material sign that the play empties out through its own art of
losing—that site of blindness where the forensic process is fated to flounder,
but which the theatre can see and show by turning signs into phantasms.34
Through a glance at Jonson’s Volpone, she leaves us reflecting on comic undervaluation of such objects as a response to tragic overinvestment.
But the essays are not only united by their interest in the productive
paradox of obfuscated or hindered knowledge. They are also engaged with
the epistemic and hermeneutic purchase of unknowability. Aveek Sen’s essay
brings together two kinds of blind spot: the willed obscurity of disowned
knowledges and the indeterminate openness of performative embodiment.
It is the former that his reading of Othello through the lens of Henry James
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sets out to minutely trace, provocatively suggesting that Shakespeare must
have known his James.35 But, in the process, it ponders the implications of
form in speculating about Emilia as a “probable and possible woman incarnated in the theatre,” pointing us to the “Emilia-shaped hole” in the texture
of the “small beer” scene. This gives us a way of seeing many similar blind
spots in the play: for instance, in the Desdemona-shaped hole in Emilia’s
Folio-unique speech on men at the end of the “willow scene” (4.3.86–103).
Imogen Stubbs’s Desdemona hugged and bonded with Zoe Wanamaker’s
Emilia through this speech in Trevor Nunn’s 1989 production; in Janet
Suzman’s landmark 1987 production, Joanna Weinberg as Desdemona
lightly, almost absently, touched Dorothy Goulde/Emilia’s cheek and went
off alone in her own direction; other Desdemonas have filled the gap by
widening it, inscribing a failure of solidarity and solace. Theatrical interpretation can play with such indeterminacies and inflect the genre of a
play. But the play itself can play a game of knowledges against performative
intent, defying it with a live, intractable core. Like Cressida who remains
the unknown quantity in her play, the residue of the unknowable is shown,
ironically, to preserve Emilia’s tragic potential in the midst of her generic
degradation through handkerchiefs and whispers—not so much what she
un-knew as what we can never know about what she “thought ... then.”
A generic theme runs through several of our essays, whether explicitly
or subliminally, and suggests further connections. A single play—Othello—
undergoes a journey through genres, from Cinthio’s comic novella through
Shakespeare’s wrenchingly painful play to Volpone’s comedic slamming of
the drama of knowledge, across Supriya and Aveek’s essays; by the time it
reaches Henry James in Aveek’s study, its genre is too post-lapsarian to fit
into a known typology, whether narrative or dramatic. Stephen Spiess discusses Shakespearean “comic” violence as a site of misrecognition—both in
the sense that it is a response to epistemic instability and insecurity, and in
its propensity to beget misreadings. Reading The Comedy of Errors against
the grain of established critical hermeneutics leads to a (mis)reading of such
errors which at once reveals their implicit investments and unlocks knowledges that they veil. Putting pressure on violence as a marker at once of
obfuscation and authenticity across the divide between subjection and subjecthood, this essay invites us to revisit the generic implications of Adam’s,
where linguistic “blind spots” produce hilarious but intimate asymmetries
that test the limits of comedy. It also enters into implicit dialogue with
Supriya’s by positing a reading strategy that turns the phantasmic underfreighting of frivolous violence into a legible but embodied sign. In showing
how error and errancy come together in the play’s beatings and blows, it
asks whether comedy itself has become a potential blind spot of criticism,
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generating a resolute, homogenizing unreading that obscures the distinct
ethical and emotional knowledges offered by the very “meaninglessness” of
humorous aggression in the plural ecologies of early modern theatres and
streets. Tanya Pollard, meanwhile, highlights the generic stakes of knowledge and its gaps, showing how the mis-cognition and mis-re-cognition of
kin and kind, gene and genre, in The Winter’s Tale bring the blind spots
of life and literature into dialogue, and further face us with the implications of the blind spots of generic reception. After all, as Zachary Lesser
points out in his response, “mongrel tragicomedy”—like collaborative
writing—slipped through the hole in John Heminges and Henry Condell’s
retinal map of Shakespeare’s plays: Shakespeare’s Comedies, Histories and
Tragedies.36 As Tanya provocatively suggests, “bastards baffle recognition”
when it comes to literary kind, standing in for unacknowledgable genetic
mixtures—like Adam’s baffles, they are noncompliant elements in a generic
field that induce radical affective cognition by obstructing received modes
of knowing. The blind-spotting of genre inevitably questions the cultural work of reception, whether in the theatre or in criticism and textual
scholarship. It also brings up evolving questions about what the cognitive
mechanism of data tools can tell us about generic textures and our assumptions about genre, as text analysis of Shakespeare through Docuscope at
Carnegie Mellon has done.37
Blind spots in works of art have a way of bringing into play a variety of
critical approaches, as our essays show us: the conception of this book partly
intuits that. But one would not necessarily have guessed what methodology
may have to do with the work we want art to do for us, and how we deal with
and wield both available and inaccessible knowledges in our individual and
communal lives; let alone when we put the human need to know in the hands
of a machine. Michael Witmore and Jonathan Hope’s dialogue on machine
learning and Shakespeare is a revealing point of departure as we test methods of
interrogating literary texts, what they tell us and what they withhold, and what
their blind spots tell us about ours. When we put our humanistic questions
about, say, attribution, to a neural network—that is, an algorithm trained to
home in on patterns—we are entrusting the process of recognition to a system
which delivers accuracy but defies explanation or representation. Machines,
after all, pick up syntagmatic structures easily, but have little yield on language
that has paradigmatic flexibility or polysemic density. For Mike, the refusal of
that transparency is the black box that hides the antecedents of the results in
our encounter with its meaning-making. But, in the very process, it becomes,
for him, a mimetic mirror for a particular epistemic desire and its operative
conditions—our desire to apprehend the invisible blind spot “where a literary and linguistic self hides.” But Jonathan turns this very inscrutability into
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an invitation to reexamine the blind spots that are embedded in Shakespearean
(or poetic) language itself; for him, this impasse does not invalidate but redirects the human reader. His provocation is to posit mechanical mistranslation
as the productive blind spot which enables us to see deep patterns of language
functioning and the quantitative basis of what we, as literary scholars, are
trained to think of as the qualitative essence or distinction of an author or style:
polysemy, for instance. Using Google Translate’s machine learning algorithm as
an example, Jonathan argues that while the model itself defies direct visualization, it almost literally diverts our eye to the neighborhood of a word, selected
according to its vector or string of properties: like the surrounding information
to which the brain directs the eye to fill in the lacuna of the punctum caecum.
This makes me recall a little experiment that Mike did for me with a vector
space model, mapping early modern words of investigation and inquiry along
an axis associated with gender. To my surprise, “discover” seemed to co-occur
with words aligned with femininity. On looking harder, we saw that it was in
fact the passive form, “discovered,” that was feminine, and looking in the lexical neighborhood revealed that “discoveries” was in fact comfortably clustered
in the extreme “male” corner with “discerning,” “experimental,” and “demonstration.” In the light of Mike’s digital experiment, then, I can understand
Jonathan’s point about the detection of directionalities: “assays of bias” push us
to the thresholds of the linguistic system and show us a kind of cultural calibration occurring around charged terms.
And so a dialogue becomes a conversation, one which Zack joins in,
crossing over from a different conversation. For he asks what human mistranslations of some of the most oft-quoted lines from Shakespeare tell us
about the blind spots of quotation itself as an act of cultural remembrance.
Zack combines statistical analysis and human interpretation to put pressure on the persistent but identical misquotation of a line from Hamlet’s
soliloquy, by editors, scholars, actors, and random users of the Yahoo
Answers website. His findings redirect our attention to a discernible desire
for Shakespeare to sound “Shakespearean”: that idea of authorial distinction that Mike and Jonathan explore in the context of the mistranslation of
machines in attribution studies. It is significant that Zack, like them, alights
on “To be or not to be”—perhaps the most “Shakespearean” soliloquy in
the cultural imaginary. “Conscience doth make cowards of us all”—through
the tiny replacement of “does” with “doth,” along with the capitalization of
“c” in “Conscience” and the excision of “Thus” to begin with this word—
faces us with a collective, unconscious, and historically ongoing but evolving
longing for Shakespeare to be marked by elevation, archaism, formality,
piety, and proverbial wisdom—suitable for commonplacing. A common
misquotation of Gertrude is shown to be driven by similar investments, but
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miscorrection (or overcorrection) becomes in turn the further blind spot
of reception and memory, whether in critical or editorial practice or in the
history of reading or spectating—making us rethink the relation between
error and misremembering. In the spirit of this volume, a personal anecdote
may not be out of place. My Italian friends Nubar and Pallina were travelling
in Scotland when they met a couple of Scotsmen with whom they got talking about political theory. These new acquaintances kept asking them eager
questions about “Gromsky’s” influence on them. Initially befuddled, Nubar
eventually saw beyond what had seemed a mere mistake. These idealistic and
somewhat awe-struck leftist young men clearly wanted Gramsci (whom they
had distantly heard of ) to be a Trotsky (whom they “knew”); the mishearing/misremembering/mistranslating came out of an inarticulate fantasy of
a unified—and therefore easily grasped—Great Marxist Tradition, revolutionary and seamless through times and cultures.38 How would Stephen and
Adam extend their thoughts on mistaking, after such knowledge?
Such questions arising, and leaving a space for yet unspoken answers,
brings me to the shape of this book.

“The forms of things unknown”39
Tracing the unknowable back into modes of knowing so far unexplored
or merely intuited, then, is the main conceptual aim of this book—pitching into a critical terrain which has seen stirrings of interest in alternative
epistemes.40 But it is not its only aim. We also have a methodological and
pedagogic mission, which makes the volume structurally and intellectually
innovative. While the essays are thematically connected, the volume is structured as an internal dialogue. Each essay is followed by either one substantial response from another contributor or two shorter responses from two
contributors. The impulse behind such a novel format is an urge to capture a
vital part of intellectual life within present-day academia. So many conversations we have at seminars and conferences, or indeed more informally over
coffee, simply dissolve and scatter. This is an attempt to find a home within
academic publishing for such dialogical thinking and “talking.” Some of the
essays in this volume come out of a seminar which made us feel the urgency
to channel such conversations into a less evanescent form, without losing
the openness of address and response.41 Through its unusual and experimental format, this book seeks to stake out a place, and find a voice, for
a particular kind of dialogic and processive intellectual energy, rather than
letting it dissipate; to encourage cross-fertilization while thoughts are fresh
and explorative; and to translate a sense of intellectual “community” into
print. It is also designed to write fun and play back into scholarship. Finally,
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it aims to catch the alertness induced and kept alive by interruption and
questioning—a synecdochic exercise in dwelling in a state of critical vulnerability, anticipation, and readiness. In that spirit, it is structured to invite
stoppages and deviations. Although it is woven out of a shared process of
thinking and cross-thinking, it is happy to be a “broken woof.”
The only book in the field of Shakespeare studies—and, to the best
of my knowledge, early modern criticism—that has attempted to break the
mould in a comparable, though distinct, way is Anthony Dawson and Paul
Yachnin’s The Culture of Playgoing in Shakespeare’s England. Shaped provocatively as a “collaborative debate,” they foreground “creative disagreement” as
a way of reading that does justice to the heterogeneity of the Shakespearean
theatre.42 Our book shares their anti-totalizing impulse and their sense of cothinking as a dynamic process; but our conversation is more heteroglossic,
and we allow the responses to flow naturally into various forms: demurrals,
questioning, expansion, diversion, and extraction. The result is not so much
unification as an opening up through crossovers. The dialogic form seems not
just pedagogically relevant but methodologically inevitable: textual blindspotting, no less than blind spots, operates in that Barthesian interspace where
the subtle mess of life constantly challenges the “purported clarities” of organized knowledge.43 The centrality of encounter in the textual experience of
conspicuous obscurities could not but be built into the structure of a book
about blind spots. The constraint of space means that we cannot bring the
dialogue round full circle, except perhaps in one inset dialogue (that between
Mike and Jonathan, who respond to each other as their topics are specifically
interrelated and integral to their ongoing collaborative work). But, in juxtaposing each “speaking out” with a response (or two), we want at least to give
form to a mode of critical activity, and to present the initiation of an ongoing
to and fro of ideas that shapes some of our liveliest critical thoughts. In the
spirit of unfinished exchange, we have deliberately retained a certain informality of presentation. The aim is not only to suggest a new, collaborative model
of scholarly conversation and revive the lamentably lost ancient traditions of
dialogic pedagogy, but also to encourage younger scholars (and indeed more
advanced scholars at a formative and evolving stage of their ideas) to articulate
thoughts in progress, in conversation with their peers, and not wait till they
feel knowledge has been controlled and chiselled into hermetic, sealed-off
articles which are too distant from process for others to easily or actively enter.
In tune with how the play texts discussed “know,” the form of the volume
tries to be mimetic of an apprehension that preserves the distinction between
encounter and knowledge, acknowledgment and mastery.
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NOTES
1
I am grateful to Tania Demetriou for her incisive comments on the first
draft of this essay. Thanks also to George Oppitz-Trotman for reading and commenting on the final draft.
2
Shakespeare, King Lear: A Parallel Text Edition, ed. Weis. All references to
the play are to this edition.
3
Aristotle, Metaphysics. Α, 980a. Cp. Plato, Republic, VII, 532a.
4
Berger, Ways of Seeing, 7.
5
Berger, Ways of Seeing, 8.
6
Hakewill, The Vanitie of the Eye. See Supriya Chaudhuri's essay in this
volume for an illuminating discussion of the complexities of the visual culture
of this period, via Hakewill, Clark and Merleau-Ponty. On the precariousness
of the visual hegemony in early modern Europe, and the visual crisis that was
its other side, see Clark, Vanities of the Eye. For a fresh study on the optics
and poetics of early modern England, see Partner, Poetry and Vision in Early
Modern England. On the relation between poetic ingenuity and visual anomaly and anamorphism in the seventeenth century, see Gilman, The Curious
Perspective.
7
A Midsummer Night’s Dream, 4.1.189. All references to Shakespeare’s plays
and poems are to the Riverside Shakespeare unless otherwise specified.
8
On the relative transparency and piety of Gertred in Q1, and the relative inscrutability of Folio and Q2’s Gertrude, see Kehler, “The First Quarto of
Hamlet: Reforming Widow Gertred.”
9
Berger, Ways of Seeing, 8.
10
I use the term “cognitive” in a less specialized sense than its technical connotation in cognitive science. But cognitive criticism is a potentially fertile area
for the study of blind spots in literary thinking, practice, and criticism. There has
been much recent, innovative work on cognition and early modern literature. For
the cognitive turn in Shakespeare studies specifically, see Mary Thomas Crane,
Shakespeare’s Brain, to which most subsequent work is indebted. For more recent
studies, see, for instance, Raphael Lyne, Shakespeare, Rhetoric and Cognition;
N. Parvini, Shakespeare and Cognition; and Laurie Johnson et al., Embodied
Cognition and Shakespeare’s Theatre.
11
“The Fly,” in Lucian, The Works of Lucian, 82–83; Spenser, The Shorter
Poems, 289–304; Donne, The Major Works, 89. Thanks to Tania Demetriou for
introducing me to the Lucian poem in private conversation.
12
Julius Caesar, 4.3.140–93. On stage direction and speech headings in this
scene, see Daniell, ed., Julius Caesar, 289, n. 155.1, and “Introduction,” 137–43,
esp. 137. See also Stirling, “Julius Caesar in Revision.”
13
For a provocative and sensitive, if somewhat schematic, thesis of the static
and dynamic models of Stoicism, see A.D. Nuttall, “The Stoic in Love,” in Nuttall,
The Stoic in Love, 56–67.
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Nuttall, A New Mimesis, 111–13 (112). See also Nuttall, Shakespeare the
Thinker, 184–85, where he reads the double announcement more explicitly as a
critique of Stoicism: “As Brutus is redeemed, Stoicism is damned” (185). For a
congruent position, see the introduction to the Arden Shakespeare edition of the
play, ed. Daniell, 139–47.
15
For an extended discussion of the difficulties of proving marital intention, and of sex itself transiting from a deed to an over-freighted sign in All’s Well
and in Shakespeare’s England, see Mukherji, “‘Lawfull deede.’” For a discussion
of the evidentiary overvaluation and generic negotiation of sensible tokens, see
Mukherji, “Of Rings, and Things, and Fine Array.”
16
See Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 8.3.61; see also Eden, Poetic and Legal
Fiction in the Aristotelian Tradition, esp. 69–75, 86–89, 92–94.
17
The Riverside Shakespeare, 520.
18
See Aveek Sen’s reponse to Tanya Pollard’s essay in this volume, unerringly
tapping into this hinterland of unspeakable loves and half-remembered texts.
19
Krauss, The Optical Unconscious.
20
McGuire, Speechless Dialect.
21
This is Prospero’s phrase in The Tempest, 1.2.50. On Shakespeare’s translation of silence from his sources, see Demetriou, “Out of Silence Yet I Picked a
Welcome”; her argument is admiringly discussed by Tony Nuttall in his discussion of Henry VI and Richard II in Nuttall, Shakespeare the Thinker, 30–31 and
136–37.
22
North, Plutarch’s Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, vol. 1, 176.
23
Barthes, Leçon, 18: “La science est grossière, la vie est subtile, et c’est pour
corriger cette distance que la littérature nous importe.” Trans. by Richard Howard
in Barthes, A Barthes Reader, 457–78 (463).
24
Anon., A Warning for Fair Women.
25
Chaucer, Troilus and Criseyde, V. 1050.
26
Heywood, A Woman Killed with Kindness, scene xiii, line 41.
27
Turgenev, First Love and Other Stories, 203–73.
28
Barthes, “Le texte pensif,” S/Z, 204–5 (my translation).
29
Kermode, The Genesis of Secrecy, esp. chapter 1, “Carnal and Spiritual
Senses,” 1–21 (2).
30
Weinstein, Unknowing.
31
Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon, vol. 3, 266–67
32
Orgel, “The Poetics of Incomprehensibility,” 437.
33
See Hutson, “Law, Probability and Character in Shakespeare,” for suggestive points of contact with this argument. See also her Circumstantial Shakespeare.
34
For a reading of the increasing evanescence of material objects in
Shakespeare and Jonson, with provocative points of contact with this essay, see
Dawson and Yachnin, The Culture of Playgoing in Shakespeare’s England, esp.
chapter 6, “Props, Pleasure and Idolatry,” 131–58.
14
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For a congruent reading of resisted knowledges in Shakespeare’s and James’s
heroines, albeit in a non-optical framework, see Mukherji, “False Trials and the
Impulse to Try in Shakespeare and his Contemporaries,” 53–54.
36
Shakespeare, The Works of William Shakespeare. “Mongrel tragicomedy” is
Sidney’s term: Sidney, Sidney’s “The Defence of Poesy,” 46.
37
See also Witmore and Hope, “Shakespeare by the Numbers.”
38
I happily acknowledge a delightful conversation with Georgio (Nubar)
Gianighian and Pallina Pavanini about this in Venice, September 17, 2017.
39
Dream, 5.1.15.
40
Early modern “knowledge studies” have become increasingly visible in
the last decade in the literary critical domain, going back to field-creating books
such as Mary Poovey’s A History of the Modern Fact and Mary Baine Campbell’s
Wonder and Science. The time may have come for the much-needed turn from the
topics of knowledge to themes of ignorance, stupidity, befuddlement, and forms
of knowledge refusal. For early indications, see, for example, Adam Zucker’s
“Twelfth Night and the Philology of Nonsense,” Carla Mazzio’s The Inarticulate
Renaissance, or Katherine Eggert’s Disknowledge.
41
“The Blind Spots of Knowledge in Shakespeare and His World,” convened
by Subha Mukherji, at the Shakespeare Association of America’s Annual Meeting
at St. Louis in 2014.
42
Dawson and Yachnin, The Culture of Playgoing, 1.
43
Barthes, Leçon, 18.
35
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Chapter 1

Baffling Terms1
Adam Zucker

It’s Not Rocket Science

T

HOSE OF US WHO study art and aesthetic elements of culture
more generally are used to dealing with a bit of ambiguity. It comes
with the territory. In some instances, and for some critics, it defines the territory. The unknown—or, more precisely, the likely unknowable—draws
our attention to imagined landscapes or unreal visions of life and nature
that we find in narrative and performance, form and phrase. Much of our
work as scholars and teachers occupies this space of the likely unknowable;
our rhetorical performances trace its outlines and fill it in; and our failures
or successes (pedagogical, political, intellectual, and otherwise) can sometimes seem to depend on its preservation from one generation of scholars
to the next.
Other fields of inquiry are, of course, more reliant on the language of
mathematical exactness and the kinds of empirical identification it allows.
Take rocket science, a discipline that is, along with “brain surgery,” a colloquial epitome of complex, specialized knowledge. Formulae and precision
would seem to make the entire endeavor possible in the first place. Thrust,
force, torque, the pull of the Earth upon us all: these are subject to numerical representation and, thus, to the calculating minds of mythical geniuses
scribbling on chalkboards and modeling engine performance.
Or, at least, that is how I imagined it, before the Internet showed
me otherwise. 2 Recently, actual rocket scientists were attempting to
reverse engineer an actual rocket engine developed in the 1960s for
NASA’s Saturn program. Saturn engines were individually built (there
is no rocket-engine assembly line), and each had individual quirks that
needed to be ironed out before it could be used to push human beings
to the Moon. One of these quirks, discovered through trial and much
error, had to do with the way fuel and oxidizing chemicals rotated as they
burned in the engine’s combustion chamber, causing vibrations that, in
turn, caused unwanted explosions. In the 1960s, engineers ginned up “a
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set of stubby barriers” in the combustion chamber of each engine to solve
this problem. At the time, nobody knew the optimal arrangement of these
barriers. They worked, but as to the mathematically precise details of why,
rocket scientists were in the dark.
Why am I bothering to write about this? My rocket-scientist readers have likely already guessed the answer. The mysteriously effective
problem-solving barrier was called a “baffle.”
In this context, then, a baffle is both an engineering enigma and
a cohesive force for propulsion and lift. It is a materialization of limited
ignorance located right in the burning heart of the moon landing, rocketry’s signal achievement. I would like to keep this combination of mystery
and effect in mind as I turn to Twelfth Night, a play that, like rocket science, makes a space for unquantifiable causes, confusing encounters with
objective experience, and, in the end, purposefully limited kinds of knowledge. Twelfth Night is not rocket science. But it does, like the Saturn
program, depend seriously on baffling elements that work in ways that are
often difficult to ascertain.

“Do, or not do?”
Engines were not being baffled in Shakespeare’s day, but people were, and
the term comes up twice in Malvolian contexts in Twelfth Night. Most
importantly, it occupies the place of honor at the center of Olivia’s assessment of all that has been done to her steward. In the play’s final scene, after
Malvolio presents his list of grievances and Fabian admits to the outlines
of the plot against him, Olivia offers a sliver of sympathy: “Alas, poor fool,
how have they baffled thee!” (5.1.363).3 Modern audiences and readers
are likely to agree. Malvolio has been entirely overmastered by Maria and
her co-plotters: confused, misdirected, and, more directly, cut out of the
shared circuit of common knowledge that defines wit and its attendant
social dominance in Shakespearean comedy. Olivia, from the audience’s
perspective, is right: Malvolio has been baffled.
One of the great pleasures of Twelfth Night, in this situation at
least, is that we, the audience, have not been baffled: we are in on the baffling processes here. The play shares in the tendency of most Elizabethan
comedy to reveal its own mechanisms of intrigue in explicit detail as they
occur. Not only are audiences in league with Toby and Maria when it
comes to the manipulation of Malvolio, we are also clear from the outset
of the action that Cesario is Viola; we quickly learn that Sebastian is alive
and slowly making his way through Illyria; we see that Olivia has fallen
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for the wrong twin; and, along with all this, we know that somewhere out
there is a recognition scene waiting to happen. And, although the rise of
tragicomic plotting with its unexpected revelations would eventually bring
what we now call “surprise endings” into Shakespeare’s narrative architecture and Jacobean drama more generally, Twelfth Night is not really that
kind of play. The sense of befuddled wonder at the events of the final scene
belongs mainly to the play’s characters. We already know who’s who and
what’s what. We do not, at first glance, share in Malvolio’s baffled state.
But, if the narrative course of Twelfth Night is somewhat less than
baffling to an audience watching it all happen, the language of the play is
another story altogether, especially for modern readers and viewers. The
rapid, punning jests that color so much of the dialogue in Twelfth Night
are very difficult to understand, let alone laugh at, in performance or on
the page. As Elizabeth Freund has suggested, the play uses Sir Andrew
Aguecheek to model a version of this linguistic confusion.4 He can be seen
as a sympathetic figure for a modern audience’s potentially uncomfortable
experience of the play, and his verbal incompetence often mirrors our own,
whatever our level of expertise. One of Aguecheek’s more obvious errors is
particularly significant for my interests here. During our introduction to
him in his first scene with Toby and Maria, he asks what may be the play’s
most embarrassing question:
Aguecheek: I’ll ride home tomorrow, Sir Toby.
Toby:
Pourquoi?
Andrew:
What is pourquoi? Do or not do? (1.3.86–89)

It is easy enough to laugh at this moment, especially if you have the good
fortune to understand more French than Aguecheek does (I do, but
only barely). This is a language joke that does a fine job of yoking audience members into the community of knowledgeable jesters organized by
Toby and Maria; it is a simple sign of Aguecheek’s ignorance which, like
Malvolio’s harsh prudishness, guarantees a kind of social separation of alliances, and puts most audience members on the privileged side of the play’s
divide. We know what pourquoi means! We like cakes and ale!
But Aguecheek’s confusion with foreign languages is actually a significant directional signpost for Twelfth Night and the history of its editorial
reception in particular. The play’s idiot, as it turns out, is not alone in his
difficulty with romance languages. Just moments before Aguecheek fails
his French exam, Toby tests us all with an exclamation to Maria that directs
her attention to Aguecheek’s immanent entrance on stage: “What, wench,
Castiliano vulgo, for here comes Sir Andrew Agueface” (1.3.41–42). 5
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Relatively speaking, there are few editorial problems in Twelfth Night,
but Toby’s outburst is one of them. Nobody, and I mean nobody, has ever
been able to figure out precisely what “Castiliano vulgo” means, or even,
for that matter, what language Toby is speaking when he says it. Assuming
that it is a Latin–Spanish–Italian hybrid, the phrase translates to something like “A Castilian, commonly put,” which is odd enough as it is; in
its context (i.e., as an exclamation that either hails Sir Andrew or begins
to turn Maria’s attention to his approach), it is entirely nonsensical. That
is not to say that Shakespearean explicators have not done their best
to explicate the phrase. Furness’s New Variorum rehearses, with typical
bemusement, the failures of nearly two centuries of guesswork: Hanmer
(1743–44) and Warburton (1747) emend “vulgo” to “volto,” to turn
the phrase into the imperative: “Put on your Castilian face!” Although
this idea presented later editors with a site for interpretation (What is a
Castilian face? Is it serious? Brave? Do other playwrights refer to Spanish
faces in some way?), there is no evidence that “Castiliano volto” was a
functional idiom in England in any case (as Furness drily points out). 6
Halliwell (1856) suggests that “Castiliano vulgo” is the correct reading
(he thinks Toby might be telling Maria to speak “in common Spanish,
that is, in familiar language”), and editors have more or less followed suit
since. Keir Elam, in the most recent Arden, admits to the ambiguity, putting forth Mahood’s theory that the phrase means “Speak of the Devil,”7
only to reject it for his own guess that the phrase refers to a variant for the
word “castellan” (“castillian”), or castle-dweller, and, thus, to an expression used to greet fellow drinking companions.8
In some very simple, ordinary sense, the exact translation of these
words is entirely irrelevant for the action of Twelfth Night, especially in
performance.9 They serve their point simply in their explosive, meaningful
noise: Sir Toby has a soft spot for romance languages (his probing “pourquoi” confirms it), and he uses them in particular around Aguecheek to
draw lines between the two of them, indicating, first, his own sophistication and, second, Aguecheek’s lack thereof. It is more than possible to
figure out what “Castiliano vulgo” is doing in the play without the guide
of a gloss or a teacher: its basic effect (along with a few other instances I
will discuss below) is to let audiences know that any relationship to foreign
languages—even fake ones—is a marker in the field of cultural competencies that defines and produces the play’s imagined Illyrian court.10
Scholarship, editorial debate, and the teacherly apparatus of historicist philology compose and mark off locations in a cultural field that
can look, at times, quite like that court. But, like Twelfth Night and the
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Saturn rocket engine, literary criticism and dramatic performance are in
part propelled by baffling elements that need not be resolved to do their
job. My discussion of “Castiliano vulgo” and its investigators is an exaggerated synecdoche for that idea in its broadest expression. We (that is,
literally, I, along with the specialist readers of this essay and the many editors, researchers, wonderers, and arguers who have come before us) circle
around a term that is clearly in the right place. We attempt to figure out
its function, its place in the machinery, and we see if we cannot keep that
machine running. But, as we reverse engineer Twelfth Night, we might at
times feel comfortable, like rocket scientists, celebrating when the thing
blasts off without exploding, whatever our position of mastery over the
design and meanings of the text. In this regard, Aguecheek’s utterly idiotic
question—“Do or not do?”—might be one we ask ourselves every time we
dive into the scholarly fray.

A Blind Spot of Knowledge
I hope the very presence of the words you are reading now indicates how
I choose to answer that question. (Do!) The way I see it, the embarrassing impossibility of textual mastery that lingers over Sir Toby’s mysterious exclamation clarifies the comic force of Twelfth Night and can help
us think in valuable ways about the place of ignorance and unknowing in
our own work. Again, the editorial response to “Castiliano vulgo” points
the way: Furness himself, near the end of his discussion, concludes that
we will probably never know what the phrase means, and W. A. Wright
goes even further in the first Cambridge edition of the play (1863): “It
is probable that these words have as much meaning now as they had in
Shakespeare’s time, and that is none at all.” 11 At the level of historical
and/or literary evidence, these claims are actually much easier to support
than any of the other theories put forth over the years. If the phrase is, in
fact, a bit of foreign-sounding nonsense, it would take its place alongside
the many, many other examples of that mode of speech in early modern
English drama. Anyone who has read city comedy has run across inflected
gibberish meant to approximate one language or another on the stage.12
The work of Marjorie Rubright, Nina Levine, Andrew Fleck, and Lloyd
Kermode among others has situated the English stage’s cacophony of
tongues as a sign or effect of religious, commercial, and, most broadly,
transnational mixture in early modern London and its environs.13 And,
even setting aside this larger corpus of plays, Twelfth Night itself has other
characters besides Toby who fake it, linguistically. Feste, famously, is the
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most active of the bunch. Playing the part of Sir Topas, he greets the
imprisoned Malvolio with the play’s other Spanish/Latin hybrid phrase,
“Bonos Dies” (4.2.12). Elam calls this either “bad Latin” or “bad Spanish,”
but, in either case, it is another loose reference to romance languages that
charts modes of courtly knowledge. Aguecheek’s remembrance of one of
Feste’s jokes works in similar ways: “In sooth, thou wast in very gracious
fooling last night, when thou spok’st of Pigrogromitus, of the Vapians
passing the equinoctial of Queubus” (2.3.20–23; whether Sir Andrew is
mangling or accurately repeating Feste’s mock lecture is beside the point
here). And, of course, Feste himself famously attributes his epigrammatic
line—“Better a witty fool than a foolish wit”—to the entirely fictitious
(but believably named) “Quinapalus” (1.5.33–34). Although fake names
are not quite the same thing as fake words, they function in similar ways
when it comes to the social logic of the text and its appeal to audiences. As
is the case with “Castiliano vulgo,” the sound of “Quinapalus” does more
work—both within the imagined world of the play and for the audiences
who encounter it—than its infinitely receding literal meaning ever could.
We have reached an odd semantic vanishing point in which
Shakespeare’s jokes about meaningless foreign words disappear into
detailed, entirely useless explanations of these words’ meanings. To put it in
terms suggested by this collection’s editor, we have reached, in “Castiliano
vulgo” and its ilk, a blind spot of historical philology. The study of language and culture is often pursued as a process of revelation or explication
that presents the authoritative knowledge of the scholar as a light in the
darkness. Mysterious knots of hidden content are unraveled in the name of
clarification. But nonsense resists this process by worrying the threads of
research into ever larger tangles. The blind spot here is neither the missing
definition of a word itself, nor a failure of knowledge pertaining to content
that might eventually manifest itself, but rather the inability of philologists
over time to see when their usual strategies are insufficient. The more we
struggle to explicate words such as “Castiliano vulgo,” the more brightly
and clearly these blind spots reflect our own ignorance back at us.
Of course, a crucial effect of the more obviously ironic nonsense
in Twelfth Night is to separate social or cultural action out from literal
signification, then to make that separation an Erasmian object lesson for
the idiot scholars who bluster their way around it.14 As one of those idiot
scholars, this is a markedly troubling situation for me. The more I work
on the intricate jokes and linguistic black holes built into Twelfth Night,
the more I begin to identify with scholars who have spent lifetimes
quibbling over words that very likely mean nothing at all. The more I
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identify with these scholars, the more Twelfth Night insults me, and the
more embarrassed I become about my own relationship to the language of
the text, foreign or otherwise. This is not, I should say, a terrifically pleasant encounter with comedy. But, before I give up on the utility of that
encounter, I will point out that a crucial word in Twelfth Night registers
my uncomfortable combination of humiliating affect and overmastered
effect, even as it provides some thrust for the play’s comic arc. Much to no
one’s surprise (I hope), that word is “baffled.”
When Olivia suggests that Malvolio has been “baffled” by Maria
and the others, she is not really calling him “out-witted” or “flabbergasted” or “confused.” Though the term was just beginning to mean
“hoodwinked” or “cheated” by the late sixteenth century, its more
dominant uses all constellate around performances meant to disgrace
and openly humiliate people, often men of rank. Spenser’s knights
are occasionally baffled in The Faerie Queene, usually by having their
shields or images reversed in a public display, meant to punish them for
their lack of honor.15 A more elaborate description of the act appears in
Holinshed’s Chronicles, appended with the marginal note “Baffulling
what it is among the Scots”: “a man is openlie periured, and then they
make of him an image painted, reuersed, with his héeles vpward, with
his name, woondering , crieng , and blowing out on him with hornes,
in the most despitefull manner they can, in token that he is worthie to
be exiled the companie of all good creatures.”16 Thomas Nashe, among
others, transposes this formal process of humiliation into joking contexts in Have With You to Saffron Walden (1596), where he imagines
that people in some distant future “may baffull and infamize my name
when I am in heauen, & shall neuer feele it” (sig. E4r). 17 And, most
importantly of all, Malvolio himself uses the term in this sense, directly
after reading the mash note he assumes is from Olivia: “Daylight and
champaign discovers not more. This is open. I will be proud, I will read
politic authors, I will baffle Sir Toby, I will wash off gross acquaintance, I will be point-device the very man” (2.5.156–59). In the midst
of the play’s most pointed joke about misinterpretation and bad performance, it is only fitting that today’s audiences misrecognize the premise
of Malvolio’s plans for Toby. Earlier in the scene, before he reads Maria’s
letter, the steward spins out his languid fantasy of leaving the Countess
to her post-coital nap in order to finger a jewel and chastise Sir Toby for
his poor behavior (40–78). Here, that fantasy is enriched by the notion
of bafflement, the public disgrace of a knight, permitting Malvolio to
grant himself the rank he hopes to achieve. Olivia’s use of the term as
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she caps Malvolio’s humiliation is, therefore, much more caustic than it
is ordinarily taken to be. He has been baffled like a knight, but he will
never, ever be one.
Are we all Malvolios, as Stephen Booth suggests in a slightly different context? 18 Are we all Aguecheeks, forced by history or basic
incompetence into a position in which we do not even know what we do
not know? I would not want to overstate the claim. But being baffled is
certainly a common outcome of Twelfth Night and early English comedy
more generally. Our problems comprehending or translating the terms
within it—in nonsensical foreign languages or in English itself—can render us similar to the characters on stage. But, whereas those characters get
to disappear, we have to decide what to do with ourselves and our various
failures. I will conclude simply by suggesting that, if we let ourselves be
bullied out of our places as critics, teachers, writers, and thinking audience
members, if we storm off stage swearing revenge on the pack of them, we
will miss an important chance to reflect on the historical, material contexts of our bafflement. The word “baffle,” after all, has a political history
built into it, one shot through with aggressive rituals of disenfranchisement and visual abjection. It is likewise an incorporating force pertaining
to and signifying the deepest modes of identification and rejection that
performed humor enables. As Twelfth Night represents and referentially
enacts these processes, it can, I hope, help us think more clearly about our
own pedagogical relationships and our own encounters with (or reproductions of ) bafflement in our classrooms and around our conference tables.
We may be rendered silent, or stupefied, by an unintelligible sense of wonder or confusion built into theatrical or literary experience. We might fail,
repeatedly, to explicate the inexplicable word. At the very least, we can
provide a sensible context for this inarticulate outcome.
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Baffling Comedy, Baffling Ourselves:
A Response to Adam Zucker
Stephen Spiess
What claims does the Shakespearean comedy make upon its audiences?
Baffling commonplace receptions of nonsensical language, Adam here—
with enviable wit, verve, and lucidity—foregrounds the immense cultural
energies pulsing through those inexplicable utterances that propel many
an early modern comedic dialogue. Gibberish certainly renders hierarchies on stage, but the “burning heart” of this essay transcends such an
(important) insight to suggest a far more discomfiting acknowledgment,
one rooted in our own “embarrassed” relations to the characters, laughter,
and languages of Twelfth Night. What, I now find myself wondering, does
the play ask of us? What does it reveal about us? How might it incorporate us into its language games?
Such questions may threaten the autonomy of the play’s imagined
world, but, as Adam demonstrates, any rigorous division of audience
and action proves inimical to Twelfth Night’s comedic work. Not only
are audiences yoked into the play’s various knowledge communities,
as he suggests, but our alliances thereof buttress its comedic architecture: throughout, dramatic irony structures the action and enables the
play’s most uproarious conceits. These include, of course, the staging of
Malvolio’s embarrassment (II.v), a scene that clearly establishes the play’s
investment in the spectator as an essential component of, and active contributor to, comedic representation.
But, in the comedy of (mis)interpretation, do we not also play the
fool? Adam suggests as much, and his brilliant insight is to explore how
the play’s comedic work continues into the present era. As trivial, asinine
phrases such as “Castiliano vulgo” catalyze ongoing interpretive labor,
Twelfth Night’s most insignificant signifiers emerge as its most productive
terms: proliferating an endless joke across the centuries. Quixotic exegetes,
myself included, are thus incorporated into Illyria’s language games, struggling to explicate the “unknown knowns” of early modern language.19 We
do not stand outside the joke (historically, linguistically, textually), but
rather, like Andrew Aguecheek, sustain it, are a part of it, and are subject
to it. Such a baffling kinship suggests the fecundity of linguistic ignorance and unknowing within and beyond the play. It also encourages new
understandings of our encounters with this early modern comedy: how we
confront, and are confronted by, its affects and effects.
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Looking ahead, I wonder how plays like Twelfth Night solicit
audience “acknowledgment.” I draw this term from Stanley Cavell, whose
epistemological readings of Shakespeare call for the type of invigorating,
scholarly self-confrontation that Adam here demonstrates.20 This analytic
move risks my own embarrassment, given Cavell’s contention that tragedy, not comedy, provides the essential structure for “skeptical doubt” in
pre-Cartesian London (128). Comedy, as it were, remains on the epistemological sidelines, ignored and seemingly insignificant. I thus may appear
foolish or, worse yet, witless for eschewing the logical points of engagement in favor of a seemingly nonsensical touchstone. If so, I venture forth,
as I take Adam and Cavell both to suggest, from exactly the right place.21
Cavell’s most provocative contention in Disowning Knowledge, for
our purposes at least, locates playgoing audiences within the epistemological work of the Shakespearean stage. What does this mean? We might
begin by recalling that, for Cavell, the various parables of Lear, Leontes,
Othello, et al. pivot on a fundamental “failure of acknowledgment”—a
catastrophic refusal to recognize, and reveal oneself to, another human
being—that proves world-consuming. They destroy the world, and their
loved ones, by refusing to confront their implication in it, and in them.
“Acknowledgment” thus signals a revolutionary (if tragically disowned)
act of self-reckoning : a radical willingness to place oneself before the
other—to recognize them and, in so doing, to reveal one’s own imperfection, unknowing, and blindness. It also, Cavell insists, constitutes the
very claim that Shakespearean drama makes on us: we must “confront the
figures on the stage ... we must put ourselves in their presence, reveal ourselves to them” (102–3). Such a demand is not resolved simply by altering
the theater lighting and exposing those playgoers “sitting silently in the
dark” to the gaze of onstage players.22 Rather, as Cavell suggests, we risk
acknowledgment only by facing our own, impossible knowledge relations
to the persons and realities depicted onstage, a dynamic that at once thematizes and “literalize[s] the conditions we exact for existence outside”
(104).23 By failing to do so, by avoiding this summons, we not only replicate but ultimately confirm what Cavell sees as the inherently tragic
character of skeptical doubt.
But what of comedy? Is audience acknowledgment elicited only
through tragic representation, only through plays that conspicuously
engage the skeptical problematic? Although Cavell largely disowns
comedy in Disowning Knowledge, his earlier study of Depression-era
Hollywood films, Pursuits of Happiness (1981), suggests that particular
comedic genres may work to resolve—under specific historical conditions
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of possibility—the epistemological crises of Shakespearean tragedy. 24
Moreover, as Adam cogently demonstrates, one need not embrace the full
armature of Cavell’s skeptical theorem to realize that Shakespeare’s comedies exercise their own profound pull upon playgoers. What is the nature
of this appeal? What kinds of epistemological work do these plays foster,
and how might our (failed) recognitions in comedy compare with those
that Cavell finds in the tragic canon?
Situating us within the comedic work of Twelfth Night, Adam illustrates how confronting the baffling terms of early modern comedy might
better inform our thinking about, and encounters with, these plays. I, for
one, have found myself lost, confused, excited, and enlightened—both by
this essay and in its nonsensical kinship to Disowning Knowledge. I now
wonder whether comedy might provide an alternative structure for thinking through problems of knowing and ignorance in Shakespeare and his
world. Reveling in the play of languages, identities, and bodies, works such
as Twelfth Night encounter the skeptical dilemma in powerful ways yet to
be acknowledged. As they incite unexpected relations and recognitions,
do they not leave us as profoundly unmoored, exposed, and revealed as
their tragic counterparts? If so, on what terms? Should we continue to baffle Shakespearean comedy, as we must, I sense that we will find ourselves
ever more confronted by, and complicit in, the very fictions (of genre
and knowledge, at the very least) upon which our scholarship depends.
Whether one recognizes this as a fundamentally tragic or comic condition
may well depend upon how, and in whom, we see ourselves onstage.
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Knowing Games: A Response to
Adam Zucker
Subha Mukherji
This agile paper, written with a delightfully light touch, opens our eyes to
see in the light of what we cannot know. It focuses on the term “baffle,” and
its affect and effect, in Twelfth Night to make us look hard at “problemsolving barriers,” like those used in making rockets, but in a literary/
textual/dramatic context where they proliferate into other kinds of productive paradox. The phrase that encapsulates this double effect for me is
“this combination of mystery and effect.” This cuts to the heart of the ideas
and the critical method that this book is wanting to explore, and taps into
an ignorance that creates its own epistemes. This is Paul de Mann territory
of blindness and insight.
Adam explores this specifically in relation to the linguistic
opacity—and dazzling nonsense—of certain words and phrases in
Twelfth Night, most tellingly in Sir Toby’s “castiliano vulgo,” which tests
and befuddles Aguecheek and us alike. What fascinates me is the suggestion that this destabilizes the field of knowledge across the fourth
wall—challenging the smug knowingness of the audience of this comedy (and many others), shared by the clever pranksters of the play, and
frustrating textual mastery. Here, of course, this is exploited to hilarious
effect—an exhilarating “explosive noise.” But, as Adam implies, this is
nonetheless part of a subtle tension between our critical, spectatorial,
and pedagogic instincts on the one hand and a temptation to surrender to bafflement on the other. Does anything similar happen in that
Babel of a comedy, Love’s Labour’s Lost, itself in a double bind between
exhibiting rhetorical mastery and freaking out at its own facility? The
social aspect of this “blind spot of historical philolog y” is something
I would love to be led to explore further. It is eye-opening to find out
how established the connotation of humiliation was in the period
when it came to the term “baffle.” I also wonder if the variant relation
between “explosive noise” and meaning maps onto the chiastic relation
between language and narrative that is suggested by the essay, with reference to what baffles the characters vis-à-vis what baffles us. I would
love to know how far Adam thinks this can be explored or extended
in Shakespeare’s work. Is there is a payoff in this critical paradigm that
resonates beyond this play?
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But I also wonder about how the drama of asymmetrical
knowledges plays out in other genres, most notably in tragedies and
tragicomedies. Are there affective and ethical implications and, if so, are
these genre-specific? When Hermione says to Leontes, “You speak a language I understand not” (III.ii.85), the counters shift, perhaps even too
far afield. But the same play, at its end, seems to gesture towards the need
for insouciance, to stop at the point beyond which we are not meant
to go, as Leontes, whose “face hath felt the winter’s wind,” learns, like
Keats’s thrush, when to “fret not after knowledge” (“What the Thrush
Said,” lines 1, 9). But I think Adam’s focus on humor is germane. For
humor is what brings unequal knowledges into piquant interplay, just
as it induces simultaneous identification and rejection. A dramatic episode this essay calls to mind is in the last scene of Cymbeline—itself
an extended joke on over-explication. I am thinking of the moment
when Posthumus strikes Imogen dressed as a page with the words,
“There lie thy part” (V.v.267): one that usually triggers smug giggles in
the audience who are in on the secret (as they are not in The Winter’s
Tale—which raises a whole different set of questions). It is a knowing,
tragicomic joke that excises the affective reality of the gesture within the
dramatic fiction as we savor our privileged knowledge that this is a boy
playing the part of a girl playing the part of a boy, and that recognition
is what absorbs our wit. But, after another five minutes of playing time,
when any sense of the visual abjection of this misrecognition has faded
as the scene keeps piling recognition upon recognition, Imogen comes
right back at Posthumus and asks: “Why did you throw your wedded
lady from you? / Think that you are upon a rock; and now / Throw me
again” (309–11). The gutting emotional directness of her question is—
is it not?—an instance of bafflement coming back at the enfranchised
to radically shift the barrier between “knowing minds” and “ignorant
ones,” to use Adam’s terms. This rebuke to the tragicomic habit of dicing with danger—sanctioned by the basis of the form in the idea of
felix culpa (“happier far by affliction made”; “the danger not the death”;
etc.)—raises the question of the affective cost of humor that feeds off
such epistemic variance across the fourth wall. The unlevel playing field
on Dover cliff in King Lear, where the blind Gloucester falls (almost
farcically) flat on level ground, stages a comparable interrogation of the
ethics of knowing games. Can we ponder such inscriptions of discomfort against the grain of genre to test the remit of blind spots? Do they
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go beyond the question of what we do with our failures of understanding, which Adam addresses, to challenge us to find a way of grappling
with our failures of relationship? Indeed, do dramatic preservations of
bafflement forge their distinct legibility by counterpointing the ecology
of the theatrical event (onstage and in the playhouse) with moments of
sharply foregrounded interpersonal encounter, fraught with incommensurabilities and, at times, their corrections?
NOTES
Portions of this essay were previously published in an expanded form
in “Twelfth Night and the Philology of Nonsense” in Renaissance Studies 30, 1
(2016): 88–101. Thank you to Jennifer Richards and Renaissance Studies for the
permission to use that material here, and to Anne Prescott, for being the animating spirit of this piece.
2
The information that follows is drawn from Hutchinson, “How NASA
Brought the Monstrous F-1 ‘Moon Rocket’ Engine Back to Life.”
3
All citations of Twelfth Night are taken from Shakespeare, The Arden
Shakespeare Twelfth Night.
4
Freund, “Twelfth Night and the Tyranny of Interpretation,” 480–81:
“Although he can cut a caper and has the backtrick as strong as any man in Illyria,
in a verbally constituted and language-governed environment Andrew does not
shine. Indeed, his incurable logo-deficiency and his repeated victimization by
lexis makes him the ultimate underachiever.”
5
Though I am not going to quibble about it here, the punctuation in the
Folio is very different: “What wench? Castiliano vulgo: for here comes Sir Andrew
Agueface” (1623, sig. Y2v).
6
Furness, in Shakespeare, A New Variorum Edition of Shakespeare, 38.
7
On this reading, see also Killeen, “Twelfth Night,” 92–3.
8
See Elam, in Shakespeare, The Arden Shakespeare Twelfth Night, note to
1.3.41, p. 173. Elam’s suggestion is by far the most convincing of the bunch. I
should say also that there are many reasons for an editor to deviate from the spelling of words in languages other than English in the Folio—“Pourquoi,” for example, appears there as “Pur-quoy” (sig. Y2v).
9
My ideas here have been shaped by Stephen Orgel’s formidable essay, “The
Poetics of Incomprehensibility.” See also Mazzio, The Inarticulate Renaissance,
1–93.
10
On the cultural capital that adheres to the study or knowledge of foreign
languages in early modern London and its drama, see Nina Levine’s work in the
third chapter of Practicing the City: Early Modern London on Stage. On the particularly Italian contexts for Illyrian civility, linguistic and otherwise, see Elam’s
1
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introduction in The Arden Shakespeare Twelfth Night, 58–67. And for the continental influence on ideas about civility more generally in England (linguistic and
otherwise), see Bryson, From Courtesy to Civility, esp. 79–106.
11
Cited by Furness, in A New Variorum Edition of Shakespeare, 37. See also
Lisak, “Domesticating Strangeness in Twelfth Night,” 176: “Corruptions such as
‘Castiliano vulgo’ may remain utterly obscure, except to Sir Toby.”
12
For other examples of putatively “foreign” babble, see the excellent fake
French in Haughton’s Englishmen for My Money: “why he may speake flaunte
taunte as well as French, for I cannot understand him” (sig. A4v); the remarkable
Dutch-ish passage in Middleton’s No Wit, No Help Like a Woman’s, which begins
“Quisquinikin Sadlamare” (3.157–58); and the gulling of Parolles in All’s Well
That Ends Well.
13
Levine, Practicing the City; Rubright, Doppelgänger Dilemmas, esp. chapter
3, “Double Dutch Tongues: Language Lessons of the Stage,” pp. 89–109; Fleck,
“‘Ick verstaw you niet’”; Kermode, Aliens and Englishness in Elizabethan Drama.
See also Dillon, Language and Stage in Medieval and Renaissance England;
Hoenselaars, Images of Englishmen and Foreigners; Smith, “‘So much English by
the Mother’”; and Clough, “The Broken English of Foreign Characters of the
Elizabethan Stage.”
14
I am far from the first to suggest as much. See, recently, Stephen Booth’s
work on the play in Precious Nonsense, which directly pertains to my project here.
15
See the entry on the term by Michael Leslie in Hamilton, The Spenser
Encyclopedia, 206–7.
16
Citation from Holinshed, Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland, 827.
17
Cf. “A New Year’s Gift to Master G. R.,” a terrible, terrible poem in Gifford’s
A Posie of Gilliflowers: “if I flinch, cry on me open shame,/ And where you come,
doe bafful my good name” (sig. Q4v).
18
Booth, Precious Nonsense, 149ff.
19
See Donald Rumsfield’s productively convoluted formulation: “as we know,
there are known knowns ... things we know we know. We also know there are
unknown knowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know.
But there are also unknown unknowns—the one’s we don’t know we don’t know,”
reprinted in Garber, Loaded Words, 118.
20
Cavell, “Knowing and Acknowledging” and Disowning Knowledge in
Seven Plays of Shakespeare.
21
On embracing “error” as an applied methodology for illuminating scholarly
ideologies and assumptions, particularly about Shakespeare, see Zachary Lesser’s
essay in this collection.
22
Strier, “Review, Disowning Knowledge,” 127.
23
On Cavell’s meta-theatrical thinking vis-à-vis acknowledgment, see especially Bruns, “Stanley Cavell’s Shakespeare,” and Dahl, “On Acknowledgement
and Cavell’s Unacknowledged Theological Voice.”
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Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness. My emphasis on historical contingency here
signals what I take to be the principal strength and, as pertains to Shakespearean
comedy, the determining limitation of Cavell’s argument in Pursuits of Happiness.
In that work, Cavell insists that the “definitive realization of the genre that
answered the Shakespearean description” of a “battle between men and women
for recognition of one another” could only emerge in a historical and cultural
context informed by first-wave feminism, where a rethinking of sexual and gendered difference fostered the “conditions [of ] viability” in which such acts of
radical “reconciliation” could take place (18–20). Although Cavell positions
this twentieth-century film genre as “an inheritor of the preoccupations and discoveries of Shakespeare romantic comedies” (1) and positions The Winter’s Tale
as a proleptic vision of such epistemological resolution in both this work and
Disowning Knowledge, he fails to provide a corollary historical accounting for the
nascent skeptical remedies he locates in Shakespeare’s romantic comedies.
24
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Chapter 2

Shakespeare’s Nuts1: The Blind Spots of
the Edible Contact Zone
Jonathan Gil Harris

S

HAKESPEARE’S NUTS. WHAT MIGHT my title mean? That I
believe Shakespeare is nuts—stark raving mad? That I plan to speak
about a part of his anatomy adjacent to his “one Will”? Rest assured: I do
not seek to cast any aspersions on Shakespeare’s mental health—though I
will be arguing here for a mode of Shakespearean thought that I call nutty,
and that works less through rational progression and more through counterintuitive long-distance leaps of the imagination. (The minds of the lover,
the lunatic, and the poet are compact, after all.) And no, I do not wish
to talk about Shakespeare’s nuts in the scatological sense—though I must
confess that my essay is very interested in male bodies. Instead, I will be
thinking about the edible nuts that appear in the writings of Shakespeare
and some of his contemporaries. Or rather, I will be thinking about the
ways in which these writers think with nuts—with walnuts, pignuts, hazelnuts, simple nuts, coconuts.
How much can we fully see a nut? And what does it even mean
fully to see a nut? When we absentmindedly reach for peanuts, we rarely
look closely at what we are about to shovel into our mouths. But I am
not interested in getting us to look more closely at the physical matter
of what we eat. Even if we closely inspect the dehiscent shell enclosing
its edible kernel,2 there is much about the nut that we will remain blind
to. Just as the commodity form effaces the labor that has produced it, so
too does the nut that we see in the palm of our hand tend to avert our
gaze from the realm of work. But I am concerned here less with the labor
that produces the nut, distributes it globally, and makes it available to
consumers as a snack. Rather, I am interested in the work, physical and
imaginative, that the nut does in collaboration with us. And this work
is a phenomenon largely concealed by the blind spots that surround our
critical as much as our eating habits. For we are heavily conditioned not
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to think of objects as active agents. As I will show, however, Shakespeare
allows us to see the work that nuts do on us. For most of us, nuts are often
next to nothing—metaphors for their own supposed insignificance. But
sometimes Shakespeare’s nuts unexpectedly become portals into other,
imaginatively capacious universes. In these instances, they reveal not only
how they work on us, but also how we work with them. Even when we tap
into nuts’ occasional uncanny power to transport us from absentminded
nut-indifference to transformative flights of nut-inspired fantasy, however,
we remain susceptible to another blind spot, one we share equally with
Shakespeare. This is a blind spot that elides what I call the edible contact
zone—the dynamic space of interaction within which people encounter
not only other cultures, but also new foodstuffs and other objects that act
on their bodies.

***
Shakespeare’s references to plant life have often been understood by critics
through a pointedly localizing prism. The gilly-flowers and cow-slips mentioned in A Winter’s Tale and A Midsummer Night’s Dream, for example,
are often supposed to bespeak his deep intimacy with the Warwickshire
countryside of his youth.3 By contrast, I want to read Shakespeare’s nuts
for their global valences—or, more specifically, for the way in which they
prompt exorbitant, unexpected swerves from the local to the foreign, from
the familiar to the alien, from the here and now to alternative universes.
To lend such a power to nuts might at first seem counterintuitive.
What could be more familiar and unexotic than the quotidian nut? A
walnut is a homely wallflower, not a nutty Clark Kent that, ripping off
its outer covering, reveals itself to be an action-hero Superman from a
distant planet. The nut’s tiny size predisposes us to think of it as meaningless and mundane. Certainly, Shakespeare’s nuts can serve as shorthand
for the insubstantial and the insignificant: when Mercutio complains that
Benvolio will “quarrel with a man for cracking nuts, having no reason
but because thou has hazel eyes” (Romeo and Juliet 3.1.19–20), he deems
the nut next to nothing—and certainly not worth getting all knotted up
about.4 Similarly, Lafew dismisses Parolles as a lightweight nobody by saying that “there can be no kernel in this light nut” (All’s Well That Ends
Well 2.5.42). And Dromio of Syracuse, believing himself to be a victim
of an otherwise inexplicable act of witchcraft, explains that devils use the
smallest things for their black magic, such as “the parings of one’s nail, a
rush, a hair, a drop of blood, a pin, a nut” (Comedy of Errors 4.5.69–70).
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But this last quote also suggests something uncanny about small,
everyday things. In imagination, they can become portals to other,
unknown universes beyond the immediately familiar and visible. Margaret
Cavendish explores this property of small things in her poem “Of Many
Worlds within This World”: “What several worlds might in an ear-ring
be: / For millions of those atoms may be in / The head of one small, little, single pin. / And if thus small, then ladies may well wear / A world of
worlds, as pendants in each ear.”5 Cavendish writes here under the influence of mid-seventeenth-century atomism, which reworked the classical
philosophers Epicurus and Lucretius’s conviction that all visible forms
are comprised of invisible, irreducible atoms.6 But Shakespeare, writing
fifty years earlier, does not need a theory of atoms to wonder what several
worlds might in a nut be. When Hamlet claims that, “I could be bounded
in a nutshell and count myself a king of infinite space” (Hamlet 2.2.260),
he hints at the capacious world within its seemingly diminutive shell.
Which is to say: for Hamlet, the nut’s contents ramify beyond its seemingly small size.
Indeed, Shakespeare’s nuts are generally minute portals through
which other, larger worlds can be accessed. The self-amplifying power
of the minuscule thing finds many suggestive points of departure in
Shakespeare’s imagined fairy worlds. A Midsummer Night’s Dream features
diminutive creatures with everyday plant names such as Peaseblossom
and Mustardseed; they are joined by the fairy Puck who can assume the
minute form of a “crab [-apple]”in a “gossip’s bowl” (2.1.47–48). Yet
these tiny, nut-like characters, named for everyday plants, are also creatures of another, larger demi-monde that, extending from Athens to the
perfumed air of India, can “put a girdle around the earth.” And nuts themselves feature in the play’s economy of amplification: Titania tells Bottom
that, “I have a venturous fairy that shall seek / The squirrel’s hoard, and
fetch thee new nuts” (4.1.34–35). Indeed, the nut is Shakespeare’s favored
fairy vehicle from the everyday to fantastical worlds. Romeo and Juliet’s
Queen Mab travels in an “empty hazelnut” (1.4.68), leading humans into
their dreams. All these tiny fairy-nuts uncannily conflate the local and the
exotic, the close-to-hand and the globally imported, the Heimlich and the
Unheimlich. They are objects, but they are also agents, working on and
with human bodies to transport them to otherworldly destinations.
The nut’s power to prompt imaginative swerves from the minutely
local to the capaciously global parallels the complexities of the word
“mundane.” Something mundane is quotidian, familiar, local. Yet the
word derives from the Latin “mundus,” meaning world; in other words,
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“the mundane” is uncannily haunted by the trace of the French “le monde,”
which includes the globally distant and undiscovered. This uncanny convergence of the mundane and the global is also legible in the everyday
“walnut,” to which Petruchio disparagingly compares Katherina’s small
hat in The Taming of the Shrew. Although the walnut grew in England,
it was commonly believed to be of Persian origin, and, although the first
syllable of the walnut’s name might seem to evoke a mundane “wall,” it
derives from the Old English word “wal,” meaning “foreign”—also the
etymological root of “Welsh.”7
But the play that most sustainedly foregrounds the mundane uncanniness of the nut is The Tempest. Again, its nuts are turnstiles between the
local and the foreign. It is only appropriate that the vessel transporting
the Milanese and Neapolitan nobles from Italy to Africa and beyond is a
“ship ... no stronger than a nutshell” (1.1.50). The metaphor is designed to
suggest weakness, but it also—within the larger networks of fugitive nut
work that I am sketching here—hints at a capacity for abrupt transition
from one world to another, for lurching from the still to the violent, for
swerving from the familiar to the unfamiliar.
The foreign shore onto which the nutshell ship releases its European
passengers is itself nut-ridden. Caliban, who has already acquainted
Prospero with “All the qualities o’ th’ isle,” including its “barren place and
fertile” (1.2.339, 240), promises to do the same for his new master, the
drunken Stephano. He says that “with his long nails,” he will “dig thee
pig-nuts” (2.2.168)—a kind of underground chestnut otherwise known
as an earthnut and a hawk-nut. And these pignuts are just one item from a
menu of island delicacies that also include “clustering filberts” (2.2.171),
or hazelnuts. The two nutty items appear together with exotic foods such
as “the nimble marmoset” (2.2.170), a South American species of monkey.
Yet the island’s nuts would have come across to Shakespeare’s audiences
not as exotic but as altogether familiar. The pignut was so called because it
was beloved of English pigs, which would snuffle out and root up this palatable snack from the soil of English woods and fields.8 And the filbert or
hazelnut, although often associated with Turkey and the Levant, grew in
southeast England as well.9 The nuts of The Tempest thus oscillate between
the exotic and the English, the Unheimlich and the Heimlich.
Throughout his work, then, the nut encourages Shakespeare to
swerve in imagination between points that are simultaneously adjacent and
remote. This habit is what I call nutty thought. Nutty thought fastens onto
unexpected, aleatory proximities between seemingly distant phenomena
and places. It is nutty, in both senses of the word, to assume such seemingly
random points of connection. But, in some ways, nutty thought is of a piece
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with Shakespeare’s famed penchant for the pun, which seizes on acoustic
commonalities between otherwise unrelated concepts. (That is one reason
why I have assailed you with so many nutty puns, to note the natty knots
knitted by Shakespeare’s nuts.) But what is it about the nut that should provoke Shakespeare’s uncanny conflations of the local and the global?
Part of it, no doubt, has to do with the way in which, during an age
of discovery and globalization, nuts were to Shakespeare and his audiences
both familiar fruits of the English landscape and metonymies for unfamiliar parts of the world. Many nuts that we now take for granted and whose
origins we have by and large deracinated were, in Shakespeare’s time,
luxury foreign imports from the Middle East and Asia. The almond was
imported from the Levant; the pistachio from Turkic regions of central
Asia. Other nuts were shipped from the Americas. Examples include the
Brazil nut, cultivated in and imported (obviously) from Brazil; the pecan,
which derives from a North American Algonquin word for a nut requiring
a stone to crack; and the peanut, first cultivated in what is now Paraguay.10
Perhaps the most suggestive nutty metonymy for non-European
lands was the coconut, native to tropical climates from the Americas and
Africa to Asia and the Pacific. It was not known to Shakespeare, as far as we
can tell. But news of the coconut commanded at least one English writer’s
attention. And that was less because of the coconut’s exotic origin than
because of—to rephrase Hamlet—the infinite space within it. As George
Herbert remarked in his poem “On Providence,” “The Indian nut alone
/ Is clothing, meat and trencher, drink and kan, / Boast, cable, sail and
needle, all one.”11 Here we can recognize something close to the uncanny
logic of Shakespeare’s nuts. For Herbert, the coconut contains within itself
“several worlds” that ramify beyond its ostensible size. It both is unfamiliarly “Indian”—a term that can refer indeterminately to Asia and to the
Americas12—and it supplies all the familiar comforts any English person
could wish for: clothes, food, drink, rope, building, and shipping materials.
There is a religious dimension to Herbert’s paean to the coconut, of
course. Turning the coconut from a minute insignificance into a bottomless
font of goodness is the nutty effect of divine providence. Shakespeare may not
have known of coconuts. But the providential logic that can convert an alien
object into a bringer of familiar comforts is very much part of the universe
of The Tempest: when Miranda asks Prospero how they arrived on the island,
he replied “By Providence divine” (1.2.159). This lubricates a conviction that
the island will provide for the needs of its European visitors. And, indeed, the
nuts of the island likewise exist only to serve (with the help of Caliban) wouldbe colonial masters such as Stephano, a little like the riches of the island of
Ternate in John Fletcher’s 1621 tragicomedy, The Island Princess:
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We are arrived among the blessed islands
Where every wind that rises blows perfumes
And every breath of air is like an incense ...
Nothing we see, but breeds an admiration.
The very rivers as we float along,
Throw up their pearls and curl their heads to
court us.
The bowels of the earth swell with the births
Of thousand unknown gems and thousand riches.
Nothing that bears a life, but brings a treasure ...13

Fletcher does not refer here to nuts. But his vision of the inanimate island
landscape willfully yielding its riches to its European visitors is similar to
how Caliban imagines his island’s nuts for Stephano. The nuts, he suggests, exist simply to serve Stephano’s needs.
For a Stephano, it may be a consoling fantasy that the “nutty” swerve
from home to New World should bring him face to face with familiar nuts
that answer his Old World needs and therefore bring him back to himself
(even if they might also serve to make him seem like a pig ). But what if
the pignuts’ radical nuttiness were to be fully realized at the moment of
their consumption? What if, upon being eaten, the pignuts did not answer
Stephano’s immediate need but instead abruptly transported him somewhere else? Does a nut transform the body that eats it? In other words,
how much may the nut have an agency of its own?
In my evidently misspent childhood, I used to love a series of Disney
comics that gently parodied the Superman story. The series shows how
Mickey Mouse’s dim-witted friend, Goofy, is transformed into a semisuperhero named Super-Goof when he eats, of all things, a kind of peanut
called a “super-goober.” He may not morph into a creature from another
planet such as Krypton, but he does magically acquire ill-fitting underwear, a badly tied cape, and one puny bicep. Clearly, the super-goober
nuts are not just passive objects. When eaten, they are agents of transformation, making Super-Goof less a superhero than a hostage to a new set
of bodily imperatives he cannot quite control: he is made to fly, though
with a horrifying lack of skill that has him banging into walls and falling
into puddles. So, what if the pignuts and filberts that Caliban promises
Stephano had a rogue agency like that of the super-goobers? How might
the island nuts transform him? We never find out, of course, because we
never see Stephano eating them. More broadly, the play is not interested in
continuing its nutty voyage to new places, as it is ultimately too invested
in going home to Europe.
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So, let me stage a nutty intervention of my own—a swerve from the
English of The Tempest to a scene in another language from another part
of the world. This scene is a real-life counter-Tempest from Shakespeare’s
lifetime: its protagonist goes abroad but does not return home, and he
encounters nuts in his new location that transform him forever. We will
take a sea voyage to an island, with many hardships, magical monsters, and
some strange alcoholic brews. But this is not the story of a man named
Stefano. It is the story of a man named Stephens: Thomas Stephens, otherwise known as Tomas Estevão and Pâtri Guru.

***
The name of Thomas Stephens is familiar to scholars of early modern
English literature as a passing reference in Ralph Fitch’s account of his travels through India and Southeast Asia, the first English travelogue about
the subcontinent.14 In 1583, Fitch and three other Englishmen had journeyed to India to see if they could break into Portugal’s lucrative trade
with the Orient. On reaching the island of Goa, they were arrested and
imprisoned. But Fitch and his companions were freed after the intervention of a mysterious “Father Stephens,” a Jesuit refugee from England resident in Goa.15 Fitch tells us hardly anything about this earlier Englishman.
However, there are many more surviving details about Stephens’s life story
than we would know simply from reading Fitch. Copies survive of two letters that Stephens wrote to England from India—one to his father, and one
to his brother—as well as two works that he published in India. And some
archival evidence from England, Italy, and Portugal helps us sketch out the
details of his life story. It is a story of religious dissidence, exile, linguistic
acculturation, and transformation—by a nut.
In certain respects, Stephens’s life is a subjunctive version of
Shakespeare’s. 16 Both were born in rural western England in the mid1500s—Shakespeare in Warwickshire in 1564, Stephens in Wiltshire
in 1550. Both received a good school education that emphasized classical poetry, especially Ovid, in ways that they remembered later in their
professional creative lives. Both had literary flair. And both probably
came from dissident Catholic families at a time when Protestantism had
become the official state religion. The difference is Stephens took his
religious faith so seriously that he chose to flee England in 1574, after
his close companion Thomas Pounde was arrested and imprisoned in
the Tower of London. In the wake of Pounde’s capture, Stephens fled to
Rome—we do not know how—and enrolled as a novitiate in the Society
of Jesus. Five years later, the Society granted him permission to go to
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Goa to aid the Jesuit mission there. Stephens travelled first to Lisbon,
from where he set sail with twelve other Jesuit missionaries in a fleet of
five ships on April 4, 1579. The fleet voyaged around the Cape of Good
Hope and arrived in Goa on October 24.
Seventeen days after Stephens’s arrival in India, he wrote a letter to
his father describing the long sea journey.17 It is a fascinating document,
not least because it is the only surviving piece of writing by Stephens in his
native English. There are occasional mentions of the providence of God
with regard to Stephens’s health and the good winds that propelled the
ship to India. But the letter foregoes any display of missionary zeal and
cleaves more closely to another genre: the fabulous travelogue. Stephens
offers detailed descriptions of exotic marvels that he saw during his sea
voyage around Africa and the Cape of Good Hope—the stuff of John
Mandeville’s and other medieval travellers’ tales. He tells his father about
his sightings of a medusa jellyfish, of strange birds with seven-span wings,
and of a miraculous fish “which hath wings and flieth.” 18 In all these
instances, Stephens effaces himself: invisible in the marvellous scenes he
describes, he offers each as an occasion “to glorify Almighty God in His
wonderful works and such variety in His creatures.”19
Yet, even as Stephens steps out of frame throughout this slideshow
of exotic marvels, we can see another tendency lurking in the background
of his letter. He also observes how the journey to India pathologically
transforms the flesh of sea voyagers: Stephens explains, in what seems to
be a description of the symptoms of scurvy, that those who undertake
such a long journey are likely to “fall into sundry diseases, their gums grow
great and swell, and they are fain to cut them away, their legs swell, and all
the body becometh sore and so benumbed, that they cannot stir hand or
foot, and so they die for weakness.”20 And he talks also of the experience
of crossing into the “Burning Zone” near the equator, where sea voyagers
suffer “so many inconveniences of heats and lack of winds that they think
themselves happy when they have passed it.”21 In other words, Stephens
had begun to note the transformation of European bodies in foreign environments. He was not simply watching a marvellous spectacle of a brave
new world that providentially took care of him: he recognized that this
new world was, more accurately, an environment that had permeated his
body, in the form of disease and heat.
In a letter he wrote to his brother Richard in 1583, Stephens notes
that he was “tried by a serious illness” shortly after he reached India.22 We
do not know what illness it was—quite possibly dysentery, the plague of
many a new arrival—but it obviously felled him with particular force,
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given that he could still recall its gravity four years later. This was but the
first of many bodily transformations that he was to undergo in Goa. But
his letter to his father, so sparse on detail about his Indian destination,
does show that his attention had already been arrested by another form of
Indian matter he took into his body—a new fruit he had not seen before:
the coconut. He writes at the very end of the letter that “the drink of this
country is good water, or wine of the palm tree, or a fruit called cocoas.”23
Stephens had clearly already sampled coconut water, a powerful antidote
to the loss of body salts caused by sweating in India’s extreme heat. As we
will see, this was the beginning of a long and profound relationship that
transformed his body and its habits.
The Goa in which Stephens landed in 1579 was an increasingly bellicose beacon of Christianity.24 Thanks to St. Francis Xavier’s aggressive
work in converting Konkan Brahmins after he came to India in 1542, the
Jesuit mission in Goa had become a major force in shaping the culture of
the region. Francis Xavier bequeathed to the mission a distinctive legacy
of intolerance.25 Horrified by what he regarded as the idolatrousness of
Goa’s Hindus, he recommended setting up the Inquisition in Goa. He
took little care to study local customs and languages: his aim was to save
souls. If Hindu temples needed to be destroyed to bring the word of God
to the infidels, that was simply a grim necessity.
Stephens approached his mission rather differently. He took
considerable pains to learn local customs and tongues: clearly a gifted
linguist—he quickly became fluent in Portuguese—he also acquired
Konkani, the local language of both Goa and the northern Malabar
coast. In the frontier village of Rachol, where he lived for most of his
four decades in India before his death in 1619, speaking Konkani was
a necessity. Indeed, he became so fluent that he wrote (under the name
of Tomas Estevão) the first Konkani grammar book, the Arte da lingoa
Canarim.26 We do not know who his teachers were, but he evidently spent
considerable time in the company of Konkani speakers. Just as impressively, he devoted himself to learning Marathi, the language of “high”
literature among the Brahmins. It was in Marathi, sprinkled with some
Konkani, that Stephens composed—under the name of Pâtri Guru—his
epic 11,018-line poem about the history of the world from Creation to
the coming of Jesus. He called the poem the Kristapurana—the Story
of Christ. First printed in 1616 on a press at the Rachol seminary, the
Kristapurana became enormously popular with the local community of
Brahmin converts and, subsequently, with Malabari Christians and even
Marathi-speaking non-Christians.27
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The Kristapurana arguably achieved a quasi-colonial end—bringing
Christian lore to the locals.28 But Stephens did not simply dress up Jesuit
Christian doctrine in workmanlike Marathi. He also demonstrably fell in
love with the language, in a way that Indianized not just the Christianity
he sought to preach, but also his own body. This much is apparent from
the best-known section of the Kristapurana, in which Stephens praises the
beauty of Marathi:
Zaissy puspã mazi puspa mogary
Qui parimallã mazi casturi
Taissy bhassã mazi saziry
Maratthiya
Paqhiã madhe maioru
Vruqhiã madhe calpataru
Bhassã madhe manu thoru
Maratthiyessi
[As the mogra among flowers
As musk among perfumes
So among languages is the beauty
Of Marathi
As among birds the peacock
As among trees the kalpataru
So among languages is
Marathi].29

We might choose to read this passage as a strategic tour de force designed
to hook an Indian readership. Stephens had carefully studied not just the
medieval Marathi puranas—epic stories of creation, gods, and kings—but
had also become adept in one of Marathi’s most distinctive poetic forms:
the ovi stanza, employed to great effect by the Brahmin Marathi poet-saint
Eknath (1533–99), a contemporary of Stephens.30
But, in appropriating Eknath’s distinctive style, Stephens was not
simply speaking to his readers in the language and the poetic form of the
region. He was also lending voice to powerful personal experiences of his
attachment to his new home. In his ovis, Stephens opened up his body
to the touch of a world supposedly separate from him. For the landscape
Stephens describes in his praise of Marathi is not designed simply to hook
his Indian readers; it also bears the imprint of his own sensuous interactions with it. Here, if briefly, we can glimpse Stephens’s own delighted
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body in Goa, smelling mogra (jasmine) flowers, hearing the cry of the peacock, gazing upon the kalpataru tree. And this body is the missing point
of connection between landscape and language, a language that seems to
have induced in him a similar delight. Which is to say: speaking Marathi
changed Stephens.
Speaking Marathi also changed the Christianity he attempted to
bring to his readers. The Kristapurana retells stories from the Old and New
Testaments. Yet the Christianity he explains is one that has been adapted to
Indian, and even Hindu, concepts. He calls Jesus, for example, a swami. But
the Hinduization of Stephens’s Christianity is perhaps most clear from one
word choice in the above passage: “calpataru,” or kalpataru tree—understood most often among inhabitants of the Konkan coast as the coconut tree.
Throughout the Kristapurana, Stephens invokes the “calpataru.”
Here he adapts a traditional Hindu motif for Christian purposes: the
kalpataru is, in Sanskrit mythology, a divine tree that has the power to
grant all wishes, as a result of which Indra the god-king takes it with him
to paradise. Consequently, “calpataru” provides Stephens with a powerful translation for the Tree of Life in the Garden of Eden, which is how
he uses the word at the poem’s beginning. This typifies how Stephens
gravitated toward Hindu concepts. He probably did so less out of a deep
sympathy than a pragmatic sense of the main constituency for his poem,
Brahmin Hindus who had converted to Catholicism. There was another
shrewd calculation behind his adaptation of the kalpataru. As his paean to
Marathi makes clear, his use of the word also serves to localize the Edenic
tree in Goa. Indeed, the kalpataru was equated by the inhabitants of the
Konkan coast with the coconut tree, because of its ability to provide for a
wide spectrum of human needs.
This was a tradition with which Stephens was evidently familiar. In
the letter he wrote to his brother, he remarks of the coconut tree that:
It gives oil, liquor (vinum), toddy (lac), syrup (mel) sugar and vinegar. Coir-rope is also made from it to tie with, and its branches
are used to protect huts from rain. It gives fruit all the year round,
which are rather nuts than dates, resembling a man’s head. When
the exterior rind has been removed, they rival the size of two fists.
Inside, the fruit contains water like light beer and good to quench
one’s thirst. It is so plentiful that, after drinking from one fruit, you
would not look for another. In the interior of the nut is a kernel
lining it all over like a covering and forming a prized article of food.
The shell furnishes the blacksmith with charcoal. Those that live
near the sea not only load their boats with the tree, but also utilise it
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for making ropes and sails. You will find hardly any piece of writing
except on its leaves. Those that live on land invariably make use of
them to shelter themselves from rain.31

Here, we can see Stephens the Goan ethnographer not so much describing the kalpataru as rehearsing an oft-repeated local narrative about it.
Yet it is clear that his relation to the kalpataru was embodied as much as
it was conceptual. As we have seen, the long letter Stephens wrote to his
father in 1579, rich in details about his fantastic sea voyage to Goa, refers
to the “drink of this country” derived from palm trees: here, he invokes
either coconut water or toddy, the zesty alcoholic brew he mentions in
his letter to his brother. Each drink has a significant impact on the body.
Coconut water is an excellent guard against dehydration; electrolyte-rich,
it has a cooling effect in the heat. And its alcoholic derivative toddy is
a fine protector against the cold. It is very difficult to imagine Stephens
having done without either drink during his four decades in India. In the
last three years of his life, prior to his death in 1619, he struggled to take
food because of a chronic stomach problem; it is highly likely that coconut water would have been a regular part of his sickbed diet. It is likewise
difficult to imagine Stephens, earlier in his life, avoiding the multiple uses
of the coconut in its many other forms: eating the coconut’s white flesh
by itself or mixed into tasty dishes such as the kishmur fish curry that is so
plentiful in the region; using its husk hair as coir for rope; employing it as
charcoal for cooking or other fires; sheltering under its leaves in the monsoon; even writing on it as a substitute for paper—indeed, it is tempting
to imagine drafts of the Kristapurana written on the leaves of kalpataru—
Stephens must have been familiar with all these.
In other words, Stephens’s “calpataru” is not simply a local figure
that translates a Christian concept. It is the catalyst for an entirely new
ensemble of bodily habits, habits that differ from how Stephens had used
his body in England. If Stephens imbues the kalpataru with miraculous
properties in the Kristapurana, it is partly because the coconut also helped
transform him from Thomas Stephens the English religious dissident into
Pâtri Guru the Marathi poet. The coconut, therefore, was for Stephens the
secular version of a consecrated communion wafer: his body was transformed by it, whether through eating its flesh, drinking its water, burning
its rind, plaiting its husk hairs into rope, using its bark as a shelter from the
rain, or writing upon its leaves.
The coconut may have provided Stephens, as it did George Herbert,
with an illustration of the workings of divine providence and the principle
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that God makes everything for some use—or, in the case of the kalpataru,
for potentially infinite use. Yet the coconut does not always function in
such straightforwardly theological fashion in the Kristapurana. When
Stephens invokes it, he does not do so simply to translate key concepts
of Christian doctrine for his Marathi-speaking readers. He also localizes
those concepts, displacing and transforming them in ways that vividly
conjure the details of the Goan landscape. When, for example, Stephens
describes the rebuilding of Jerusalem, he writes that:
Draqhe vely puspa taru bhina zahale
Zuna taddamadda bhumy paddale
Teanche tthai vruqhe vaddhale
Apaisse
[Grape vines, flowers and trees fell apart
Old high coconut and palm trees fell to the ground
In their place trees grew
Naturally].32

Here, Stephens imagines a Jerusalem that has fallen from its former glory, a
glory associated not just with vines and flowers, but also with the coconut
tree. His term for the latter in this passage is not the heavenly kalpataru of
Sanskrit mythology, however, but “taddamadda”—a local Konkani word
that, describing the soaring height of mixed groves of coconut and palmyra
trees, helps Stephens reimagine the original Jerusalem as a version of the
contemporary Konkan coast. As a result, the paradisal bliss that Christian
doctrine associates with a lost past is subtly outsourced to Stephens’s and
his readers’ Indian present.
Describing the animals afflicted by the waters of the Great Flood,
Stephens again evokes the local coconut-rich landscape with a word that
points to neither Christian doctrine nor Hindu mythology, but an actual
experience of a Goan coconut tree. This time the word in question is Marathi:
Veagra bocaddiyã saue põuaty
Zalli siha sardhalla craddaty
Zallachare manuxanssi mellaty
Nariyelli vari
[The tigers swim with the sheep
In the water the lions play with smaller cats
Those living in the water meet men
Atop the coconut tree].33
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Stephens here describes the devastation wrought by the biblical flood
as an inversion of cosmic order: its water levels the hierarchical distinctions between species and between heights, placing mighty and weak
animal, treetop and submarine seascape, in unexpected proximity. For
modern readers, this might sound less like the flood as conceived in the
Bible than a description of the tsunami that crashed into India’s coconutlined Coromandel Coast in 2004. But the stanza has a more specifically
Goan resonance. Stephens’s concluding line invokes the Nariyelli, a commonplace Marathi term for the coconut; the image he conjures with the
Nariyelli, of men atop the coconut tree, is a powerful one in Goa even
today. For the coconut trees of the region are scaled daily by agile men
who tap the fruit for water and toddy. Stephens may not have adapted his
body to clamber up coconut trees in search of libations. During his forty
years in India, however, the Nariyelli was the agent of numerous other
recalibrations of his body and its flesh.
These recalibrations of the flesh are why we cannot dismiss Stephens
as simply an agent of European colonial power. To this day, his name is associated in Goa with the flowering of Konkani as a literary language.34 And
Stephens has additionally served as a standard-bearer for Goa’s other indigenous languages: in the mid-twentieth century, at the height of the Quit
India movement, his praise of Marathi from the Kristapurana was posted
widely in non-Christian venues throughout Goa, such as the Saraswat
Brahman Samaj’s library in Margão. 35 Stephens did not just convert
Brahmins to Christianity. He and his Christianity were also transformed
by the Goan ecosystem, including the coconuts he encountered there.

***
In light of Stephens’s coconut, then, we can revisit Stephano’s pignut.
When we read the two nuts contrapuntally, we might see Stephens’s
Marathi poem as a counter-Tempest, and Shakespeare’s English play as a
counter-Kristapurana.36 Written unbeknownst to each other in the early
1610s, they constitute a conflicting canon of early modern nutty writing.
They also represent sharply different ways of thinking about the experiences of migrant bodies and the agency of food in the contact zone.
The phrase “contact zone” is, of course, Mary Louise Pratt’s. She
uses it to refer to “social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple
with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of
power, such as colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived
out in many parts of the world today.”37 Pratt’s definition of the contact
zone is curiously disembodied: it rightly thinks about cultural encounters
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and power relations, but it finesses the ways in which these encounters and
relations are mediated by, and imprinted on, bodies. The documents of
early modern literary nut-writing allow us to put not just human but also
non-human bodies back into what we might call the edible contact zone.
The Tempest’s pignuts are never allowed to be anything other than
fodder that serves the European migrant’s need to continue functioning
as himself. As we have seen, the play’s nuts are simply inert commodities accumulated through indentured native labor for consumption by
European masters. The nuts exist only to maintain European health and to
safeguard a political economy in which European supremacy is assumed.
By contrast, the Kristapurana, and indeed the life story of Stephens in
Goa, suggest that nuts are not simply consumable goods. They are also
actors that transform migrant bodies. In Shakespeare’s plays, the nut has
an uncanny power to swerve from the familiar to the strange. But that
power is somehow diminished as soon as the nut becomes food; then it is
simply a means by which a European can remain a European. What I have
called Shakespeare’s capacity for nutty thought, then, is nonetheless blind
to an embodied power that Stephens more fully recognizes—that the nut
not only comes from a brave new world, but can also open up a new world
within the body of the person who eats it. This opening up is equally an
adaptation to a larger ecology—an edible contact zone—within which
nuts and humans meet, become bonded as fellow actors, and with transformative effect.
No matter how much the nut may transform settler bodies within
the edible contact zone, however, we must still attend to the shaping political economy within which the nut is made available to its foreign eater.
The mere fact of transformation by a nut does not mean that larger colonialist social relations and forms of labor must be likewise transformed. If
Stephens did not himself clamber up coconut trees to retrieve coconuts,
who did? Which Calibans cracked his coconuts for him? Which Calibans
labored to safeguard his health? In telling the story of the miraculous
powers of the coconut in Goa, it is perhaps too easy to forget the stubborn
power of an economy in which labor was divided in entirely colonialist
ways. Stephens was doubtless the beneficiary of an early version of this
economy—which is to say, he must have assumed the privileges of a gora
sahib (white master) served by Indian peons.
Yet there were other economies at work in Stephens’s career, economies in which power was not organized in quite so predictable a fashion.
From whom did he learn local languages, including vernacular Konkani
and high Marathi? From whom did he learn the complexities of the
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ovi form? From whom did he learn about Eknath? Stephens immersed
himself in the local literary tradition in a way that few other early European
settlers did and, as a result, mastered Konkani, Marathi, and their poetic
forms. But his education would have demanded that he submit to other
local masters. How much did he have to submit, not just intellectually, but
also physically, to his Indian gurus? How, for example, did he sit during his
Marathi lessons? How did he turn the pages of Marathi Puranas—perhaps
inscribed on coconut leaves—such as Eknath’s? How, in short, might his
body have adapted not only to the plant life, but also to the classrooms of
the Konkan coast? How did his body change in ways that not only served
the ends of the Portuguese colonial state but also traced the outlines of
rather different modes of contact between foreigner and local?
In the edible contact zone of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
Goa, then, the asymmetry of power relations in favor of European colonialist hegemony cannot always be presumed in advance. The coconut
was, in Stephens’s case, a node within a complex, dynamic network of
social relations that entailed considerable fluctuations of power, identity, and bodily habits. Within and without its nutshell, we find infinite
space, at least in terms of lifeworlds that exceed the standard narratives of
colonial history and European imperialism, including The Tempest. And
that is why, in my nutty reworking of The Tempest prompted by Thomas
Stephens’s Kristapurana, Stephano will not only eat the nuts Caliban
gives him: he will also learn the language of Caliban and Sycorax, write
an ode to Setebos, and train his fingers to dig banquets of pignuts under
the bewitching influence of fenny—that is, cashew-nut liqueur. In my
Tempest, then, Stephano—like his near-namesake Stephens—will go nuts.
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Flying Blind, Going Nuts: A Response to
Jonathan Gil Harris
Subha Mukherji
This delightful tour de force of nutty thought does not only give us a
tantalizing route into nuts and people, colonialism and consumption,
Prospero’s isle and the island of Goa, The Tempest and the Kristapurana,
Stephano and Stephens. It also opens casements onto the power of small
things to act as unsuspected portals for worlds of possibility, realized or
longed for, the capacity of passive objects to function as active agents
of epistemic swerves into worlds elsewhere—in life and in fiction, for
actors, authors, and readers alike. It draws us into the blind spots that we
need to outstare for such insights. Methodologically, then, it goes to the
heart of the idea behind this book. The diminutiveness of such puncta—
needle-like wounds and apertures that lead us into woody places in the
text that are hidden from the light of common day and common sense—
makes it particularly delicious that the tiny fairy in A Midsummer Night’s
Dream is the one whose ad/venture it is to fetch new nuts for the character who is most “translated” by a physical change. And it is a translation
that registers in literal-minded Bully Bottom’s language, which smacks
more numinously but less literally of nuts than Thomas Stephens’s: the
weaver weaves himself into sense as he tries to grasp the texture of his
dream, which feels—well, a bit like having gone blissfully nuts. For the
lovers too, who feel something similar at the end of that play, it happens
through a substance infiltrating the body (the love-juice). A larger point
arising is that of somatic agency in knowledge. For all the fashion of
body criticism, have we asked the right questions about embodiment and
epistemology?
Interesting, too, is the transition from spectator to inter-actor.
The flying fish and obscure birds of Stephens’s epistolary report of his
long sea voyage give way to the coconut that becomes “incorporate” in
the porous colonial body (as the Gothic queen Tamora becomes incorporate in Rome) and cross-cultural poetry. What knowledges do such
osmoses as these instill in the human agent who is also inscribed by the
non-human object, which takes on agency as it transforms him? Is the
coconut like Bottom’s ass’s head, a physical object—a prop—that transforms being without usurping it quite? What complicates the structural
symmetry of transactions is that one of the agents is an inanimate fruit.
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Is its surprising agency constituted or undermined by the knowingness
of the person ingesting or absorbing it, unlike the passivity of the human
agent when Puck squeezes love-juice into Titania’s eye? Can the metonymic object be a stage prop too? How conscious is Thomas “Stephano”
of the cultural capital to be drawn from the edible contact zone of a
foreign environment where he not only wants but needs to be accepted?
How easily can this relation be destabilized, and does that require the
agency of the colonized? Even when the “other” is a nut rather than a
manipulative foreign queen, how reversible is the agent–object relation
in this exchange?
The other factor I wonder about, in the specific context of the
nariyel, is that of labor. Does it matter that it probably was not Patri
Guru Stephens who climbed the tall tree, as Gil says, but an agile, “wondrous necessary” native, quite possibly someone in a servant capacity,
aiding colonial provision in unfamiliar heat (not to speak of the cultivation of the trees)? 38 Does the prehistory of the coconut getting into
the body of the missionary foreigner change the counters in this act of
transformation? A story I grew up hearing comes back to haunt me.
My friend Santanu’s family, from our South Calcutta neighborhood,
had a trusty servant, “Ramani,” who had served a British family home
in the city before Independence. 39 He was a great raconteur. One of
his stories was how his British masters would call out for him—the
“khansama” or “Johnny”—and offer him a penny if he could crack open
a coconut: “Johnny Johnny, one penny” was the refrain. When the
water was extracted, the “shaheb” would drink it and say “good water,
good water.” Ramani-da also recalled how the British played football
with “narkols” (and Americans “soccer,” when they visited briefly to
drop a bomb on the Howrah Bridge). So the coconut in this second
scenario was not just an agent in the labile contact zone but functional in homosocial bonding and phenomenological change through
an act of colonial bricolage in the world of Western sports: reinvented
as a ball, it impinged on the white male body and its practices, not
just as taste and texture but as exertion, not as pulp but as play—to
be chased, dribbled, exchanged on the plains of Bengal; entering the
zone of competitive contact (who gets “passed” the coconut-ball), and
then to be prised open to be savored, all filtered through the memory
of Ramani the manservant (ban-ban Ca-Caliban) who was called upon
to serve it and paid in small change for his small labor. In his later postindependence days, the subaltern spoke, to his new (Bengali) masters,
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their children and their friends—like Iachimo in captivity, repossessing
the scene with performance. The nut can be a prop for the native
too! But then again, did he have the last word? The memory trace is
cathected through these middle-class children, now academics in the
West. The point is that these relations are often uncanny “walnuts”
themselves—I love the way Gil touches on the etymology of the word,
suggesting both quotidian wall and threatening foreignness. It reminds
me of what Derrida calls the paradoxical affiliation of hostis—etymologically evoking both host and guest, for between host and hostage is
one small step, as Lear knew when he was turned out “at gates,” his own
gates, by his daughter and son-in-law.
And yet, even as I raise these questions, I am moved by the sense of
joy and indeed of “love,” as Gil puts it, that comes across in the ovi stanzas of Stephens’s Marathi poetry. Through all the social constructivism we
may be legitimately tempted to test the thesis against, there is a certain
irreducibility of affect that can only be conveyed elusively in the feel of
the poetry and—perhaps in a segue into self—in Gil’s delightful narrative (i.e., it takes delight in capturing this), even while he acknowledges
shrewd calculation, strategy, and pragmatism underlying some of Thomas
Stephens’s moves. This interests me not only personally and biographically, but also critically. Is affect one of the blind spots in the necessarily
politicized field of contact zone studies? Have we found a way of fully
incorporating it yet in the knowledges we seek through our obstinate
questionings and disciplinary rigors? What I find missing in a lot of the
relevant critical writing is play—which this essay is quick with. And this in
turn makes me wonder if the edible, audible, and olfactory contact zones
are not potentially also zones of a peripateia in the migratory, especially
colonial, plot? That something can in fact reverse at these thresholds, and
a transition can be effected from one stage to another? Perhaps Stephano
fails to enter the proffered dream because in this, Shakespeare’s most compact and Aristotelian play, the encounter has to be momentuous rather
than processive; the shift from object to agent does not get fully triggered (unlike, perhaps, in The Winter’s Tale)—though I wonder where
Puck stands in this spectrum. Stephano is not made of words either, in the
way that so many of our Shakey characters are. And language, as Barthes
knew, is a skin—another surface of contact. Gil’s reading of the language
of Stephens’s poetry (and letters) opens up the possibility of tracing bodily knowledge through linguistic texture—from one form to another is a
fluid passage.
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Yet the boundary of potential passage remains fugitive and precarious, which is why I wonder if desire needs to be brought into the
equation for a full understanding of such encounters. I would love to hear
what place it has in Gil’s larger narrative and project. At the cost of risking a relapse into the conceptual from the embodied, I want to put some
pressure on the kalpataru as a generic metaphor, rather than, straightforwardly, a coconut tree. In different parts of India, the name is given to
different trees: the famous kalpataru in Badrinath, for example, is a mulberry tree; the one I knew in our village home in Birbhum was a banyan.
Also called the kalpavriksha, the kalpataru is, after all, etymologically and
semantically, as well as in Hindu myth and Sanskrit literature, the “wishfulfilling tree”—kalpa is a derivative of the Sanskrit kalpana, meaning
imagination, fantasy. It evokes the fantasy and desire of the white body
to not just claim, but belong to, a paradise of osmosis that might replace,
even displace, or transform, an anti-paradise of possession, conversion,
and conquest of a non-white, largely non-Christian people. In Agamben’s
terms, the end sometimes wants to forget its beginning. Perhaps the
haunting, namaaj-like chants of the Kristapurana in present-day Goa,
distantly resonant in Cambridge and Delhi on YouTube, are a token of that
forgetting—which is also an alternative form of memory; a re-membering
at once assimilative and recuperative. The precise impossibility of this, in
Stephens’s case, makes poignant his poetics and somatics of desire, and
makes his literary use of the coconut “lawful as eating,” if only in a lived
romance.40 The body is not elided, but both sensed and emplotted. Might
one go as far as to say that embodiment and narrative are woven together,
just as doctrine dissolves into affect, as Stephens gives Christian concepts a
local habitation and a name?
Even if Shakespeare’s Stephano failed to either feel or recognize
the transformative potential of the merely edible nut, Shakespeare knew
about the potency of nutty thought—not just in relation to small objects
or infiltrating substances, but liminal moments, spaces, even creatures—
for example, dreams as a threshold state of heightened perception. What
Gil’s argument draws in is the sense of an active transaction. The point
about the multiform, polylavent nut is that it is, and is not, a nut. It is an
operative counterpart for that dimension of the theatre that trains us to
see double, with parted eyes. As a point of entry, it tempts me into my
own nutty swerve, and makes me introduce a point of exit into a world
apart: “Exit, pursued by a bear” (The Winter’s Tale 3.3.58). Theseus
and common sense tell us that a bush is a bush and a bear is a bear, but
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the play shows us that a man can turn into an ass! So the bear in The
Winter’s Tale is both material and metonymic, and, through the terrible
sportiveness of its own act of eating (and the clown’s recounting of it), it
somehow makes lawful the transition between winter and spring, cruelty and joy, death and life, loss and restoration, the “familiar” Sicily and
the “strange” Bohemia; indeed, between tragedy and comedy. Perhaps
it also has something to do with the fluidity of bears—the polar bears
brought into England and put on show by Henslowe et al., and their possible interchangeabilty in the theatre with bears of fantasy presented by a
big bouncy person in bearskin. The edible contact zone where Antigonus
becomes mere food but Perdita is rescued into life is also the eldritch
space of tragicomic reversal and formal experiment, and a surrender to a
world elsewhere. Is there a generic story that I am trying to get at? Should
I be? Or have I eaten too many nuts?
Infinite riches in a little nut! But remember, ceci n’est pas une noix ...
NOTES
A version of this essay appears in the Shakespeare Jahrbuch, vol. 153 (2017).
“nut, n. 1 and adj. 2,” I.i. Oxford English Dictionary Online, consulted
December 2, 2016.
3
See, for example, Kerr, Shakespeare’s Flowers, 3: “the flowers Shakespeare
loved best were the flowers of his childhood and his home. These were the ones
he chose ‘to hold, as ’twere, the mirror up to nature.’” Thomas and Faircloth assert
that, “the language of plants, a commonplace of the rural world, was augmented
in Shakespeare’s London by ‘green desire,’ a new-found passion for plants and gardens” (Shakespeare’s Plants and Gardens, 1), but they also note, in ways that resonate with my argument in this essay, that Shakespeare’s references to plants are
prompted by a fascination with exotic flora and fauna.
4
All references to Shakespeare’s plays will be to The Arden Shakespeare
Complete Works, edited by Proudfoot, Thompson, and Kastan.
5
Cavendish, “Of Many Worlds in This World,” line 12. In Cavendish, Poems
and Fancies, 45.
6
On the history of Lucretian thought in early modern England, see Stones,
“The Atomic View of Matter in the XVth, XVIth, and XVIIth Centuries”;
Kargon, Atomism in England from Hariot to Newton; Lezra, Unspeakable Subjects;
and Harris, “Atomic Shakespeare.” For a fuller account of Cavendish’s own somewhat ambiguous engagement with atomism, see Goldberg, “Margaret Cavendish,
Scribe”; and Harris, Untimely Matter in the Time of Shakespeare, 160–61.
7
“The first element is Germanic *wal […] ‘Welshman,’ i.e. Celtic or Roman
foreigner,” “walnut, n.1,” Oxford English Dictionary, online.
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See Culpeper, Complete Herbal, and English Physician, 37, for a description
of the “Sussex pignut” (which he includes under the heading of “Earth Chesnut”).
9
The etymology of “filbert” is Norman French: Saint Philbert’s feast day is
on August 20, and the plant was most likely renamed for him because the nuts
matured on or around this day. See “filbert, n. and adj.,” Oxford English Dictionary,
online.
10
An extensive natural and cultural history of nuts is, to the best of my knowledge, yet to be written. But the budding nuxologist may wish to make a pilgrimage to the Leavenworth Nutcracker Museum in Leavenworth, Washington State:
it is a startlingly capacious archive of all things nut-related, including nutcrackers.
Its website offers a brief but useful account of the global history and geography
of nuts: www.nutcrackermuseum.com/history_nuts.htm (accessed October 22,
2018).
11
Herbert, “Providence,” lines 130–32, in The English Poems of George
Herbert, p. 109.
12
See Harris, Indography, esp. 1–22.
13
Fletcher, The Island Princess, 1.3.16–18, 26–31.
14
Fitch, “The Voyage of M. Ralph Fitch,” 465–504.
15
In his travel narrative, Fitch mentions only that Stephens was “an English
Jesuit”; in a private letter written from Goa in January 1584, he says that Stephens
and Marco “did sue for us unto the Viceroy and other officers,” And, “if they had
not stuck to us, if we had escaped with our lives yet we had long imprisonment.”
Fitch’s letter is also reproduced in Locke, The First Englishmen in India, 89.
16
My biographical information about Stephens derives from the following sources: Saldanha, The Christian Puranna of Father Thomas Stephens of the
Society of Jesus; Schurhammer, “Thomas Stephens 1549–1619”; Singh, “The First
Englishman in India”; and Southwood, “Thomas Stephens.” See also Harris, The
First Firangis, 47–70.
17
Stephens’s letter to his father is reproduced in Saldanha, The Christian
Puranna, xxvi–xxx.
18
Saldana, The Christian Puranna, xxvi, xxvii.
19
Saldana, The Christian Puranna, xxviii.
20
Saldana, The Christian Puranna, xxviii.
21
Saldana, The Christian Puranna, xxvii.
22
Stephens’s Latin letter to his brother Richard is also reproduced in
Saldanha, The Christian Puranna, xxx–xiv
23
Quoted in Saldanha, The Christian Puranna, xxx.
24
My discussion of pre-Portuguese and early colonial Goa is indebted to de
Souza, Goa Through the Ages; Lach, Asia in the Making of Europe, 381–91; and
Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500–1700, 80–85.
25
For an extensive if somewhat reverential biography of Francis Xavier, see
Schurhammer, Francis Xavier.
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My discussion of Konkani is indebted to Ivo Coelho’s introduction to the
facsimile edition of Stephens, Arte de Lingoa Canarim.
27
Original editions of the Kristapurana do not survive, so I have worked
with Saldanha’s 1907 Marathi edition. The Marathi of this edition is rendered
in Roman rather than Devanagari script. All English translations are mine, with
considerable help from Vibha Kamat and Suresh Walawalikar.
28
It is important to remember that, even if the Jesuits initially worked
with the sanction of the Portuguese colonial state, they were not identical to it.
Although King João III had appointed Francis Xavier as his Apostolic Nuncio
in Portuguese India, the Jesuits did not operate straightforwardly within the
machinery of colonialism and empire. Stephens’s mission to translate the Word of
God into local vernaculars may have not fallen foul of state law in his lifetime, but
it did later, as, indeed, did the Jesuit order in general. After several years of sustained pressure, the colonial authorities banned the use of vernacular languages in
1684 and declared Portuguese the sole official language. Stephens’s Kristapurana
suddenly became a problematic text. The poem went even further underground
with the (temporary) suspension of the Jesuit order in 1773, as a result of which
many texts associated with the Society of Jesus were destroyed. This might be the
reason why not a single copy of the first three editions of the Kristapurana survives today. But, in the wake of the vernacular language ban and the suspension of
the Jesuits, the Kristapurana survived in largely secretive, oral form among Goan
and Malabari Christians. In the process, it became a powerful rallying point for
anti-colonial sentiment; it was still recited with pride by Marathi-speaking Indian
freedom fighters at the height of Gandhi’s Quit India Movement in the 1940s.
29
Saldanha, The Christian Puranna (Auasuari 1, ovis 123–24).
30
Stephens’s debts to Eknath, as well as to earlier practitioners of the ovi
tradition such as Dnyaneshwar, are discussed by Staffner, “Fr. Stephens’ Christa
Puranna,” and Silva, “Thomas Stephens, S. J.”
31
Quoted in Saldanha, The Christian Puranna, xxxii–xxxiii.
32
Quoted in Saldanha, The Christian Puranna, 179 (Auasuari 33, ovi 16).
33
Quoted in Saldanha, The Christian Puranna, 42 (Auasuari 7, ovi 77).
34
The association of Stephens’s name with the flowering of Konkani as a literary language is in no small part due to the Thomas Stephens Konknni Kendr in
the Goan parish of Bardez, which houses an extraordinary archive of Konkani
texts by Stephens and other non-Portuguese Goan writers of the past four centuries. Stephens has also recently become a figurehead for the indigenous Romi
Konknni Movement, whose objective is to have Roman-script Konkani declared
one of the official languages of Goa.
35
This story comes from Vibha Kamat.
36
The practice of reading “contrapuntally” means reading a text from the
double perspective of imperialist ideology and the means of production or forms
of resistance that it might efface, “with an understanding of what is involved when
26
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an author shows, for instance, that a colonial sugar plantation is seen as important
to the process of maintaining a particular style of life in England” (Said, Culture
and Imperialism, 66).
37
Pratt, “Arts of the Contact Zone,” 34.
38
A phrase used by Beatrice-Joanna to describe Deflores, the charismatic
court servant who at once repels and fascinates her and who both serves and dominates her through erotic complicity, in Middleton and Rowley, The Changeling,
5.1.92.
39
Delighted thanks go to Santanu Das, the source of this story, himself a
raconteur par excellence.
40
Shakespeare, The Winter’s Tale, 5.3.111, in The Arden Shakespeare.
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Chapter 3

Eyes Wide Shut: Seeing and
Knowing in Othello
Supriya Chaudhuri

“Give me the ocular proof.”
(Othello, 3.3.363)1

I

F KNOWLEDGE, LIKE VISION, has its blind spot or punctum
caecum, the analogy with the faculty of sight would suggest that it is a
not-knowing at the very core of knowing, one for which knowledge seeks
incessantly to compensate. The point is relevant to Othello, a play obsessed
with seeing, yet one that repeatedly falls back upon imagined spectacles
as substitutes for visual evidence. “Give me the ocular proof,” says Othello
to Iago: “Make me to see’t.” To this Iago replies, “Would you, the supervisor, grossly gape on? / Behold her topped? ... It is impossible you should
see this” (3.3.363–64, 398–99; 405). The exchange has been much commented on in a number of contexts, from Shakespeare’s literal dependence
upon Cinthio for the phrase “ocular proof,” to the links between spying,
sexual jealousy, and theatrical spectatorship.2 Nevertheless, it retains its
power to trouble us, constituting the paradox at the heart of the play’s visual dynamic. The impossibility of Othello’s actually seeing the act of adultery that Iago attributes to Desdemona is almost physically tied in to the
assumed primacy of sight in their relationship: on her part, the fact that
“she had eyes, and chose me” (3.3.192), and, on his, the call to witness:
“Look where she comes / If she be false, O then heaven mocks itself / I’ll
not believe’t” (3.3.281–83). Yet that very reliance on the evidence of the
eyes, signaled more than once in this play, is betrayed by the fluency with
which seeing becomes a metaphor or a mental act, from Desdemona’s seeing “Othello’s visage in his mind” (1.3.253) to Othello’s frantic probing of
the “monster” in Iago’s thought, “too hideous to be shown” (3.3.110–11).
So too, as Iago calmly assures him, where knowledge cannot be based upon

76   Supriya Chaudhuri

sense perception, it must be derived from “imputation and strong circumstances” (3.3.409): that is, from inference and background information.
There is a curious link here to the psychophysiology of the blind spot in
the human eye.
Anatomically, the punctum caecum, first detected by the French
physicist Edmé Mariotte in 1668, is the small area in the retina where
the optic nerves pass through the optic disc, thus making vision possible.
Lacking photoreceptors entirely, the junction forms a blind spot, or stain
(Mariotte named it la tache aveugle) in the field of sight. This hole—a
punctum, or puncture at the heart of seeing—is filled in by the physiology of binocular vision, the other eye supplying what one does not see,
repairing the neural gap by a visual overlap, and restoring “wholeness” to
sight. But, even when the blind spot is isolated—if one sees with a single eye—the brain’s psychological mechanisms work to “paper over” the
neural gap with information from the background, so that there is no perceptible empty space or stain in the field of vision. The place of the spot
we do not see is filled in by what is adjacent to it in the visual field. The
phenomenological analogy, with consciousness and the cognitive process,
was not far to seek. In May 1960, Maurice Merleau-Ponty began a section
of his “Working Notes” for the unfinished manuscript of The Visible and
the Invisible with the following statements:
Blindness (punctum caecum) of the “consciousness.”
What it does not see it does not see for reasons of principle, it is
because it is consciousness that it does not see. What it does not see
is what in it prepares the vision of the rest (as the retina is blind at
the point where the fibers that will permit the vision spread out into
it). What it does not see is what makes it see.3

“What it does not see is what makes it see.” Inevitably, Merleau-Ponty
is fascinated by this blindness at the origin of sight, by the fact that the
seeing eye is occluded at the very point where vision becomes possible.
For him this constitutive incapacity of sight is key to the complex psychophysical relation between body and world, visible and invisible, touchable and non-touchable: like Shakespeare, he uses the analogy of the glove
to speak of the reversibility of inside and outside.4 Jacques Lacan refers to
these passages repeatedly in Seminar XI to work through his idea of the
inside-out structure of the gaze (le regard), and the notion of “scotoma”
(blind spot) or “scotomization,” a metaphor for méconnaissance (misrecognition) in his celebrated analysis of Holbein’s “The Ambassadors.”5

EYES WIDE SHUT   77

For Merleau-Ponty, the “blind spot” of consciousness is what we cannot
even acknowledge as a lack because consciousness works to conceal it.
Othello’s blind spots are very much a phenomenon of this kind: the point
is not that he fails to see but that his imagination persuades him he is seeing what is not there to be seen.
In Vanities of the Eye, the historian Stuart Clark argued that the
“ocularcentrism” of the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, associated
with “the rationalization of sight,” perspectival naturalism in painting, and
major advances in optics, in fact generated a profound visual crisis.6 Taking
his title from the Oxford scholar George Hakewill’s The Vanitie of the Eye
(1608), a scathing attack on the faculty of sight, Clark suggests that early
modern visual regimes were, despite their power, subject to deep internal
uncertainty: “John Berger once wrote: ‘The relation between what we see
and what we know is never settled’; my argument will be that this relation
was particularly unsettled in late Renaissance Europe. In one context after
another, vision came to be characterized by uncertainty and unreliability,
such that access to visual reality could no longer be normally guaranteed.
It is as though European intellectuals lost their optical nerve.”7
Right from antiquity to the seventeenth century, the relations
between the three elements of the Aristotelian chain of cognition, perceiver, medium, and perceived object, were being renegotiated. Medieval
optics, divided between conflicting theories of vision and cognition
in Greek science, was signally advanced by Arab philosophers such as
Al-kindi and Alhazen, but the question of how visible species, or “likenesses” of objects in the visual field, were propagated by the eye to the
brain and received by internal senses such as imagination continued to be
problematic.8 Even after Johannes Kepler’s discovery of the inverted retinal image (pictura) produced through intromitted rays received by the
crystalline lens (thus explicitly distinguishing the physical optics of image
formation from the psychological optics of vision), the problems were by
no means solved. Clark concludes that the 250 years between the early
fifteenth and late seventeenth centuries ended in a “collapse of the ‘representational’ model of vision based on species,” while “visual anomalies and
paradoxes multiplied to such a degree that they overwhelmed the cognitive theory that permitted them to occur.”9 In consequence, it is the very
primacy accorded to sight in most accounts of the senses and of the cognitive process that allows Hakewill to prove, “That the eies serue not only
as treacherous porters, and false intelligencers in naturall and artificiall
things, but also as secret intelligencers, for discovering the passions of the
minde and diseases of the body.”10
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Yet, as Clark acknowledges, the period is also characterized by
intense visual hunger, not unrelated to the Augustinian “lust of the eyes”
behind Othello’s demand for ocular proof, and the sexual innuendo on
“satisfaction” with which Iago responds (3.3.397). 11 What is rendered
obscene and “hideous”—or, by a folk etymology discussed by Michael
Neill, hidden—in Othello is the sexual act itself, which Stanley Cavell, in
an influential reading of the play, makes equivalent to murder: “My guiding hypothesis about the structure of the play is that the thing denied our
sight throughout the opening scene—the thing, the scene, that Iago takes
Othello back to again and again, retouching it for Othello’s enchafed
imagination—is what we are shown in the final scene, the scene of murder. This becomes our ocular proof of Othello’s understanding of his two
nights of married love.”12
At the very start of the play, Brabantio is roused from his dream
by Iago and Roderigo’s crying the news of his daughter’s sexual truancy
aloud: “Even now, now, very now, an old black ram / Is tupping your white
ewe!” (1.1.87–88). Shouted into the darkness of the night, Iago’s lewd
visualization of the carnal act corresponds, Brabantio confesses, to the
substance of his dream: “This accident is not unlike my dream / Belief of it
oppresses me already” (1.1.140–41). What Brabantio does not see is what
he has already seen in his dream, and therefore already “knows.” For him,
the transition from the “eye of the mind” to the bodily eye—Aristotle
had declared in his De Anima that “visual images appear even to those
whose eyes are closed”—is superseded by what we might call a preemptive
leap of cognition.13 Yet what father dreams of his daughter so engaged? If
we recall Prospero’s “take my daughter” injunction to Ferdinand in The
Tempest (4.1.13–23), we must say: every Father, which, in a Lacanian
sense or under the sign of patriarchy, includes husbands and brothers.
There is a running parallel between Brabantio and Othello through the
play, especially in the insistence on Desdemona’s obedience, filial or marital (1.3.179–80, 4.1.255–56, and 3.3.89). That Desdemona, in a response
worthy of Cordelia herself, has carefully divided her duty and obedience
between father and husband is irrelevant in this proprietary context. Once
married, Desdemona has no wish to put her father “in impatient thoughts /
By being in his eye” (1.3.243–44). Brabantio’s impatience, like Othello’s,
is surely less anger than a form of sexual jealousy fixed on the object “in
his eye,” but not in his possession: an object towards which, in a crucial
aspect, he has been blind.
For a play so obsessed with the faculty of sight, Othello records a
persistent anxiety about actual seeing. When Desdemona declares that
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she “saw Othello’s visage in his mind,” she refuses the conventional receiving of visual images, or species, in her mind, instead replacing Othello’s
physical “visage” by a composite of his mental qualities, which become
the imaginary object of her “seeing.” How, Brabantio asks, could a girl
brought up so modestly as Desdemona “fall in love with what she feared
to look on?” (1.3.99). The answer that both Othello and Desdemona give
to this question has more to do with the faculty of hearing than that of
sight, with the “greedy ear” Desdemona opened to “devour” Othello’s discourse, urging him to “dilate” his adventures (1.3.150, 154). At one level,
this love seems exemplary, a product of what the senator calls “such fair
question / As soul to soul affordeth” (1.3.114–15), rather than the charms
and poisons of which Othello stands accused. At another level, however,
there appears to be something missing. The Neoplatonic “soul to soul”
communion of Donne’s “The Extasie” or “The Good-Morrow” is founded
on the exchange of looks between the full, dilated eyes of the lovers as they
gaze at each other (“My face in thine eye, thine in mine appears,” “The
Good-Morrow,” 15).14 Though the terms “dilate” and “dilation” in Othello,
brilliantly linked by Patricia Parker both to narrative elaboration and anatomical scrutiny, suggest the opening up of hidden sights or secrets (as in
Iago’s “close dilations,” 3.3.126), the plighting of troth between Othello
and Desdemona is explicitly linked to the opening of the ear that receives
the “dilations” of rhetoric, rather than to the opening of the eyes—“secret
intelligencers for discovering the passions of the minde,” as Hakewill
called them.15
If Othello has charmed Desdemona through her ear, Iago too
resolves, “I’ll pour this pestilence into his ear” (2.3.351). Iago is convinced
that Desdemona’s love, its violence founded on no more than Othello’s
“bragging and telling her fantastical lies,” will not survive, as “her eye must
be fed” (2.1.221, 223). Are the lovers’ eyes wide open or wide shut? The
dilation of the pupil of the eye, commented on as early as the tenth century by the Baghdad physician al-Razi, known in the west as Rhazes, was
traditionally held to indicate sexual arousal, so that women in Renaissance
Italy used drops of poisonous belladonna or deadly nightshade to enlarge
and brighten their eyes.16 Whether or not Desdemona followed this practice, Iago deliberately comments on the sexual provocation of her gaze
(“What an eye she has! Methinks it sounds a parley to provocation”), to
which Cassio responds rather feebly: “An inviting eye, and yet methinks
right modest” (2.3.21–22, 23). The Italian name belladonna, alluding to
the plant’s use as a beauty aid, was applied by John Gerard in his Herball
(1597) to solanum lethale, deadly nightshade or, as Gerard called it, sleepy
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nightshade, closely related to the equally deadly mandragora or mandrake:
“This kind of Nightshade causeth sleepe, troubleth the mind, bringeth
madnesse if a few of the berries be inwardly taken, but if moe be giuen
they also kill and bring present death. Theophrastus in his sixth booke doth
likewise write of Mandrake in this manner, Mandrake causeth sleepe and
if also much of it be taken it bringeth death.”17
“Nor poppy nor mandragora,” says Iago of Othello, “Nor all the
drowsy syrups of the world / Shall ever medicine thee to that sweet sleep /
Which thou owedst yesterday” (3.3.333–36). Mandrake was also believed
to be an aphrodisiac, so Othello may stand to lose more than just sleep. But
what he has already lost—in some sense, appears never to have enjoyed—
is the full reciprocity of the dilated gaze, the “look” that he fears to meet
in death: “How dost thou look now? / ... This look of thine will hurl my
soul from heaven / And fiends will snatch at it” (5.2.270, 272–73). Like
Desdemona’s dead father, whom the sight would have driven to a “desperate
turn,” Othello cannot endure “possession of this heavenly sight” (5.2.205,
276). Even more than the lust of the eyes, it is the impossibility of fully
returning the gaze of the other that constitutes the core of the Othello plot.
Cavell and Neill are surely right in reading “the tragic loading of this bed”—
the “object” that Lodovico commands Iago to “look on,” before it is hidden
from us (“The object poisons sight. / Let it be hid,” 5.2.361–63)—as the
very thing “denied our sight” through the play’s course.18 Yet the obscenity of this sight indicates more than a transgression of sexual and racial
boundaries: it points to a failure of the sight, even a poisoning of it, echoing the play’s obsession with charms, drugs, and poisons such as belladonna
or mandragora, which could also cause blindness and death. The lovers’
inability to use their eyes, whether as secret intelligencers (with Hakewill)
or true witnesses, like Donne’s lovers, whose “true plain hearts do in the
faces rest,” suggests that Othello’s blind spot is Desdemona, or something
in her; hers is Othello, or something in him. By the time Othello demands
of Desdemona, “Let me see your eyes. / Look in my face” (4.2.25–26),
he can no longer recognize her, nor she him. As Desdemona kneels and
Othello commands Emilia to shut the door, he sees only the product of his
and Iago’s imagination: “I took you for the cunning whore of Venice / That
married with Othello” (4.2.91–92).
Philosophically understood, this failure of sight is inevitable at the
point of what Merleau-Ponty would call the intertwining or chiasm of
the seer with the seen: reversibly, being seen, a point of overlap that never
entirely matches. His phrase, “reciprocal insertion and intertwining of
one in the other,” powerfully recalls another of Donne’s images of visual
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exchange: “Our eye-beames twisted, and did thred / Our eyes, upon one
double string” (“The Extasie,” 7–8).19 Reading this section, Lacan comments on how “consciousness, in its illusion of seeing itself seeing itself,
finds its basis in the inside out structure of the gaze.”20 In another of his
working notes from May 1960, Merleau-Ponty wrote: “When I say then
that every visible is invisible, that perception is imperception, that consciousness has a ‘punctum caecum,’ that to see is always to see more than
one sees—this must not be understood in the sense of a contradiction.”21
The blind spot in Othello’s consciousness is located where he sees
himself being seen, misapprehending both himself and the other whose
gaze is intertwined with his own. In consequence, the forensic process of
probation is bound to fail, because the place of what he cannot actually see
in the play is taken up by a superfluity of visual signs and material tokens
that are either misrecognized or overvalued, creating a false compound of
perception and inference.22 Even what should lie at the core of belief, the
truth of reciprocated love between himself and Desdemona, becomes an
object of slanderous reportage as his blackness converts him to a specular
self he must explain or defend. As audience, as spectators, we are drawn, as
Neill suggests, into a prurient and overwhelmingly visual curiosity about
the hidden marriage bed and the actual or deferred scene of physical consummation, ending in Cavell’s monstrous question, “Well, were the sheets
stained or not? Was she a virgin or not?”23
The stain in sight (la tache aveugle) is precisely what we cannot
see. Cavell’s impossible query is central to his reading of the tragedy “as
a kind of epistemological problem, or as the outcome of the problem of
knowledge.”24 Sexuality, the marker of human separateness, is at the heart
of this skeptical crisis. For Othello to accept his own sexual knowledge of
Desdemona is to recognize her as other to himself: faced with the impossibility of that recognition, he chooses rather to degrade and destroy
her. Impressive as this reading is, it proceeds, as Howard Marchitello
observes, “upon a series of assumptions on Cavell’s part—assumptions
about sexuality, Othello and Desdemona’s wedding night, and about narrative and ocularity—, assumptions, in fact, that are very nearly identical
to Othello’s.” 25 That Marchitello then proceeds to compare Othello’s
“anatomization” of Desdemona with Vesalius’s cutting open of the bodies of pregnant women suggests that Cavell’s reading has more of a hold
on him than he is willing to admit.26 Unquestionably, the play’s central
problem is that of knowledge, including sexual knowledge, but there is
a kind of misogynist reduction here. The tragedy does not proceed from
Othello’s epistemological crisis alone: the problem of knowledge afflicts
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everyone in the play, and we share in it as “knowing” spectators in a
catastrophe we are powerless to prevent. Othello is, to an extent unparalleled elsewhere in Shakespeare, the object of our gaze: his blackness,
his military judgment, his sexual prowess, his vulnerability, his jealous
folly, are on display, made into a spectacle by Iago’s relentless, malicious,
possibly erotic obsession with him. The principal external mark set on
him is that of his race, his visible difference from others. Black actors
in particular have had difficulties with this overdetermined, in-your-face
stage presence: Adrian Lester is on record as having tried to deal with it
by including more actors of color in the cast.27 Nevertheless, the visual
overrepresentation or theatrical excess that singles Othello out remains a
major obstacle to our understanding him.
Seeing Othello involves a kind of blindness, manifested in the phobic responses of Brabantio and Iago to Othello’s color, but most in his own
self-doubts: “Haply, for I am black . . . or for I am declined / Into the
vale of years—yet that’s not much— / She’s gone, I am abused” (3.3.267,
269–71). But other sights and things in the play are also infected, like
the “infected house” (4.1.21) of Othello’s memory, by this disease of sight.
Objects, gestures, and actions receive the full weight of a predisposition
to overvalue the visual sign while persistently mis-seeing it or seeing it
only in the imagination. In fact, ocular evidence is largely misleading and
almost wholly manipulated in the play. Both Brabantio and Iago accuse
Desdemona of deceitful appearances, and Iago constructs an entire chain
of false inference from Cassio’s visible behavior, first for Roderigo in Act 2,
then for Othello in Act 4. Most weight, in this play of insistent verbal and
visual repetitions, falls upon a single material object, the handkerchief,
seen where it should not be, imagined where it is not. “I saw the handkerchief ” (5.2.66), says Othello. For him, this seeing converts a murder
to a sacrifice, and Desdemona’s denial “stones” his heart and makes him a
murderer: surely Yeats had this in mind when he observed that too long a
sacrifice can make a stone of the heart?28 Othello’s handkerchief, spotted
with strawberries, dyed in mummy from maidens’ hearts, a gift (of confused provenance) from Othello’s mother, dropped, picked up, planted,
employed as exemplum, is a site of fetish-desire as well as a visual signal. In
the rich and intricate corpus of commentary that has grown up around it,
from Lynda Boose on its spots to Ian Smith on its dye, the handkerchief
has been shown to function as a metatextual placeholder for the play’s governing obsessions: virginity, blackness, wedding sheets and shrouds, ocular
proof, blind spots, delusion, folly.29 It is so clearly a displaced representation of Othello and Desdemona’s wedding sheets, spotted with hymeneal
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blood, that its loss and errancy, to the extent that its embroidered design is
sought to be taken out (copied, but also perhaps removed?), set in motion
a kind of cognitive truancy that ends in Desdemona’s commanding Emilia
to lay out her wedding sheets on what is to be her deathbed. Inevitably,
we do not see the handkerchief again after Act 4, when Bianca declares
to Cassio that, “I’ll take out no work on’t” (4.1.154), as what we see is the
wedding bed, repository of Desdemona’s faith and love, but converted, in
Othello’s chilling (and more than faintly absurd) doggerel, to the unchaste
site where her impure blood must fall: “Forth of my heart those charms,
thine eyes, are blotted, / Thy bed, lust-stained, shall with lust’s blood be
spotted” (5.1.35–36). Powerfully, bathetically, the couplet plots together
the play’s preoccupation with love, charms, eyes, blots, bed, lust, blood,
and spots. In fact, Othello does not shed Desdemona’s blood, leaving the
wedding sheets to bear chaste witness to his folly and her love. If Cavell’s
question remains unanswered, the handkerchief is a material, visible surrogate, though it can scarcely be prominent on stage, justifying Boose’s
and Smith’s focus on attributes (spots, color) that might actually serve
as visual signs.30 But it is also a Lacanian objet petit a, carrying an enormous cognitive overload as fetish-thing and love-token. We know more
about it than we see, through Othello’s mesmeric account of its weaving
by a 200-year-old Sibyl from hallowed silk, its dyeing in mummy from virgins’ hearts, its use as a love-charm, and his injunction to Desdemona to
“Make it a darling, like your precious eye!” (3.4.68). Given this magical
aura, Desdemona’s loss of what should have been the apple of her eye is
like losing the eye of the Gorgon that could turn men into stone, a story
explained by Hakewill as an allegory of “the suddaine astonishment of
men at the raies of her rare beauty.”31 At the same time, there is a bathetic
disjunction, as Rymer noted, between “so remote a trifle” as a handkerchief, and the “passion and repetition” the object attracts in the play.32
If the handkerchief is a visible, risible token of Othello’s cognitive
confusions, causing the blinding physiological reaction of an epileptic fit
(4.1.35–43), its immaterial counterpart is that “cunning whore of Venice”
whom Othello identifies in Desdemona, and whom Iago projects as a
cultural stereotype of Venetian women. This imaginary being is directly
invoked by Iago in the temptation scene and rapidly takes shape as a complex of sensuality, sophistication, immorality, and cunning, about whom
Iago professes an extreme and worldly knowingness, which he seeks to
communicate to Othello. Knowingness, as a substitute for knowledge, is
precisely the mode of cognition that fosters méconnaissance. It is founded
in the background of preconceptions from which information can be
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drawn to supply the cognitive map, even where perceptual knowledge is
lacking. When Thomas Coryate came to report his travels into France and
Italy in 1608, he was already well informed about the famous Venetian
courtesans, seeking only to validate what he already knew. 33 But Iago
affects a much greater degree of knowingness than the relatively naïve
Odcombian traveller, offering his worldly wisdom about the conduct of
Venetian wives as a substitute for anything that Othello can validate from
his own experience. In consequence, what Othello sees as a forensic, probative process—“Make me to see’t, or at the least so prove it / That the
probation bear no hinge nor loop / To hang a doubt on” (3.3.367–69)—is
fatally corrupted by Iago’s interposing local knowledge before proof: “I
speak not yet of proof ... I know our country disposition well” (3.3.199,
294). It is this kind of knowingness that supplies the deficit of the perceptual blind spot, and it may be worth suggesting that both spotted
handkerchief and lustful whore are blind spots of knowledge perceptually
overlaid by information derived from assumption and conjecture.
In conclusion, I will offer some comments on the theatrical fate,
post-Othello, of these two signs: material and immaterial, the handkerchief and the whore. Ben Jonson’s Volpone, written around 1605–6,
reworks several plot elements from Shakespeare’s Othello, performed at
court on November 1, 1604 and written by mid-1602. Influence is usually understood as a linear, temporal sequence, but, if we recall Jonathan
Gil Harris’s brilliant exposition of time in Othello, we might reflect
how questions of influence too can be illuminated by Michel Serres’s
celebrated use of the “handkerchief ” analog y to explain collapsed or
“crumpled time.”34 Serres uses two metaphors to explain temporal relations: first, the idea of percolation or filtering, observing that “Time
doesn’t flow: it percolates”; and second, the handkerchief that can be
crumpled to make spatially distinct points contiguous, and torn apart to
separate what was proximate.35 The uncanny relevance to Othello of an
analogy involving a handkerchief—a temporally confused object in the
play if ever there was one, given its crucial position in the “double time”
of the last three acts—naturally does not escape Harris’s attention. But
additionally, influence requires us to use the notions of percolation on
the one hand and collapsing on the other. It asks us to attend, as Serres
does, to the idea of temporal succession as well as the fact of an experiential, pleated time where objects and events are in surprising conjunction.
Unsurprisingly, then, Othello and Volpone are related not only by parody
but also by prolepsis, and similar relations can be found to obtain between
many of the plays produced around the turn of the century. In particular,
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it is impossible to miss the generic mixtures and textual echoes that link
Shakespeare’s tragedies from this period with Jonson’s “comical satyres”
that (mostly) precede them, a point made by the late Russ McDonald.36
The repetitive combination of sexual obsession, misogyny, fetishism, and
the psychopathology of violence pushes us towards discarding notions of
influence for something closer to an ecology, a sort of moral climate.
Both Othello and Volpone may be classed as plays about knowledge.
In both, the engine of plot is driven by a “knowing” knave who exploits
the ignorance, folly, or self-deception of those around him. Both make
play with the unreliable relation of seeing to knowing, and with blind
spots of knowledge that function like unseen stains in the cognitive field.
Parallels and links between the two plays are numerous: I will focus here
on two, the handkerchief and the whore.37 In Volpone, these signs appear
initially to be replete with meaning, as they are in Othello, but they turn
out in fact to be empty, denied functional privilege, forgotten or discarded
in the course of the play. When Brabantio accuses Othello of stealing
Desdemona from him “by spells and medicines bought of mountebanks”
(1.3.62), he anticipates Volpone’s disguising himself as a mountebank,
Scoto of Mantua, in which role he induces Corvino’s wife Celia to drop
him her handkerchief in payment for a cosmetic powder wrapped in a
paper (Volpone, 2.2). 38 Celia is accused by the jealous Corvino of playing “an actor with your handkerchief,” though he is less like Othello
than like Jonson’s own earlier creation, Thorello, in Every Man In His
Humour (a play in which Shakespeare acted when it was performed in
1598). 39 Corvino charges Celia with having made an assignation with
the mountebank through the exchange of handkerchief and paper, and
we are treated to a truly spectacular display of jealous rage and sadism.
Subsequently, however, these objects disappear entirely from the plot and
from everyone’s minds. The handkerchief is a real, material object, but,
like all such objects of everyday life that we constantly misplace or lose,
it is lost somewhere midway through the play. On the other hand, Mosca
attempts to get rid of Lady Politic by inventing a Venetian courtesan with
whom, he says, he has seen her husband riding in a gondola. Once introduced, the figure proves surprisingly hard to dismiss, being identified
first with Peregrine, then with Celia in the first trial scene, and finally
with Lady Politic herself, but, in that bathetic conclusion, she fades
before the comic menace of Mosca’s threats (5.3.40–45). The courtesan,
so central to all cultural typologies of Venice, floats through the play as
a signifier that, like all stereotypes, has no materiality at all. The figure
introduced by Mosca is a travelling, phantom appearance, settling now
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on one character, now on another. In fact, the immateriality of this figure
oddly replicates the insubstantiality of Iago’s talk about super-subtle, promiscuous Venetian wives (also a cultural stereotype), who are no more in
evidence in Othello than the courtesan is in Volpone.
If sexual knowledge constitutes a blind spot in Othello, money is
the blind spot in Volpone, a play addressing what Karl Marx described as
“the fetishism of commodities and the secret thereof.”40 Volpone explicitly dissociates himself from labor or industry, but is obsessed with the
fetish-value of gold, which he hoards in a site of primitive accumulation,
his treasure chamber. Unwilling to put his financial capital into circulation, he falls prey instead to the delusion that human beings, in a capitalist
economy, can become fluid and current, like money: that he can freely
employ a succession of “character-masks” (again, Marx’s term) to mediate social relations and maximize profits from each interaction. Volpone’s
role-playing, like that of Mosca and the captatores, is directly related to
the commodity-value—that is, the fetish-value—of the objects he pursues,
especially Celia, described by Mosca as “Bright as your gold, and lovely as
your gold!” (Volpone, I.1.575). The problem here is that, as Marx puts it in
a passage that appears to have a direct bearing on the notion of the blind
spot, the qualities of commodities are at once “perceptible and imperceptible by the senses”:
In the same way the light from an object is perceived by us not as the
subjective excitation of our optic nerve, but as the objective form of
something outside the eye itself. But in the act of seeing, there is at
all events, an actual passage of light from one thing to another, from
the external object to the eye. There is a physical relation between
physical things. But it is different with commodities. There, the
existence of the things quâ commodities, and the value relation
between the products of labor which stamps them as commodities,
have absolutely no connection with their physical properties and
with the material relations arising therefrom. There it is a definite
social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things.41

In comedy, a form of imposture that Jonson seems to have regarded
with distrust, laughter is itself a commodity, one that Volpone actively
pursues in the second trial scene, pretending to be dead so as to witness
his clients’ discomfiture when they learn that Mosca is his heir. 42 What
he fails to see is that, once set in motion—even through the archaic
mechanism of inheritance rather than in the market—his own wealth,
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so much the object of universal desire, will act, as Marx foretold, as “a
born leveller and cynic ... ready to exchange not only soul, but body,
with any and every other commodity.”43 Volpone’s unmasking is therefore symbolic on many levels: at the most basic, it strips both master
and slave, Volpone and Mosca, of the status that accrues to them as
owners of commodities that they have neither made nor used, that exist
for them only as an inventory of fetishized objects.
Given that the thrust of Jonson’s plot is towards a relentless demystification of commodity capitalism and its sustaining illusions, it is
scarcely surprising that he should extend this uncompromising critique
to the fetish-object as such. What interests me about Jonson’s reusing of
devices that are markedly overdetermined in the tragic plot of Othello is
the way in which he subjects them to a radical undervaluation: that is,
he robs them of both significance and function. At one level, Volpone
is a reductive reading of Othello, ironing out the “crumpled handkerchief ” of the tragic plot and reassigning relatively minor and transitory
places—in the clear, harsh light of comedy—to exactly those elements of
fetish-obsession and sexual delirium that drive its protagonist to disaster. At another, it magnifies enormously the imbalance instituted in the
Othello plot between what the audience knows and what the play’s characters know. It seizes upon this imbalance—historically attested as one of
the reasons why the play is so painful to watch—as a critical component
of its comic plot, making us complicit in Volpone and Mosca’s defrauding of the captatores, and later in Mosca’s attempt to outwit his master.
Like Iago, Volpone and Mosca take pleasure in co-opting us into a guileful malignity which is, if not entirely motiveless, certainly far in excess
of what a simple profit motive might demand. Esse est interesse: being is
being in, as we realize to our cost, for the play is made by us as much as by
anyone in it. This complicity, which is as much a source of discomfort in
Volpone as our ineffective knowledge is in Othello, suggests that Jonson is
exploring, with Othello perhaps somewhere in his mind, the limitations
of the drama of knowledge.
For fictional knowledge too has its blind spots: “what it does not
see is what makes it see.”44 As it is as much an invention as the fictional
content it claims to read, it fails to recognize its own limitation and powerlessness. Othello’s blindness to the delusions of sight and mind practiced
upon him by Iago, his inability to understand that his view is compromised by its origin at a point of non-reciprocity, is matched by our own
inability, as audience, to intervene in a spectacle that is enacted for us,
but does not return our gaze. We are “knowing” spectators, but cannot
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intervene in the action. Cavell uses the word “impotence” in reference to
Othello, and he is not referring to sexual impotence per se.45 Knowledge,
the kind of knowledge that is produced by fictions—lies, Plato would call
them—is not power but powerlessness. Is this because fiction, by demanding our acquiescence, robs us of agency? I think that Jonson is deeply
worried about this problem, just as Shakespeare was in Othello, and as
he was to be again in The Winter’s Tale, a play of knowing but powerless
agents if ever there was one.
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Seeing Blindness: A Response to
Supriya Chaudhuri
Jonathan Gil Harris
Supriya offers a brilliant unveiling of how Othello, in the words of Stuart
Clark, loses its optic nerve. What her essay allows us to see is the blindness at the center of the play’s fantasies of seeing—or, rather, how blindness is the basis of sight. This punctum caecum comes into shimmering
focus through a variety of interpretive strategies: rigorous historicization (Stuart Clark’s account of the seventeenth century’s crisis of sight),
deft theoretical exfoliation (Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenolog y of miscognition, Lacan’s méconnaissance), suggestive critical contextualization
(Michael Neill’s reading of the spectacle of Desdemona’s marriage/death
bed, Stanley Cavell’s speculation about the “ocular proof ” of sexuality),
and artful comparative reading ( Jonson’s Volpone and its revisualization
of Othello’s handkerchief ). In other words, Supriya makes the play’s blindness visible through a panoply of artful critical interventions.
This panoply uncannily mirrors the diversity of what the play’s characters blindly do to the handkerchief. They “persistently mis-see”—which,
as Supriya’s Lacanian phrasing insists, is equally to “see”—the handkerchief through many different strategies of reading it. Desdemona first
produces it as a remedy for Othello’s headache; Emilia then transforms
it into a gift to win the affection of her husband, Othello into a matrilineal heirloom from an Egyptian sibyl and a token of fidelity gifted by
his father, Cassio into a fashionable item stitched with impressive “work,”
Bianca into a proof of infidelity, Iago into a “medicine” that induces epilepsy. The handkerchief is, like the problematic of seeing in Supriya’s essay,
multiply historicized, theorized, contextualized, compared.
The insubstantial shred of “linen” so reviled by Thomas Rymer is
“persistently mis-seen” not just by the play’s characters, but also by its
audiences, thanks to the multiple stains of narrative it acquires. As Supriya
remarks, in an elegant pun that suggests not only the French term for
blind spot and Othello and Desdemona’s imagined spotted nuptial sheets,
but also the stains of a crumpled and pocketed handkerchief, “The stain in
sight (la tache aveugle) is precisely what we cannot see.” Yet it is the “stain
in sight”—blind spot and imaginary projection alike—that also allows us
to see. In the case of Othello, multiple “stains in sight” prompt us not only
to see the otherwise unseeable handkerchief, but also to visualize, through
the handkerchief, what we are otherwise blind to (sex, Egyptian magic,
artisanal labor, the act of interpretation itself ).
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As a result, Supriya’s multifaceted reading strategy might seem less
an unveiling than a repetition of the play. We should then feel compelled
to ask: what is the blind spot behind her compulsion to see blindness in
Othello? And here a potentially infinite regression suggests itself: what
is the blind spot behind my compulsion to see the blind spot behind
Supriya’s compulsion to see blindness?
Of course, and this is the beauty of Supriya’s essay, she is aware of
this regression and how it ensnares Othello’s spectators. It is one of the
reasons she claims, toward the end of the essay, that: “We are ‘knowing’
spectators, but cannot intervene in the action. Cavell uses the word ‘impotence’ in reference to Othello, and he is not referring to sexual impotence
per se. Knowledge, the kind of knowledge that is produced by fictions—
lies, Plato would call them—is not power but powerlessness.” Precisely.
And this is what makes Othello so painful for many of its viewers: we know
what the characters do not, yet we are helpless to “intervene.”
But, in seeing the characters’ blindness, to what extent do we also
mis-see our own blindness, both in the obvious sense of denying it and in
the Lacanian sense of misrecognizing an image? How does this misrecognition subtly transpose what Cavell sees as the spectator’s “impotence” into
a perverse agency, albeit an agency that we disavow? How do we blindly
intervene in the play, even as we think we are just watching it?
To answer these questions, we might take a detour through another
of Shakespeare’s plays equally obsessed with the blindness of seeing : A
Midsummer Night’s Dream. As Helena notes, in what might serve as a summary of the play, “Love looks not with the eyes but with the mind. / And
therefore is winged Cupid painted blind” (1.1.234–35). Helena describes
the blinded sight not just of the lover, unseeing “things base and vile” and
“transposing” them “into dignity” (1.1.232, 233), but also of the theatrical spectator. To see Pyramus and Thisbe, we also have to actively unsee
Bottom and Flute; to see Helena, we have to actively unsee the boy actor
playing her. These unseeings exemplify what James Calderwood has called
the anamorphism of the play. Seeing blindness in Othello may provoke anxiety and a sense of impotence, but, in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, the
blindness that subtends anamorphic sight becomes the enabling condition
of a delighted poesis or creative remaking. When Theseus says that he does
not believe in antique fables and complains that, in imagination, “how easily is a bush supposed a bear” (5.1.22), we laugh, knowing of course that
he is a character from an antique fable, a fabulous bush who imagines himself a realist bear. But the pleasure we might take in Theseus’s self-blindness
is also potentially a narcissistic pleasure, not only in knowing “Theseus”
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better than Theseus does, but also in our studied blindness to the fact that
this fabled character who does not believe in fables is really an actor playing
a fabled character, transposed by our own as much as the actor’s imaginative art into a superhero. Theseus “himself ” notes this transposition when
he tells Hippolyta to cope with the rude mechanicals’ performance by cultivating a strategic blindness to its dreadfulness: “the worst are no worse if
imagination amend them” (5.1.209–10).
A Midsummer Night’s Dream, then, reminds us of our own art in
seeing (through) blindness. We want our blind spots even as we crave full
vision, because “full” vision is always the product of blindness. And this,
paradoxically, is the blind spot we most unsee—that is, we unsee our own
artful labor in “amending” the object even as we think we see the object
itself. Supriya’s essay is an anamorphic illustration of this artfulness, even
as it seems to cast light primarily on Othello “itself.” I would add that her
essay also performs an elegant counterpoint to my own contribution to
this volume. If, as I argue, we easily unsee the agency of visible objects
upon us, Supriya reminds us of how we equally unsee our own agency as
viewing subjects of those objects. Either way, we both argue for seeing
blindness.
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Towards an Epistemology of the Stage?
A Response to Supriya Chaudhuri
Stephen Spiess
What does the theater know ? At the conclusion of this remarkable
essay, we find ourselves looking at Jonson and Shakespeare looking at
audiences, at their own craft, perhaps even at us, across their respective
fictions. Behind them, one glimpses the specter of Plato, that detractor
of mimesis and derogator of theatrical knowing, ever-haunting discussions of the “kind[s] of knowledge” produced onstage. He is a phantom, a fleeting presence, a wound: he is, I want to suggest, the punctum
of this essay.
I draw here not from Mariotte, Merleau-Ponty, or Lacan, but rather
from Roland Barthes, for whom punctum connotes that “off-center detail,”
that minor element or feature that “rises from the scene, shoots out of
it like an arrow, and pierces me.” 46 For me, the scene is imagined rather
than represented: a fiction of my mind’s eye as opposed to a photograph
or daguerreotype. As I scan the page, those five letters (P-l-a-t-o) perform
a type of work similar to the Barthesian punctum, expanding beyond the
frame, threatening to circumscribe the possibilities for theatrical knowing.
Can we envision theater without Plato? How has the Platonic injunction
blinded us to what theater might know or render knowable? What is concealed or misrecognized in a Western philosophical tradition that rejects
the “kind of knowledge that is produced by fictions?”
The central irony of this dismissal is etymological rather than visual. As with its cognates “theorem,” “theory,” and “theorist,” the English
“theater” derives from a constellation of Greek terms (theatron, thea,
theasthia) that join sight to speculation, view to thought, observation to
contemplation. 47 A site for thinking through seeing, theater nevertheless remains a blind spot in Western epistemology, even as contemporary
knowledge regimes, governed by a commitment to empirical observation,
increasingly link sight with knowledge.48
Yet theater is also, as Supriya aptly demonstrates, a site for querying relations of thinking to seeing, including how human consciousness
might interact with and inform what one sees (and vice versa). Here, the
London stage emerges as a powerful medium through which writers and
dramatists could think through their period’s “intense visual hunger,”
including the various anxieties that accompanied such “ocularcentrism.”
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These recursive dynamics imbue plays such as Othello and Volpone with
affective force, as audiences can observe how the plays’ various fictional
personae see, feel, think, and “know” in relation to information that they
do—and, crucially, do not—possess. Concurrently, playgoers can scrutinize how the Moscas, Volpones, and Iagos of the world attempt to shape
such “knowing” through particular conceptual frameworks or categories
of thought. Attending to these latter practices, I submit, can help us envision the epistemological dimensions of theatrical thinking.
I take my cue here from Supriya, whose reading of Brabantio highlights the relations between this patriarch’s “preemptive leap of cognition”
and those infamous, pornographic promptings of Iago and Roderigo.
However unsavory, it is clear that the latter duo’s rhetorical constructions do not, ipso facto, persuade Brabantio of his daughter’s “treason”
(1.1.167). Rather, what this opening scene dramatizes is precisely how
such lascivious images come into alignment with, and become significant
in light of, a preexisting conceptual template encoded within a father’s
dream vision. Iago, in other words, is not the progenitor of (the idea of )
Desdemona’s “sexual truancy,” but rather its midwife: his lewd inferences
provide an interpretive framework—the wayward daughter—that helps
to determine how this convoluted mise-en-scène signifies to Brabantio.
As the exchange progresses, playgoers watch this grid of intelligibility
fall into place: Desdemona’s domestic absence is immediately accepted as
proof of paternal deception, a sign that confirms Brabantio’s (preexisting)
“belief ” in his daughter’s duplicity (1.1.141).
When Brabantio later insists upon the veracity of his perceptions,
testifying before the Venetian council in the third scene, he sutures
signification—fatally, one might argue 49 —to knowledge: what he
“knows” (or accepts as knowledge) about his daughter’s contested
meaning s is definitively linked to how the words, actions, and
dreams of the preceding scene have been rendered intelligible to him.
Brabantio may never witness Desdemona’s supposed transgression, but
he does not have to: Iago summons a powerful interpretive framework
that allows, indeed encourages, him to see it everywhere.
These vexed relations of sight and signification, conceptual categories and knowledge claims, are further queried in the play’s fourth
act, where audiences watch Othello watching Iago “question Cassio of
Bianca” (4.1.94). As with other meta-theatrical representations, this
exchange is fueled by differing knowledge bases: those of the characters
onstage, but also between these characters and spectators. The latter
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are aware of four crucial facts: first, that Othello has demanded “ocular proof ” of Desdemona’s deception; second, that Iago, by way of
response, has encouraged him to envision her liaison(s) with Cassio,
and thus to “think” her a “whore”; 50 third, that Iago frames his staged
conversation with Cassio as addressing this adulterous relationship;
and fourth, that the general is unaware that his subordinates are really
discussing Bianca, not Desdemona. Lacking such basic information,
Othello tragically misreads the lieutenant’s “smiles, gestures and light
behavior” as evidence of his wife’s infidelity (4.1.103). In so doing, he
demonstrates how easily signifiers can be transferred from one field of
meaning—Cassio’s relationship with Bianca—to another and accepted
as truth. In the hands of Shakespeare (and Jonson), dramatic irony
becomes a vehicle for epistemological inquiry: configuring an asymmetrical knowledge relation between playgoers and characters, this
dramaturgical device invites scrutiny of how duplicitous yarn spinners
structure their counterparts’ seeing and knowing practices.
Thinking in such terms illuminates the particularized functions of
“handkerchief ” and “whore” in these dramas of sexual knowing. On the
one hand, both appear to operate as necessary supplements to problems
of sexual knowledge: entities that emerge in place of, and substitute for,
a particularly “recalcitrant” object of social and critical inquiry.51 I am
persuaded furthermore that the handkerchief operates as a type of epistemological fetish: a desired object that promises a certain type of knowing.
But the “Cunning Whore of Venice” might best be conceived as a conceptual framework rather than a spectral fiction: a field of intelligibility that
allows opaque events, dreams, and objects to signify in recognizable—we
might even say predictable—ways. How Iago, Mosca, and Volpone weaponize this framework informs their respective knowledge games and each
play’s affective work.
Looking back at Shakespeare and Jonson, I imagine these two
actor-playwrights casting a critical, knowing eye back towards the
ghost of Plato. What, they seem to ask, is his blind spot? In Ion, one
of the philosopher’s lesser-known dialogues, we find Socrates mercilessly dismantling the knowledge claims of an Athenian rhapsodist. As
with all “reciters and actors,” this figure, Socrates insists, possesses no
knowledge of his own: he simply represents the experience and insights
attained by others—the charioteer, the carpenter, the fisherman, the
wool-spinner, and so on. In contrast to the imitator, these latter figures,
Socrates suggests, accrue a certain specialized knowledge, one forged
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through their unique relations to, and laborious experiences with, particular objects, bodies, and events. 52 Similar knowledge(s), Pamela H.
Smith has argued, circulate in the early modern period, underpinning
what she calls “artisanal epistemologies”: frameworks for understanding the world informed by the artisan’s ability to imitate the “creative
power of nature itself.”53
Although Smith does not address theater practitioners, her argument urges reconsideration of the various knowledges that actors and
dramatists possess about the world, their craft, and the “fictions” they
produce onstage. Given their relationship to the human body, the arts of
representation, the nature of language, and the contexts of performance,
what might the actor-playwright tell us about seeing and knowing, cognition and categories of thought, theater and epistemology? How do they
perceive or understand the spectator’s role in producing what is known or
knowable onstage? I am not thinking here of that famed “Southern yokel,”
so memorably described by Stanley Cavell, “who rushes to the stage to
save Desdemona from the black man.”54 Rather, as my opening comments
suggest, I wonder how such plays pierce us: bringing own beliefs, biases,
and conceptual categories into question. If such frameworks emerge from
the social, how do we distinguish between the fictional and real? Can
our present work—this probing of blind spots, these excavations of early
modern (un)knowability—offer new ways of seeing such relations? Can
Shakespeare and Jonson help us (re)think an epistemology of the stage?
NOTES
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Chapter 4

What Emilia Knew: Shakespeare
Reads James
Aveek Sen

F

RANCIS FORD WONDERS IN The Merry Wives of Windsor if
“experience” might be “a jewel—that I have purchas’d at an infinite
rate” (2.2.194–95).1 I believe that a critical approach to Shakespeare’s
plays and poems has to engage with their truth to ordinary as well as
extraordinary human experience. This is not a repudiation of historicism,
but an acknowledgment of how we create, encounter, live, understand, and
become history. Our reading of Shakespeare is nourished by our perceptions of, and curiosity about, other people, other lives and relationships,
and by the books we read, the pictures we like to look at, the films and
music we cannot forget—Keats’s “world of Circumstances.”2 It is the world
that holds the canon, the non-canon, and the archive, and enriches, complicates, distracts, and even frustrates teaching and scholarship.
The renewal of my interest in Othello is linked to a few everyday
events: teaching Shakespeare to a group of high-school students; conversations with an undergraduate anxious about her theatrical debut as
Emilia; listening again to Tullio Serafin’s 1960 version of Verdi’s operatic
version; and finally—hence the title of my essay—an abiding, and often
harrowed, fascination with the relentless difficulties of Henry James’s late
fiction, especially The Golden Bowl, The Wings of the Dove, The Turn
of the Screw, and The Sacred Fount. Having freed myself professionally
from having to “apply” theory as a tool kit for “unpacking” texts, I have
at last begun to take pleasure in theory—a pleasure that is not essentially
different from the pleasures of art, literature, and conversation. Instead
of placing both Shakespeare and Henry James on the literature side of
the theory–literature divide, my reading of Othello will use James to read
Shakespeare. The fact that James knew his Shakespeare is of less interest
to me than my conviction that Shakespeare knew his James. In any case,
two frightfully intelligent people are perfectly capable of reversing the
direction of conventional literary history.
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In its Jamesian reading of Shakespeare, this essay is an attempt to
translate the Emilia-marks on the Shakespearean page into a probable and
possible woman incarnated in the theatre. Emilia—and perhaps Gertrude
and Portia—are very much in the same league as James’s Maggie Verver
and Milly Theale. I find both Maggie and Milly, the princess and the dove,
profoundly sinister creatures—in the depths of their half-willed capacity
for denied and resisted knowledge, for seeing what they want to see and
believing what it suits them to believe, for their skillfully averted recognitions, and then for using these evasions and denials to arrange people
into situations—pathetically, yet magnificently, “with a high headshake”
as James would say. They are, in the language of this book, consummate
“blindspotters.” The fullest account of this is given in Kate Croy’s description of Milly Theale to Merton Densher in The Wings of the Dove: “She
never wanted the truth ... She wanted you. She would have taken from you
what you could give her and been glad of it, even if she had known it false.
You might have lied to her from pity, and she have seen you and felt you
lie, and yet ... she would have thanked you and blessed you and clung to
you but the more. For that was your strength, my dear man—that she loves
you with passion.”3
There is nothing squeamish or sentimental in the way James confronts sordidly tragic human arrangements. But this hard, unflinching
gaze—chillingly captured in John Singer Sargent’s portrait of the writer—
also belongs to the “master of nuance and scruple” that Auden had written
about in his poem, “At the Grave of Henry James” (line 55).4 It is the James
for whom a high reticence, a fastidious disdain for providing “weak specifications,” became an imperative of good taste.5 This called for a narrative
method of fathomless suggestion, of being able to intimate just about
everything without saying very much, forcing the reader to bring to the
text a whole universe of observation, interpretation, suspicion, surmise,
and inference. James’s account of how such “utmost conceivability” works
within the story—as suggested in the preface to The Turn of the Screw—
could well be a description of how the Iago–Emilia marriage works on the
reader, spectator, actor, or director: “Only make the reader’s general vision
of evil intense enough ... and his own experience, his own imagination, his
own sympathy ... and horror ... will supply him quite sufficiently with all
the particulars. Make him think the evil, make him think it for himself,
and you are released from weak specifications” (Turn of the Screw liv–lv).
It is no coincidence that those words—observation, suspicion, surmise, inference—are keywords in the Iago-language, particularly in the
quasi-legal and empiricist language that Iago refines for Othello in Act III,
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scene iii, Shakespeare’s great suggestion scene. To “suggest” had a corrupting, evil frisson in Shakespeare’s English, lost in modern usage: “Two loves
I have, of comfort and despair, / Which, like two spirits do suggest me still”
(Sonnet 144, lines 1–2).6 This Jamesian and Shakespearean art of suggestion is a way of representing reality—not always, or not simply, a world of
fact, but a world of the probable and the possible, which often demands
from us a corresponding act of what A. D. Nuttall called “humane inference,” “a willingness to enter the proffered dream.”7 By looking at Emilia
alongside some of James’s characters, we begin to see the remarkable scope
of Shakespeare’s mimesis as one of the founts, perhaps even the sacred one,
from which James drew the resources for his art.
In Othello, Shakespeare interlaces a tragic opera with a domestic
novel. The play’s mimetic registers cover the entire range from Verdi to
something like Ingmar Bergman’s six-part television serial of the 1970s,
Scenes from a Marriage—a series of episodes with titles such as “The Art of
Sweeping Things under the Carpet” and “In the Middle of the Night in a
Dark House Somewhere in the World.” When Shakespeare took the story
from Giraldi Cinthio’s collection, the Hecatommithi, published a year after
Shakespeare was born, he made a few startling changes that define Emilia’s
role in the play. First, Cinthio’s Iago was driven by his unreciprocated lust
for Desdemona, whereas Shakespeare’s Iago remains sexually uninterested
in her. He would have been less monstrous if he had, indeed, fallen in love,
or lust, with Desdemona. He mentions, almost unmindfully, that Othello
may have slept with Emilia and coolly considers the possibility of deciding
to resent this, but only to give a salutary edge to his professional rancour.
At every other level, and most of all at the sexual level, Iago does not care if
his wife, Emilia, is being unfaithful to him. His principal motive, declared
in no uncertain terms, is professional envy. In fact, although Iago is the
prime and inexhaustible source of the play’s sexual imaginings, he remains
the only person unmoved by lust, focused single-mindedly on his own
sense of professional deprivation.
This is the sort of person Emilia has been married to for a few years.
In Cinthio, they have a three-year-old daughter. In Shakespeare, they
appear to be childless. In Cinthio, both the couples were married for a
while—and Othello and Desdemona very happily married—before things
start going terribly wrong. In Shakespeare, the “long time” of the Iago–
Emilia marriage is juxtaposed with Othello and Desdemona’s “short time,”
with the latter’s conjugal inexperience. Iago’s scheme operates in this “long
time,” giving to the play its notorious double time scheme. This lends to
the operatic intensity of Othello and Desdemona’s soaring passion a more
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mundane and novelistic dimension of “slow time.” Unlike Othello and
Desdemona, who come too soon to the iron gates of life, Iago and Emilia
have had world enough and time in which to turn over the many accretions of a “long” marriage.
The mid-eighteenth-century English translation of Cinthio, obviously influenced by Shakespeare, describes Emilia as “fair and honest.”8
Desdemona spends a lot of time with her at Iago’s house, and, during one
of these visits, it is Iago who uses his infant daughter to filch the handkerchief from her. But, although Cinthio deprives Emilia of agency in the
handkerchief plot, he gives her full knowledge of the matter: “The Ensign’s
wife, who knew everything (for her husband had wished to use her as an
instrument in causing the Lady’s death, but she had never been willing to
consent), did not dare, for fear of her husband, to tell [Desdemona] anything” (389). Then she disappears altogether from Cinthio’s narrative as
Iago’s plot unfolds. Desdemona is clobbered to death by Iago with a stocking filled with sand, Othello is slain by Desdemona’s relatives, and Iago
dies miserably at home after being severely tortured. Unspecified periods
of time pass between these events. Emilia, however, reappears at the very
end of Cinthio’s story as the sole survivor and repository of the facts of the
case. “All these events were told after his death by the Ensign’s wife, who
knew the facts as I have told them to you,” says Cinthio’s narrator (395).
What Shakespeare does with this is extraordinary, and wonderfully Jamesian. He exactly reverses Cinthio’s use of Emilia, which gives
her knowledge but no agency. Shakespeare’s Emilia is persistently associated with the handkerchief-stealing, the lowest plot element in the play.
He gives her full agency at this level. But simultaneously, the question
of her knowledge—and, equally important, her motive—is kept unclear
to the very end and grows tantalizingly opaque. Agency, consciousness
and motivation, doing and knowing, are therefore finely and inscrutably
wedged apart. The “register” of Emilia’s consciousness remains obscured
by what James calls, in The Golden Bowl, “a great white curtain.”9 James
also declares in his preface to The Golden Bowl that the “essence of any
representational work is of course to bristle with immediate images” (23).
But this bristling “representative surface” and “the play of representational
values” (both 35) in no way detract from the “appeal to incalculability”
(21). By making Emilia embody the incalculable, while associating her
with the vicious triviality of the handkerchief plot, Shakespeare places her
across an entire range of “representational values,” from low intrigue to
high tragedy, although visually she is always kept in the margins of the
action, in the penumbra of the Othello darkness. In The Golden Bowl, as
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the tragedy of Charlotte and Amerigo’s entrapment in adultery moves
into the sublime, the sordidness and horror of the situation begin to be
felt more and more relentlessly in Maggie’s own curtained consciousness.
This counterpointing of an ascent into tragic sublimity with an inexorable
descent into quotidian horror is exactly paralleled in the interlacing of the
Othello–Desdemona love duet with the Iago–Emilia marriage.

***
Emilia’s first appearance in the play is in a scene that “bristles” unyieldingly. This is the opening scene of the second act in Cyprus—a long scene
of desultory conversation among the Venetians, as they wait on the headland for Othello’s arrival. Desdemona is anxious and restive, and her companions—Emilia and Iago, together with the worshipping Cassio and
the inflamed Roderigo—try to help her while away the time. The texture
of this scene brilliantly captures the drift of polite social talk, what Iago
calls “chronic[ling] small beer” (2.1.160). But there is an Emilia-shaped
hole in this texture, very similar to those astutely choreographed scenes in
Jane Austen—usually at balls, private theatricals, or in the Upper Rooms
in Bath—where her mousy, silent heroines are silhouetted against a background of chatter. This is how we initially get to know Catherine Moreland
in Northanger Abbey or Fanny Price in Mansfield Park.
As Emilia joins this little gathering, Cassio greets her with a kiss,
assuring her husband that it is merely a “show”—although somewhat
“bold”—of “courtesy” (2.1.99). Iago immediately absorbs Cassio’s courtesy into his own brand of bawdy: “Sir, would she give you so much of
her lips / As of her tongue she oft bestows on me / You’d have enough”
(2.1.100–102). To this Desdemona interjects, “Alas! She has no speech”
(2.1.103). Iago disagrees, for Emilia talks so much in bed that he cannot go to sleep—“In faith, too much; / I find it still, when I have list to
sleep” (2.1.103–4)—but allows that perhaps, in front of Desdemona,
Emilia “puts her tongue a little in her heart, / And chides with thinking”
(2.1.106–7). Then, and only then, Emilia answers him: “You have little
cause to say so” (2.1.108). The impeccable playfulness that Cassio and
Desdemona have kept up so effortlessly between them has therefore been
broken into twice: once by Iago’s gratuitous and suggestive disclosures
regarding Emilia’s bedroom habits, and then by Emilia’s words, “You have
little cause to say so.” She is the first to use the play’s most famous word,
“cause,” and her smouldering quietness immediately strikes a contrary
note. She directly and exclusively addresses her husband in a conversation that has so far been strenuously public. What do her words imply?
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She could be saying, “You are misrepresenting me to these people because,
actually, I hardly speak at all,” thereby endorsing Desdemona’s “Alas! She
has no speech.” Or, she could be picking up Iago’s intriguing “she ... chides
with thinking” in order to say, “You can’t say this because you have no idea
of what I think.” Either reading immediately opens up an area of darkness
that is always present at the heart of the play: the realm of what another
person could be thinking. It is an inwardness that is imponderable, cannot be possessed, and is therefore obscurely threatening; it later becomes
Iago’s trump card and Othello’s greatest fear. Later in this scene, Iago’s
mock-misog ynist badinage with Desdemona imagines a woman who
“could think, and ne’er disclose her mind” (2.1.156). And, after Iago has
successfully aroused in Othello the desire for “ocular proof ” (3.3.363), he
describes Desdemona’s “honour” as “an essence that’s not seen” (4.1.16).
But it is Emilia who first begins to embody this essence, this baffling and
maddening reticence that resists the will to intimate knowledge. And her
identification with this quality happens in the midst of social chatter.
Desdemona salvages this potentially embarrassing moment between
husband and wife by starting to flirt with the husband. Her flirtatiousness
in this scene is also a part of her innate graciousness: her good breeding
makes her unwilling to impose her own impatience and nervousness upon
others. Emilia again refuses to join the little game of fishing for compliments being played by Iago and Desdemona, and again there is a quietly
dissonant moment between husband and wife, a vicious little aside. “You
shall not write my praise,” says Emilia. “No, let me not,” answers Iago
(2.1.116). Is this playful, or nasty?
Throughout the scene, Iago skates smoothly between badinage and
concern. He plays along with Desdemona, yet also lets her know, with
just the right degree of unobtrusiveness, that he is alert to her restlessness,
while understanding and respecting her good manners in concealing it in
public. His hasty aside with Emilia contrasts with his brief exchange with
Desdemona, who asks, sotto voce, in the middle of all this talk, “There’s
one gone to the harbour?” (2.1.120). “Ay madam” (2.1.121), Iago immediately assures her, before resuming, in a different voice, the public façade
of playful unconcern. Emilia is throughout a spectator to her husband’s
canny and customized attentiveness. As he keeps it up with Desdemona,
Emilia is expected to keep it up with him—not out of a natural and
mutual conjugal rhythm, but out of a tight, furtive pressure put on her by
her husband, an occasional twitch of what James calls the “silken noose”
(The Golden Bowl 553), a pressure that it is up to Emilia to keep out of the
public eye. What builds up in this scene, in a kind of tedious “long time,” is
the sense of a wordlessly resentful fear confronting this wordless pressure,
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a slow arm-twisting that achieves an unsavory, precarious, but continually resisted complicity between husband and wife. Shakespeare creates a
space for this little portrait of a marriage between two “high-wrought”
moments, between Cassio’s vaulting praise of the “divine Desdemona”
(2.1.73) and the fine rapture of her reunion with Othello: “O my fair warrior! ... My dear Othello!” (2.1.180) The beautiful music of the “enchaféd
flood” (2.1.17) introduces and concludes this quotidian interlude of tense
small talk, for which Verdi could not have made room in his opera.

***
Emilia, however, is not allowed to remain just a passive looker-on. And,
in drawing her into the action, Shakespeare blurs, again in a very Jamesian
manner, the line between active and passive. Profound and unsparing questions of volition and responsibility are raised by both artists. In the preface
to The Golden Bowl, James writes about “the religion of doing”: “the whole
conduct of life consists of things done, which do other things in their turn,
just so our behaviour and its fruits are essentially one and continuous and
persistent and unquenchable, so that the act has its way of abiding and
showing and testifying, and so, among our innumerable acts, are no arbitrary, no senseless separations ... We recognize betimes that to ‘put’ things is
very exactly and responsibly and interminably to do them” (36).
Neither Emilia nor Maggie ever quite faces the fact that even victimhood does not absolve them from this “religion of doing.” Emilia’s
ineffectuality and submissiveness within her own marriage inevitably and
actively begin to determine the brutalization of Desdemona’s. What we see
her doing in the face of this unavoidable fact is choose between her loyalty
to Desdemona and her own stakes in the situation. What does she want to
keep, to have and to hold? Up to what point can she risk these investments
so that she could stay on Desdemona’s side? And where does she draw the
line in this matter? Shakespeare’s gaze on Emilia as she confronts or evades
these questions and decisions is minute and unflinching. He makes her
steal and lie—acts that lead up to the violence at the end. Similarly, in The
Wings of the Dove, James does not hesitate to present Milly Theale’s apparently selfless generosity as also a way of “promoting her [own] illusion,”
her spectral millions ruining other relationships, creating “communities
of doom” (6, 8).

***
Iago’s evil is sub-tragic, and its ability to trivialize tragic gravitas finds its
best symbol in the play’s legendary handkerchief. Compared with the slow
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unfolding of the suggestion scene between Othello and Iago, the moment
when Emilia picks up the handkerchief is teasingly brief. It reminds me
of the Ancient Mariner shooting down the albatross, inexplicably, in an
instant, and of the absolute externality of that single, momentous act in
Coleridge’s otherwise nightmarishly inward poem: “with my cross-bow /
I shot the ALBATROSS.”10 Shakespeare’s depiction of Emilia’s act is also
strangely shallow, lacking any obvious psychological depth, thus giving
it a brief, fleeting quality. Paradoxically, Emilia speaks a soliloquy at this
point, which is more self-addressing than taking the audience into confidence (as her husband frequently does). “My wayward husband hath a
hundred times / Wooed me to steal it,” she tells herself (3.3.296–97). This
then is in “long time.” “Steal” betrays an awareness of wrongdoing, which
is fudged by “wayward,” investing Iago with a self-willed perversity that
somehow absolves Emilia from being clear-headed about what she is up
to. “It’s just one of his weird obsessions,” she tries to convince herself. And
then comes the locus classicus of willed evasion: “what he will do with it /
Heaven knows, not I, / I nothing, but to please his fantasy” (3.3.301–3).
The sequence of words, “not I, / I nothing,” is a tantalizing chiasmus linking disavowal of knowledge with female self-effacement, although the
repeated “I”s inscribe the self as a repressed moral agent. The “I” can also
be heard as “Ay” (as in “Ay, my lord”), and the sounds form a “no–yes–yes–
no” sequence (not–ay–ay–nothing).
Emilia’s subjectivity here attempts to shrink to a “nothing,” to disappear altogether into a state of complete moral inaction. However, another
level of mysteriousness is negatively invoked by her words—a realm of
imputed or transferred agency that is linked, not to a rational motive, but
to “fantasy,” something subjective, arbitrary, ungovernable, and unknowable. In this connection, even “Heaven knows” suggests much more than
a mere colloquialism, invoking a sphere of inscrutable operation that
indulgently encompasses human action. The dialogue between Emilia
and Iago, which follows this soliloquy, places the handkerchief within a
different nexus. The handkerchief moves out of the Othello–Desdemona
marriage and becomes a counter in the play of control and appeasement
between the other couple. We are given the first stark glimpse of Emilia’s
tensely resentful, yet helpless, investment in Iago when he reduces her
to a cussedly teasing, ineffectual juvenility, snuffing out her token resistance. She tries again to fudge the issue of stealing, devising an elaborate
way around Iago’s brutal question, “Hast stolen it from her?” (3.3.314).
Iago denies her any moral high ground with a vengeance, as if pointing
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up her own hypocrisy in pretending not to know why he wants the handkerchief. The shallow compassion of Emilia’s “Poor lady, she’ll run mad /
When she shall lack it” (3.3.321–22) suddenly reveals a heartlessness in
Emilia that tries desperately to match Iago’s.
This brief dialogue is discomfiting because it depicts something that
absorbed both Shakespeare and James. In The Wings of the Dove, James
calls it “the inevitabilities of the abjection of love” (296). The writer of the
sonnets and creator of Antonio in The Merchant of Venice knew abjection
very well, and his exploration of it in these texts and in Othello hinges
around the word, “use.” Emilia and Desdemona play with the word at the
end of the willow scene: “let them use us well” (4.3.101). “The only horror
is not to be used,” says Patroclus in Marguerite Yourcenar’s Fires.11

***
But perhaps Emilia shoots her albatross, not when she picks up the handkerchief, but when she lies to Desdemona about it. This lie is truly her act,
and it will come back to haunt her later. The clown who heralds this scene
quibbles continuously on lying. This transition from stealing to lying in
Emilia’s moral unfolding takes place alongside Othello’s now inexorable
movement towards what Iago calls “the door of truth” (3.3.410), a phrase
that suggests an inaccessibly private realm that shuts Othello out. Again,
Emilia’s lie constitutes the briefest moment: “Where should I lose that
handkerchief, Emilia?” / “I know not, madam” (3.4.23–24). It is the simplest disavowal of knowledge. She quickly changes the topic to Othello’s
jealousy, and then Othello enters: “Look where he comes” (3.4.31). It is
Emilia who announces, almost furtively but with a rising alertness, the
entry of both their husbands, quickly adapting her tone. This creates a
peculiarly unsettling atmosphere of female complicity—a complicity that
Desdemona begins to rely on, but we cannot trust, for we know Emilia
better. She witnesses Othello’s anger over the lost handkerchief, and after
he leaves Desdemona again expresses her puzzlement over losing it. Emilia
changes the topic again, but this time her evasion is more complex. She gets
into her railing-against-men mode with a little outburst beginning, “’Tis
not a year or two shows us a man” (3.4.104–7). Like the other long speech
in the willow scene (4.3.85–102), it sharpens the sense of her ineffectuality within the situation. She seems to have drawn the line with her lie. She
would defend Desdemona’s honor valiantly to Othello, as she does a little
later. But that is all. And this withdrawal on her part contributes to the
growing sense of Desdemona’s vulnerability, in the play. Emilia’s occasional

110   Aveek Sen

bouts of eloquence suggest genuine and complex personal resonances, but
most of them are strategically timed to prevent other conversations. Her
eloquence can actually “do” nothing to help Desdemona.
This is why a sentimental reading of the willow scene overlooks the
nature of Shakespeare’s theatrical and mimetic achievement in it. Emilia is
“with” Desdemona in this scene, but they talk across the abyss of Emilia’s accumulated lies and silences and of her by-now-quite-settled sense of what she
cannot, and will not, do for Desdemona. They are together on the other, intimate, side of the “door of truth,” but it still remains half open for Emilia to
leave—and she knows this. She must, and will, leave at the end of the scene.
This too, like the small beer scene, is a scene of desultory conversation. But
there is an ineffable inner-chamber whimsy in Desdemona, in spite of the abiding pensiveness. Woven into this pensiveness is an obscure sense of foreboding,
of a suspended brutality that dimly gathers around Emilia’s ministering, but
strangely detached, presence. When Desdemona asks Emilia if the itching
in her eyes “bode[s] weeping,” Emilia answers, “’Tis neither here nor there”
(4.3.57–58). It is a peculiarly reflective scene in which the two women’s, especially Desdemona’s, inchoate forebodings are not left behind, but suddenly
appear so surreally incomprehensible that they produce a lightheadedness
which can be kept up only for a while, and only in the still center of a storm.
Towards the end of the scene, Desdemona initiates an important conversation about unfaithful wives, which gets Emilia going until she takes over
entirely with her last impassioned oration on wives having “sense” (4.3.93).
In the course of this conversation, the two women move further and further
apart in their moral stance regarding sex outside marriage. Emilia comes out
a materialist and a pragmatist, Desdemona an idealist. Emilia thinks, “The
world’s a huge thing: it is a great price / For a small vice” (4.3.68–69). It is
clear from what follows that by “price” she does not mean “the price to be
paid”; her “price” is a variant spelling of “prize.” She will risk her fidelity if
the world is her reward. She also thinks that such a deed can be undone,
the wrong quickly made right if only it is done “well i’ th’ dark” (4.3.66),
whereas Desdemona would rather not do it at all “by this heavenly light”
(4.3.64). Emilia and Desdemona inhabit disparate visions of marriage and
separate moral universes, and there is, in Emilia’s “religion of doing,” room
for a lie or two, as long as she is not asked to kill.

***
But, in a few moments, Emilia is made to move on from stealing and lying
to greater vices. Shakespeare compresses what, in Cinthio, is like a slow
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draining away of life through a long series of just but brutal punishments.
Completely reworking Cinthio’s ending, he pitches Emilia into quite
another mode than what she was created for. After learning of Roderigo’s
death and Cassio’s wounding, Emilia reenters the “door of truth” as the
ghostly echo of Desdemona’s smothered voice. It is as if she has suddenly
discovered center-stage histrionics, till the final exit. Shakespeare is interlacing again, and at more than one level. First, the double anagnorisis:
Othello and Emilia both face the truth of their respective marriages and of
their purblind conduct in this sphere. Neither survives this—Othello kills
himself, and Emilia is killed by Iago. More interestingly, Emilia’s assumption into high tragedy does not quite free her from remaining implicated
in lying. Her extreme vocal presence in the last scene is nuanced to the end
with a wealth of Shakespearean mischief, similar to what James keeps up
with his dying dove, Milly, till the very moment of her death, and after.
For both Othello and Emilia, facing the truths they either had no access
to or had deliberately kept at bay means losing everything, everything they
had staked. In the case of Emilia—who dies on another woman’s marriage
bed—what she lets go of is the idea of “home.” As in his earlier “Speak
within doors” (4.2.146), Iago charges her now to “get you home,” and she
replies, “Perchance, Iago, I will ne’er go home” (5.2.191, 193–94). So,
Emilia’s generic elevation from novella through domestic tragedy to high
tragedy becomes a measure of what she loses.
But James wrote of higher, more resilient, loyalties than Emilia’s in
his shorter fiction. His 1887 story, “The Liar,” is narrated by a painter who
had been rejected by a woman twelve years before he meets her again; she
is now married to the “raconteur,” Colonel Clement Capadose.12 This colonel is known to be “a thumping liar” (273), modeled on a gentleman, “the
most unbridled colloquial romancer,” James once met at a dinner party
in London. 13 The morbidly jealous painter contrives to paint Colonel
Capadose in such a way as to expose his pathological lying, in order to
“execute a masterpiece of ... legitimate treachery” (283). The once-rejected
painter wants to draw out a confession from the woman who had rejected
him, now a liar-colonel’s wife, that her life “would have been finer” with
the painter (286). Although the cruel accuracy of the painter’s portrait
breaks her down for a while, it is eventually destroyed, and she remains
loyal to her husband. James describes the painter’s attempted exposé as an
“ineffectual experiment” Writing to his friend, Theodora Sedgwick, James
mentions some of his female readers who “declare it is monstrous to have
represented [the liar’s wife] as not taking the artist into confidence—& as
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sticking to her husband.” “We move, my dear Theodora,” James adds, “in
dim & tortuous labyrinths & we sit in eternal darkness.”14 This is the sort
of terrain in which Emilia “moves” with Iago.
There is a fine irony working upon Emilia at the end of Shakespeare’s
play. Desdemona dies lying in order to protect her husband: “She’s like a
liar gone to burning hell” (5.2.127). But Emilia is denied the moral satisfaction of exposing Othello, for which stern task she was raring herself up
with every moral absolute she could invoke. But Othello confesses immediately, and then Emilia is faced with the truth about her husband. She
repeatedly reduces Iago’s evil to compulsive lying, lacerating herself with
the word “lie”: “You told a lie, an odious, damned lie! / Upon my soul, a
lie, a wicked lie!” (5.2.176–77) But, in speaking “as liberal as the north,”
she suppresses her own lie to Desdemona and tells a half-truth about her
agency in stealing the handkerchief (5.2.218). Iago points this out: “Filth,
thou liest” (5.2.229). But Desdemona, the only witness to Emilia’s error
of commission, is now dead. There is something excessive about Emilia’s
dying moments, which speaks of a torment different from that of being
married to an evil man. ( James speaks of “the beautiful little eloquence
involved in Milly’s avoidances” (299)). I cannot help finding Emilia’s final
moments slightly comic. But her last words are significant: “So speaking
as I think, alas, I die” (5.2.249). In drawing attention to her final integrity of speech, these words remain opaquely self-reflexive. They fold in
upon themselves, without actually letting on what she thinks. Cinthio’s
Emilia knows and tells all at the end. But, in Shakespeare, between Iago
and Emilia, the circle of lies and silences remains closed. Emilia dies full
of words, but never really managing to sound her silences. Bleeding but
not killed, Iago becomes an embodiment of the ultimate silence, opting
for an infernal reticence that will give out nothing : “Demand me nothing. What you know, you know. / From this time forth I never will speak
word” (5.2.300–301).
The maddening circularity of Iago’s black hole of a sentence—
“What you know, you know”—reminds me of the experience of reading
The Sacred Fount. It is James’s sublime joke, largely at his own expense,
teased out into a novel. At the end of this impossible work, the beautiful
Grace Brissenden, driven to the last exasperation by James’s pathologically
Jamesian narrator, asks the narrator, “Then what on earth do you think?”
But soon giving up on a clear answer, she says, simply, “My poor dear, you
are crazy, and I bid you good-night!” (218).
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Minding Shakespeare’s Gaps: A Response
to Aveek Sen
Tanya Pollard
In a New Yorker essay titled “On Omission,” the writer John McPhee suggests that writing depends crucially on the art of choosing what to leave
out. “The creative writer leaves white space between chapters or segments
of chapters,” he explains. “The creative reader silently articulates the
unwritten thought that is present in the white space. Let the reader have
the experience. Leave judgment in the eye of the beholder.”15 McPhee notes
in passing—or rather, cites Harold Bloom as observing—that Shakespeare
exemplifies the power of omission: “what he leaves out becomes much
more important than what he puts in” (48). McPhee’s essay offers a useful frame for Aveek’s haunting account of Emilia’s silences and the blank
spaces that they invite or challenge us to fill. Aveek calls our attention to
disturbing gaps that both become stories in themselves and prompt further possible stories.
Shakespeare’s omissions have shaped those of others, and Aveek
points out that Henry James cultivated the art of the gap in ways that
can sharpen our understanding of its earlier versions. In particular,
James’s acute readings of Shakespeare offer lenses through which we can
reread Shakespeare’s earlier absences. If we view Shakespeare through
James-tinted glasses, what might we be newly enabled to see? Aveek
makes a persuasive case that attending to the willed evasiveness of
James’s female figures illuminates uncomfortable underpinnings behind
Emilia’s apparent support for Desdemona. We associate the play’s
drama of knowledge especially with Othello’s insistent demands for it,
but Emilia’s insistent denials of knowledge can slip between the gaps
of our attention. Similarly, many associate the play’s drama of intimacy
primarily with the doomed marriage between Othello and Desdemona,
and secondarily with the pact between Othello and Iago, but the complex ties between Desdemona and Emilia are as central to the play as
they are under-examined.
Although she speaks little, and conveys almost nothing of her
thoughts, motives, marriage, or history, Emilia’s impact is enormous.
Without her conveyance of the handkerchief to Iago, and her ongoing
concealment of this maneuver, Othello would never encounter the socalled ocular proof that catalyzes and crystallizes his faith in Iago’s stories.
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Without her status as trusted confidante, moreover, Desdemona would
lack the intimate interpersonal spaces in which she is moved to reflect
on love, loyalty, willows, and weeping, communicating and heightening
grief in ways that sharply escalate audiences’ affective stakes. If Emilia is
to Desdemona as Iago is to Othello—a dangerous interlocutor, whose
intimate access and ability to inspire trust bring about the play’s terrible
denouement—we would do well to pay more attention to the crucial
silences that create this uneasy power.
Emilia is far from consistently silent. Her conversation with
Desdemona is breezy and bawdy, and she speaks sharply to her husband. She almost speaks sharply to herself; in an unguarded moment,
she comes close to acknowledging the cruelty of her actions. As Aveek
observes, she anticipates the impact of the handkerchief ’s disappearance: “Poor lady, she’ll run mad / When she shall lack it” (3.3.321–22).
Yet she both occludes her role in this theft and commits herself to concealing it, answering Desdemona’s queries with a direct lie: “I know not,
madam” (3.4.24). She goes on to hide the truth further by omission,
standing by silently while Othello interrogates and berates Desdemona
on the handkerchief ’s disappearance, without ever inter vening ,
explaining , or distracting. Nor does she offer help when Desdemona
laments to her, “Sure, there’s some wonder in this handkerchief: / I am
most unhappy in the loss of it” (3.4.90–91). Actively eliding her privileged knowledge and complicity, she presents herself as aligned with
Desdemona in perplexity and victimhood. The two of them, she suggests, are both women beleaguered by male aggression: “They are all
but stomachs, and we all but food” (3.4.105). She speculates sympathetically on the possible causes of Othello’s jealousy as if she had no
insiderly access. When she tells Othello, “I durst, my lord, to wager she
is honest,” she offers to “Lay down my soul at stake” (4.2.12–13), but
she will not go so far as to lay down her secret. Othello, wrongly—or
perhaps rightly—observes of her non-confession, “She says enough”
(4.2.20). Emilia says little, but what she says, combined with what she
does not say, is enough to convict.
Attending to Emilia’s silences makes for uneasy reading of her final
scenes, when she rants indignantly, and with apparent incomprehension, about the injustice of Othello’s suspicions. “A halter pardon him,”
she curses, “and hell gnaw his bones! / Why should he call her whore?”
(4.2.138–39). Has she forgotten her theft, Desdemona’s anxious queries,
and her own dismissive evasions? Or is she obstructed by a blind spot large
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enough to block the link between the handkerchief ’s disappearance and
Othello’s jealousy, despite her intimate access to direct conversations on
this topic? Emilia’s silences conceal multitudes and complicate our understanding of the play’s terrible end. By doing so, they also prompt, invite,
and even require our own further stories—including stories that some
(maybe Henry James) might formalize. Shakespeare’s gaps prove fertile, if
dangerous, sites. We ignore them at our peril.
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Darkness Visible: A Response to Aveek Sen
Subha Mukherji
What Aveek uses James to anatomize brilliantly is the way Shakespeare
shows us how we do not know and how we arrange not to see, and sometimes intimates why, though motives and impulses can glimmer beyond
such intimations, perhaps even intentions: who knows what William, or
Henry, knew—except perhaps Michael Wood!16 Should we even ask?
The one thing William did know, though—as this essay makes
us see—is the charge of Emilia’s journey from the woman in Cinthio
who “knew everything” to the enigma in Othello who “[knows] not,”
yet “thought so then” (3.4.24; 5.2.191). Aveek sees this as a journey
that puts agency and knowledge at variance. Yet silence or passivity can
be an exercise of choice, and I wonder whether Shakespeare’s play does
not suggest an alternative model of agency, rather than “wedging apart”
knowing and doing. For the dimension of knowledge at play in Emilia’s
“curtained consciousness,” no less than Maggie’s, is knowingness—hovering in a shadowland between complicity and resistance. From which side
are we looking at the curtain? And who draws it? Correspondingly, it is a
kind of obscurity that both baffles and invites reading, teetering between
absence and mystery, cat and cavity, as it does between comic triviality and
tragic recess. In representational terms, the analogy is exact. After all, in
The Golden Bowl, the source of the phrase Aveek quotes, Maggie shares her
curtain with Amerigo’s “new friends,” including Mrs. Assingham, whose
“state of mind [...] had resemblances to a great white curtain,” in turn compared to “white air that was like a dazzling curtain of light, concealing as
darkness conceals, yet the colour of milk or snow.”17 Like a blind spot on
an image of the retina, dazzlingly dense? The direction of invisibility—as
of obscuration—is dizzyingly reversible when it comes to the diaphanous
texture of Shakespeare’s or James’s characters. No less gauzy is the range of
elusive paradigms that the essay draws out: whimsy, fantasy, and fancies
as varieties of ungovernable, irrational, arbitrary states that can feel like
knowledge to the subject (though like a nightmare to the object, as with
Hermione, confronted by Leontes’s visceral conviction, which is also the
basis of her legal conviction in his court). They are also, of course, possible
forms of unknowing. But gossamer to ghost is one small step.
Desdemona, Toni Morrison’s lyrical, multimedia adaptation of
(mainly) the “willow scene” in Shakespeare’s Othello—performed at the
Barbican in summer 2012—is shaped around three posthumous meetings
Desdemona has.18 The main encounter is that between Desdemona and her

Darkness Visible  117

mother’s maid Barbary, in Morrison’s vision the second African character
imagined but absent in Othello, who died singing the song of lost love that
“will not go from [Desdemona’s] mind” (4.3.29); for “Barbary is what you
call Africa,” as she says to Desdemona (p. 45), evoking the “Barbary” courtiers
who arrived and fascinated London in 1600, as well as the Barbary corsairs
(or North African pirates) who had started raiding British shores and ships
at the time when Othello was first performed. This exchange happens in an
Africa which, in Shakespeare, could only be displaced onto Othello’s mind:
remember Desdemona’s tellingly ambiguous phrasing, “I saw Othello’s visage
in his mind,” almost as if she had to bypass his skin—turn it into a blind spot
of sorts—to see the real, fair Othello (1.3.248). That is in a scene where she
expresses, with touching frankness, her desire to accompany her newly wed
husband to the wars “for the rites for which [she loves] him” (1.3.253). It is
also the moment when the new bridegroom Othello declares, with strange
defensiveness about the sexual chemistry between them, that he is kind of past
it, and wants Desdemona with him in Cyprus to enjoy mental affinity alone:
I therefore beg it not
To please the palate of my appetite,
Nor to comply with heat the young affects
In my defunct and proper satisfaction,
But to be free and bounteous to her mind.
(Folio, 1.3.257–61)

Famously, this passage has been a blind spot of textual scholarship, itself
refusing to read the blind spot of Shakespeare’s Venice which, in turn,
has been internalized by its alien military hero. Editors (such as Norman
Sanders in the New Cambridge edition) have often tended to follow Lewis
Theobald’s emendation to “distinct” to skirt round the apparent misfit of
“defunct” with the context; others—following Edmond Malone—have
gone with Q1’s “disjunct,” which neither sees nor unsees—“neither here,
nor there,” as Emilia would say (4.3.58). Yet other scholars, such as Hulme
and Salgado, have resorted to more tortuous ways of getting round the
embarrassment caused by this textual “baffle”—to adapt Adam Zucker’s
term in this volume—by reading “defunct” to mean “discharged,” by a
dysfunctional (in the English syntactical context) analogy with the Latin
form, which demands an ablative to make sense as “discharged from.” 19
Some (such as Peter Alexander) have suggested that a minor emendation
of “my” (Q1 and F) to “me” would help make grammatical sense of the
lines if conjoined with “defunct”: “the young affects / In me defunct” in
a parenthesis, taking the cue from Q1’s comma after “heat,” absent in F:
“Nor to comply with heat, the young affects in my defunct, and proper
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satisfaction.” But even this emendation seems unnecessary, given the
non-congruence of early modern punctuation with ours. A. D. Nuttall,
a consummate reader of eloquent textual wobbles, favors this emendation, but also thinks, surely rightly, that the syntactic awkwardness is a
case of “naturalistic confusion” in a character who is anxious to obscure
the sexual implications of his race in a society where he is a prized general but becomes an “old black ram” tupping their white ewe the moment
he becomes Desdemona’s lover. 20 For me, the balancing of “my ... satisfactions” and “her mind” makes syntactic sense. It is the deeper affective
indecorum masked by social decorum that gives me pause, as well as a way
of seeing. On hearing Othello out, the duke declares to Brabantio that
his son-in-law is “more fair than black” (286). In the very way blackness
becomes white to the eye, its dense refusal to reflect light in the alleys of
“Venice” trips us up and makes us look harder. The Malian singer Rokia
Traoré, as Barbary, sang the willow song hauntingly as a blues number in
Desdemona. Is it not strangely apposite that Morrison’s Africa becomes
a photographic “negative” of the original’s location? A place where all
things that could not be looked in the face in Venice are translated into
face-to-face encounter? But her mimetic aim is in sync with Shakespeare’s:
making darkness visible. And so, in this work, when Desdemona confronts Emilia with accusations, Emilia responds with sharp defensiveness,
lacking shades where she can hide from what she “knew,” where knowing
can take cover from doing.21 In the afterlife of characters, in the afterlife
of the play, Africa surfaces and claims the conscious mind and its merciless clarities, along with all the specific affective knowledges available but
resisted. Desdemona accosts Emilia here: “Didn’t you acquiesce to all of
Iago’s demands, even the most vile, corrupt ones? [...] Your dangerous,
murderous silence led to my death,” and mocks her “survival strategies”
(42–43). In Emilia’s reply, the tone of resigned, lonely insouciance carries
over from the older play: “Life is what it is. [...] To own my life, I had to
forge a secret path” (42–43). But she also confronts Desdemona and her
class for “[taking ] devotion for granted,” and challenges her privileged
and sentimental knowledge claims: “I am glad you never knew how desperate life is for the truly orphaned” (44). After such knowledge, what
forgiveness? “I know not, madam,” Shakespeare’s Emilia might say. “All
is known here,” Morrison’s Desdemona might answer, as she does when
Emilia protests to her: “Did you know I was the first to lay dying next to
you?” (42).
So, though Cinthio did not quite know his Shakespeare, did
Shakespeare know his Morrison, as he “knew his James”? How does
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James’s knowing feel for the pulse of unknowing relate to such resurrections as Morrison’s? his representation of what is unrepresentable
not only between self and Other, but to the self itself ? Is there a risk of
homogenizing acts of ambiguous knowing? How are we to orchestrate, in
composition or in reception, distinct if related disavowals of knowledge?
And what is the role of a gap of time in filling what Tanya Pollard (in her
response), after John McPhee, calls the “white space[s]” in Shakespeare’s
own texts, as sequels step into the breach of his open endings? Do the
unknowings of Emilia, and indeed of Desdemona and Othello, invariably belong with the reticence of willed resistance, as Aveek suggests, as
opposed to the after-world of Desdemona where they are brought into
light? Or are they to Morrison’s retrospective vision what Billie Holiday’s
“Strange Fruit” is to Nina Simone’s? Holiday’s 1939 rendering is fragile,
uncomprehending, and ballad-like, as it comes out of the heart of a reality
it is trying to bear, and make sense of; an as-yet barely grappled cognitive
dissonance around racial lynching translating into a strange, dislocated
pathos. In Simone’s, recorded in 1965, there is articulate rage—stylized,
shaped, and dramatized as distance alone can make possible. But,
of course, the alertness to the raw, unprocessed, experiential texture of
half-knowing and apprehension can itself be a defiantly ethical mimetic
position in relation to the matter of life: a refusal of formal solace and its
comprehensions.
Where, in this spectrum, do James’s precise tracings of disavowed,
untold, and rearranged knowledges dwell? Whereas, in Morrison, the
encounters lead to a possibility of redemption and understanding, no matter how uneasy, James’s more implicit reinvention of Shakespearean elisions
preempts, as this essay shows, any transcendent or feel-good move to truth
and reconciliation. How, then, does he manage—as I think he does—to
write in the profound loneliness and vulnerability underlying such retellings and evasions? What is the relation between high reticence as an
aesthetic mode or a function of taste, as Aveek posits, and reticence as an
experiential position, a function of human choice or, indeed, impotence?
James and Iago and Shakespeare are all artificers; Emilia, Portia, Gertrude,
and Helena are arguably both subject and agent, as are Maggie Verver and
Milly Theale. How is the space between the art of suggestion and the lived
moment of withholding knowledge negotiated by different media—drama
or narrative? Shakespeare’s silences offer lacunae that embodied action on
stage can fill in—but are they coterminous with the characters’ silences?
What choices and risks does a director face in trying to make the “pensive
text” speak?22
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NOTES
1
All references to Shakespeare’s plays, except Othello, are to the Arden
Complete Works. References to Othello are to the Arden edition, ed. Honigmann.
2
Keats uses the phrase in a letter of April 21, 1819. See Atkins, On Keats’s
Practice and Poetics of Responsibility, 9.
3
James, The Wings of the Dove, 477. All quotations are from this edition.
4
Auden, Collected Poems, 312.
5
James, The Turn of the Screw, lv. All quotations are from this edition.
6
Shakespeare, Sonnets, 405.
7
Nuttall, A New Mimesis, 82, 81.
8
Cinthio, trans., quoted in Honigmann’s Othello, 381. All quotations are
from this edition.
9
James, The Golden Bowl, ed. Crick, 56. All quotations are from this edition.
10
Coleridge, “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” lines 79–80, in Wordsworth
and Coleridge, Lyrical Ballads, 55.
11
Yourcenar, Fires, 33.
12
James, The Liar, 270. All quotations are from this edition.
13
Preface to The Aspern Papers, in James, The Art of Criticism, 344.
14
James, James: A Life in Letters, 204–5.
15
McPhee, “On Omission,” 46.
16
See Michael Wood’s brilliantly provocative essay, “What Henry Knew,”
13–26, unerringly alighting on Henry James as the gatekeeper to “the question of
literature and knowledge” (13).
17
James, The Golden Bowl (1995 ed.), chapter 1, p. 12.
18
Morrison, Desdemona.
19
Hulme, Explorations in Shakespeare’s Language, 153–54; Salgado, ed.,
Othello, New Swan edition, 30.
20
Nuttall, A New Mimesis, 139.
21
Morrison, Desdemona, Sec. 8, 42–44.
22
Barthes, S/Z, 17.
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Chapter 5

Knowing Kin and Kind in
The Winter’s Tale
Tanya Pollard

“I would most gladly know the issue of it.”1

E

ARLY IN THE WINTER’S Tale, Paulina presents Leontes with what
she identifies as inarguable proof of his paternity, and accordingly of
his wife’s fidelity. Hermione’s newborn infant, she explains, is “So like you,
’tis the worse.” Turning to onlookers for corroboration, she continues,
“Behold, my lords, / Although the print be little, the whole matter / And
copy of the father” (2.3.98–100). The baby, according to Paulina, is easy
to read, a miniature reprint of Leontes’s features. Leontes, however, draws
the opposite conclusion: “This brat is none of mine. / It is the issue of
Polixenes” (2.3.93–94). Any knowledge we can glean from the baby’s matter and copy, he suggests, will direct us towards a different original imprint.
Leontes’s error suggests a variation on a standard pattern. Throughout
Shakespeare’s plays, characters routinely fail to recognize members of their
family. Rosalind evades Duke Senior by wearing a cap; Sebastian is stymied by Viola’s male apparel; Cymbeline has no idea that the young men
who save his kingdom are his sons; and the Ephesian Antipholus shares a
city with his long-lost mother for years without knowing that she is even
alive, much less his neighbor. As Launcelot Gobbo observes after his father
attributes his non-recognition to blindness, “Nay, indeed, if you had your
eyes you might fail of the knowing me. It is a wise father that knows his
own child” (Merchant of Venice 2.2.65–66). Among these many familial
misrecognitions, however, Leontes’s response to Perdita stands out, not
only because of the impressive number of failed familial recognitions that
surround it, but also for its self-conscious alignment of kin with literary
kind. As Aaron Kitch has argued, the play’s repeated use of the vocabulary of print to illustrate paternity implicitly links the fear of illegitimate
birth with concerns about unauthorized printing practices and uncertain
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genres, such as its own mongrel tragicomedy. 2 Throughout the play, its
shape-shifting dramatic form proves as hard to identify as family members, suggesting that the challenges of knowing kin and knowing literary
kind create similar sorts of blind spots.
Failure to know kin precipitates the central crisis of The Winter’s
Tale, when Leontes stakes his kingdom on misreading his family: his failure
to recognize Perdita as his daughter rests on his similar failure to recognize
Hermione as his faithful wife, which also raises questions over whether
Mamilius is his son.3 Projecting his errors onto others, he accuses Camillo
and others of blindness to Polixenes’s guilt and insists that Hermione has
failed to distinguish him from his figurative brother: “You have mistook,
my lady— / Polixenes for Leontes” (2.1.83–84). And, although the play
suggests that these particular accusations are mistaken, Leontes’s pattern
of familial misrecognition extends contagiously to others: Polixenes lacks
knowledge of his son’s familial intentions, Florizel fails to recognize his
disguised father through an extended and increasingly intimate conversation, and the shifting disguises of Autolycus defy recognition by Perdita’s
Bohemian family. Even the play’s external family of readers and audiences
find their illusion of privileged knowledge shattered—at least in their first
encounter with the play—when Paulina reveals an apparent statue to be
the still-living Hermione.
Fittingly, the play develops its preoccupations with knowing kin
through the intermingling of two lexical families. The play is densely
populated with forms of the word “know,” some conspicuous and some
more easily missed. From the Old English cnawan and Old High German
-knāen, “know” shares Indo-European roots both with Latin gnō-, gnōscere,
the roots of cognition, recognition, ignore, and acquaint (from accognitus),
and with the earlier Greek γνω-, γιγνώσκειν, the roots of prognosis and
diagnosis.4 Direct forms of “know” (including knowledge, acknowledge,
known, unknown, and knowing) occur ninety-four times in The Winter’s
Tale, placing it at the upper end of Shakespeare’s most knowledge-fixated
plays (exceeded only by All’s Well That Ends Well with 124, King Lear
with 112, and Othello with 97).5 These words, rooted in English from its
earliest Anglo-Saxon origins, also mingle in the play with later-arriving
lexical cousins, including five instances of “ignorant,” three of “acquaint,”
and one of “prognosticate”: all linguistic immigrants that entered English
with the Norman invasion, and all of which appear in the play in relation
to the problems of knowing family.
Alongside this preoccupation with the language of knowledge, the
play similarly showcases the thematic ties between kin and kind, gene and
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genre, with one hundred instances of words from these terms’ overlapping
family trees. “Kin” and its suffixed cognate “kind” are Germanic words,
rooted in Old English cyn(n) and its continental forebears.6 This word,
in turn, is part of a larger lexical family rooted in the Aryan gen-, gon-,
gn-, “to produce, engender, beget,” and accordingly shares lineage with
Greek γένος, γόνος, and γίγνομαι, as well as the related Latin genus and
gignĕre.7 These terms form the roots not only of genre but also of gender, generation, genesis, genitals, genes, genetics, genealogy, and related
familial vocabulary. Just as literary kinds represent a thinly veiled familial
metaphor, then, genres have the same genealogical roots, and The Winter’s
Tale actively explores their interwoven threads. Versions of the word kin
(including kindred, kinsman, kind, kindness, and mankind), occur seventeen times in the play, but its most extensive investment in this lexical
family appears in its eighty-three uses of genealogical words—generation,
gentry, and especially gentle. 8 Versions of “gentle,” in particular, occur
sixty-seven times in the play, becoming at times the object of an almost
farcical obsession.9
Although these two linguistic bodies are not directly related, the
roots of familial begetting in cin, kin, gen, and gn- suggest an uncanny
proximity with the roots of knowledge in knāen, ken, γνω, gno, and gn.
The close, if apparently superficial, resemblance between these two lexical
families suggestively calls to mind the sense of “know” as “to be sexually
intimate with; esp. to have sexual intercourse with.” Do knowing and
engendering go hand in hand? Can we have one without the other? I
suggest that, in The Winter’s Tale, blindness to family brings about both
literal and literary barrenness, whereas acts of recognition, culminating in
the final scene, restore the play to both literal and literary fertility.
Amid the dense linguistic underbrush of knowledge, kin, and
kind, the play’s denizens have trouble seeing the forest for the trees.
Critics of Leontes’s errors typically focus on his blindness to Hermione,
but his responses to Perdita—his own progeny—offer an especially
rich site for tracing the play’s reflections on the challenges of knowing
kin. When Paulina makes her case that the child’s features recreate “the
whole matter / And copy of the father,” Leontes threatens to destroy
the evidence. After telling Paulina, “I’ll ha’ thee burnt” (2.3.114), he
goes on to redirect the threat of fire towards the baby: “My child? Away
with’t! Even thou, that hast / A heart so tender o’er it, take it hence /
And see it instantly consumed with fire” (2.3.132–34). Otherwise, he
explains, “The bastard brains with these my proper hands / Shall I dash
out” (2.3.140–41).
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In turning to the epithet “bastard” to distance himself from his
putative kin, Leontes seizes on a term that becomes a recurring touchpoint
for him, and for the play. “Give her the bastard,” he instructs Antigonus
when Paulina sets down the baby; “Thou dotard! thou art woman-tired,
unroosted / By thy dame Partlet here. Take up the bastard, / Take’t up,
I say” (2.3.74–77). Shortly after, he asks in dismay, “Shall I live on, to
see this bastard kneel / And call me father?” (2.3.155–56). He goes on
to taunt Antigonus for his eagerness “To save this bastard’s life,—for ’tis
a bastard, / So sure as this beard’s grey” (2.3.161–62) and instructs him
to “carry / This female bastard hence” (2.3.174–75). Not only does the
apparent familial resemblance elude him, then, but he finds the opposite
certainty blindingly clear. After harping on the term seven times in this
one scene, he returns to it as his verdict at Hermione’s trial, where he confidently pronounces, “You had a bastard by Polixenes” (3.2.81).
The word “bastard” appears ten times in The Winter’s Tale, more
frequently than in any other Shakespeare play besides King John and 1
Henry 6 (both of which use the term primarily in stage directions referring
to characters titled bastard), although several other plays, such as Much
Ado, Troilus and Cressida, and most famously King Lear, feature actual
bastards. This frequency accords the play a privileged position in the
period’s already extensive theatrical engagement with bastardy; as Alison
Findlay and Michael Neill have pointed out, bastards are surprisingly
prominent in the period’s plays and feature disproportionately in plays
by Shakespeare.10 I suggest that the word’s pervasiveness in The Winter’s
Tale, which lacks literal bastards, points not only to Leontes’s trouble with
knowing kin, but also to the word’s unusually lonely lexical status. The
word “bastard” is itself an orphan of sorts, the rare French word that lacks
a classical Latin parent. A medieval invention putatively formed from fils
de bast, “pack-saddle child,” the word apparently links the Old French bast
(pack-saddle, used as a bed by muleteers in the inns) with the pejorative
“-ard” suffix, though a link with bas, low, has also been speculated, in keeping with connotations of base-born.11 The term’s primary meaning is “One
begotten and born out of wedlock; an illegitimate or natural child,” but
by Shakespeare’s time it also could mean “A mongrel, an animal of inferior
breed” and, as an adjective, “Illegitimate, unrecognized, unauthorized.”12
The word’s own lack of parental authorization, then, neatly mirrors its
definitions.
At first glance, Leontes appears to be the character most intimately
linked with the word “bastard.” He pronounces the word in eight of its ten
appearances in the play, and his status as the source of paternal recognition
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(or lack thereof ) gives him a privileged authority for defining legitimacy.
Yet Perdita, the unauthorized apparent orphan, offers a more consistent
link to each of the play’s instances of bastardy. She is the only character
termed a bastard in the play, the second person beyond her father to use the
word, and the addressee of its final instance, spoken by Polixenes in an echo
of her usage. Although Perdita uses the term to denigrate a flower rather
than a person, like Leontes she pronounces it in the context of a failed recognition between parent and child. Despite apparent oppositions between
these two bastard-infused scenes of failed recognition—the first takes place
in Sicilia, in the play’s so-called tragic half, and the second in Bohemia
in the so-called comic half—their shared pairing of unacknowledged kin
with the language of bastardy produces curious symmetries. Both scenes
are fraught with generic precariousness, marking moments when a choice
between knowing and not knowing kin creates consequences for the play’s
generic identity.
Perdita’s apparent illegitimacy follows her to Bohemia, where her
appearance prompts reflections on illicit procreation. “[S]ure some scape,”
the shepherd reflects upon seeing her abandoned in a basket. “Though I
am not bookish, yet I can read ‘waiting-gentlewoman’ in the scape. This
has been some stair-work, some trunk-work, some behind-door-work.
They were warmer that got this than the poor thing is here” (3.3.69–72).
Despite his certainty about her misbegotten origins, however, he avoids
the stigmatizing term bastard. By offering pity rather than distaste for the
baby’s circumstances, he signals the familial kindness in which she will
grow and flourish. It is sixteen years later when we see the language of
bastardy resurface, when Perdita appears to be not only at risk of mongrelizing Bohemia’s royal bloodline, but also such a distraction to Prince
Florizel that he fails to notice the emergence of his own father into his
sightlines. Just as Perdita is both object and subject of the term bastard,
she is similarly both the object of non-recognition and the cause of nonrecognition in others.
Polixenes seeks out the shepherd’s home to see his son, but, before
interrogating Florizel, he first turns his attention to Perdita, the child
previously misidentified as his bastard by his one-time best friend. In
response to his questions about her garden’s winter flowers, she refers to
the “carnations and streaked gillyvors, / Which some call nature’s bastards,” pointing out, “of that kind / Our rustic garden’s barren, and I care
not / To get slips of them” (4.4.82–85). In echoing her diction, Polixenes
imitates and escalates her reproductive vocabulary. “You see, sweet maid,”
he explains,
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we marry
A gentler scion to the wildest stock,
And make conceive a bark of baser kind
By bud of nobler race. This is an art
Which does mend nature—change it rather; but
The art itself is nature.
(4.4.92–97)

Polixenes’s analogy of botanical cultivation to category-crossing art has
attracted considerable discussion of the play’s challenges to codified systems
of literary genre; the play self-consciously marries the wild stock of comedy
to the gentler scion of tragedy, in the process arriving at a hybrid or bastard genre akin to Perdita’s gillyvors.13 According to this analogy, art offers
both an opposition to nature—a word rooted in the Latin nascor, nasci,
natus, to give birth—and an alternative form of reproduction. In the context of his opposition to his son’s looming inter-class marriage, Polixenes’s
recommendation that Perdita should embrace the plants’ prolific hybrid
fertility—“make your garden rich in gillyvors, / And do not call them
bastards” (4.4.98–99)—is of course saturated in irony. Perdita, for her part,
insists that she will not countenance this generative mixing of kinds in her
garden, although she is apparently willing to do so in her marriage.
If Perdita’s reluctance to breed bastard flowers suggests apprehensions towards the social mixing she enters, Florizel for his part is eager to
deny the claims of kin and kind. Challenged by his father on his intentions
towards his mistress—“Let me hear / What you profess” (4.4.354–55)—
Florizel presses his unrecognized father into service. “Do,” he bids, “and be
witness to ’t” (4.4.355). He will marry Perdita, he insists, despite his blood:
were I crowned the most imperial monarch,
Thereof most worthy, were I the fairest youth
That ever made eye swerve, had force and knowledge
More than was ever man’s, I would not prize them
Without her love; for her employ them all,
Commend them and condemn them to her service
Or to their own perdition.
(4.4.358–64)

Florizel not only prizes Perdita over both kin and knowledge, but punningly relegates these realms—and everything else—to perdition if
they fail to serve her. When she accepts his impromptu proposal, her
adoptive father exhorts them to make their vows then and there. “And,
friends unknown, you shall bear witness to ’t,” he addresses Polixenes and
Camillo; “I give my daughter to him, and will make / Her portion equal
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his” (4.4.370–72). Florizel assents eagerly: “But, come on, / Contract us
fore these witnesses” (4.4.375–76). As one of the “friends unknown” who
will “bear witness,” Polixenes raises the question of the absence of friends
known, or rather parents. “Soft, swain, awhile, beseech you,” he addresses
Florizel; “Have you a father?” (4.4.377–78). To his reply—“I have. But
what of him?”—Polixenes asks, “Knows he of this?” and is told “He neither does nor shall” (4.4.379–81).
Florizel’s insistence that his father not know his most intimate life
plans spurs outrage from his disguised parent. “Methinks a father / Is at
the nuptial of his son a guest / That best becomes the table,” Polixenes
insists. “Pray you once more,” he continues,
Is not your father grown incapable
Of reasonable affairs? Is he not stupid
With age and alt’ring rheums? Can he speak, hear,
Know man from man?
(4.4.382–87)

This quarrel hinges on questions of familial knowledge: who knows what,
who is capable of knowing what, and who is deserving of knowing what.
Polixenes invokes sensory numbing—the stupefied incapacity to speak,
hear, or know—as the only possibility that would justify a man’s not meriting knowledge of his son. In the absence of this stupefaction, he insists,
“You offer him, if this be so, a wrong / Something unfilial” (4.4.393–94).
Florizel grants this, but maintains that withholding this knowledge is justified. “But for some other reasons, my grave sir,” he explains, “Which ’tis not
fit you know, I not acquaint / My father of this business.” A knowledge tug
of war ensues: “Let him know’t”—“He shall not.” “Prithee let him.”—“No,
he must not.” According to the shepherd, “he shall not need to grieve /
At knowing of thy choice” (4.4.399–404). Knowing this choice, however,
leads not only to grief but to fury. At Florizel’s “Come, come, he must not.
/ Mark our contract,” Polixenes explodes. “Mark your divorce, young sir,”
he retorts while uncovering himself: “Whom son I dare not call. Thou art
too base / To be acknowledged. Thou a sceptre’s heir, / That thus affects a
sheep-hook?” (4.4.404–8). In lowering his affections from a scepter to a
sheep’s hook, Florizel loses the name of son, becoming too base for familial status. Denied the knowledge that is the privilege of blood, Polixenes
in turn denies acknowledgment of filial status. “[W]e’ll bar thee from
succession,” he continues; “Not hold thee of our blood, no, not our kin”
(4.4.418). If Florizel, as it seems, is the king’s only heir, his disinheritance
leaves Bohemia, like Sicilia, issueless. No knowledge, no kindness; no kin,
no kingdom.
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Why is it so hard to know, or acknowledge, kin? Leontes’s nonrecognition of his daughter and Florizel’s non-recognition of his father
are not the only moments of familial blindness in the play, but they offer
paired fulcrum points for the play’s own generic instability. When Leontes
denies his daughter, he seems also to deny the possibility of comic fertility
for Sicilia, moving in the opposite direction from Benedick’s blithe subordination of cuckoldry fears with the imperative that “The world must be
peopled” (Much Ado 2.3.213–14). And, although Perdita’s flourishing in
Bohemia’s lush gardens suggests a triumph over Leontes’s drive towards the
tragic, the play’s second familial denial rewrites Bohemia in Sicilia’s image,
challenging the possibility of generic recuperation. As the primary sites for
the play’s odd invocations of bastards, moreover, these scenes raise questions about the relationship between bastards, recognition, kin, and genre.
Do bastards baffle recognition? If they represent not the opposite of kin
but an uneasy and unrecognized cousin to it, do they similarly undermine
the straightforward classifications of literary kind? Do bastards mongrelize
their plays, turning them into hybrid, half-breed, bastard genres?
If the base status of bastard represents the most extreme form of
familial non-recognition, its opposite might be the lofty and acknowledged status of gentility, the aristocratic realm to which Leontes and
Polixenes attempt to deny their children access. Despite the prevailing
current associations of “gentle” with refinement and delicacy, its usage in
Shakespeare’s time continued to reflect its etymological origins, which
refer explicitly to birth. The word comes from the Old French gentil, highborn, noble, which in turn stemmed from Latin gentīlis, from genti-, gens,
race, family. It shares parents, that is, with the words gender, genre, genealogy, as well as sharing grandparents with kin and kind.
Claims to gentility acquire a vexed status in The Winter’s Tale, in
which Leontes’s suspicions of his wife’s pregnancy come to color all forms
of birth. The word’s first instances appear in conjunction with Mamilius,
whose birth Leontes also begins to question in the light of his later suspicions. “You have an unspeakable comfort of your young prince Mamillius,”
Archidamus tells Camillo in the exchange of courtly compliments that
opens the play’s first scene; “it is a gentleman of the greatest promise that ever
came into my note” (1.1.30–31). If Mamilius’s gentle status is an unspeakable comfort, it may also be simply unspeakable, or at least unknowable, as
Leontes increasingly broods on his son’s adherence to familial resemblance.
“How like, methought, I then was to this kernel,” he declares of Mamilius
in the next scene: “This squash, this gentleman” (1.2.161–62). Just as
Mamilius’s gentility hinges on his nascent status as kernel, squash, seed,
and egg, the opposing “ungentle business” (3.3.33) of Perdita’s denial and
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deportation hinges on her father’s non-recognition of her birth, and, when
the play pauses to announce its passage through a generic rebirth, its chorus
directs the language of gentility to those watching the play. Addressed as
“Gentle spectators” (4.1.20), the audience is invited into the play’s extended
acknowledged family.
The play concentrates its lexicon of gentility, however, in its last
acts, with their dawning recognitions of kin. As the world of the court
invades the pastoral realm of the shepherd’s home and fields, so too does its
vocabulary. “Be merry, gentle,” the prince Florizel counsels the apparently
ungentle shepherd’s daughter, and his disguised father similarly addresses
her as “gentle maiden” (4.4.46, 85). When Polixenes and Camillo draw
the shepherd into conversation, their social status attracts attention; the
shepherd’s son tells Mopsa and Dorcas, “my father and the gentlemen are
in sad talk” (4.4.296–97). Speaking of Florizel, Camillo tells Autolycus to
“change garments with this gentleman” (4.4.619–20) and soon after urges
“Nay, prithee, dispatch: the gentleman is half flayed already” (4.4.624–25).
Autolycus himself, meanwhile, offers the clown and shepherd a liaison with
nobility: asking them to take him to the king, he explains, “being something gently considered, I’ll bring you where he is aboard” (4.4.768–69).
This lexicon of gentility escalates and arguably explodes, however,
back in the Sicilian court, which finds its members unexpectedly expanded
not only by the belated recognition of Perdita, but also and especially
by a new recognition of her extended kin. Even before the unveiling of
Hermione’s statue, which simultaneously reveals kin and kind, generation and genre, the play unveils a similarly strange forging of new kinship
bonds. Upon their miraculous adoption into the king’s family, the shepherd and his son learn not only that they have been socially elevated, but
that their births have been accordingly rewritten. “Come, boy,” the shepherd tells his son; “I am past more children, but thy sons and daughters
will be all gentlemen born” (5.2.113–14). Developing this point, his son
accosts Autolycus with his failure to recognize his gentility. “You denied
to fight with me this other day,” he complains,
because I was no gentleman born. See you these clothes? Say you
see them not, and think me still no gentleman born. You were best
say these robes are not gentlemen born. Give me the lie, do, and try
whether I am not now a gentleman born
(5.2.115–20)

Like the play, the shepherd’s son—along with his clothes—is born
again, under newly gentle conditions. And under these conditions, he is
newly recognized. “I know you are now, sir,” Autolycus acknowledges,
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“a gentleman born” (5.2.121). “Ay,” the clown reiterates for emphasis,
“and have been so any time these four hours.”
Through his belated new birth, the shepherd’s son’s also acquires a
paradoxical new precedence over his father. When the shepherd echoes
that he, too, has now been gentleman born—“And so have I, boy”—the son
offers a correction of sorts, by way of clarification. “So you have,” he agrees,
but I was a gentleman born before my father, for the King’s son
took me by the hand and called me brother; and then the two kings
called my father brother; and then the Prince my brother and the
Princess my sister called my father father; and so we wept; and there
was the first gentleman-like tears that ever we shed
(5.2.123–29)

The new recognition of gentility not only rewrites birth but reverses its
order, elevating first the adopted/illegitimate daughter, and then the legitimate son, before finally lifting the father. And, as the shepherd points out,
their newborn gentle status has behavioral as well as social implications.
When Autolycus asks to be forgiven for his previous failure to recognize
their gentility, the shepherd seconds his urging. “Prithee, son, do,” he
insists; “for we must be gentle now we are gentlemen” (5.2.136–37).
In keeping with his new gentility, the shepherd’s son accepts
Autolycus’s apology and includes him in the Sicilian court’s expanded
family outing to admire Hermione’s statue. “Hark,” he tells him; “the kings
and the princes, our kindred, are going to see the Queen’s picture. Come,
follow us” (5.2.156–57). This extended gentle family—“our kindred”—
will crucially form part of the larger audience to the play’s final revelations
of kin and kind. As Perdita recognizes her mother, and Leontes recognizes his wife, audiences can finally recognize the play’s evolving form as
tragicomic, ending finally with the renewed fertility of comedy despite
its seasons in the dark underworld of the tragic. Knowing kin proves
prerequisite not only to continuing kingdoms, but to knowing—and
acknowledging—the fertile, mongrel literary kind that the play embodies.
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Unknowing Kind: A Response to
Tanya Pollard
Zachary Lesser
Tanya’s excellent essay on knowing, and not knowing, in The Winter’s
Tale draws attention to the intertwined philological histories of words
such as kin and kind, gens and gentle and genre, words that classify and
create groupings based on family, race, class, and literary form. In the
Renaissance, tragicomedy was the privileged dramatic form for thinking
about such questions, and it insistently posed difficult questions about
kinship. In his Compendio della poesia tragicomica (1601), the Ferrarese
professor and poet Battista Guarini theorized this modern genre, significantly unmentioned by Aristotle, through repeated comparisons to
the kinds of mongrel or “bastard” mixture that Tanya traces through The
Winter’s Tale. But he gives these mixed forms a positive valence: “Aren’t
the horse and the donkey two distinct species? Of course. And yet from
both springs a third species, the mule, which is neither one nor the other.
The same can be said of the wolfdog [licisca] born of the wolf and the dog,
which is neither wolf nor dog.”14
For Guarini, what is crucial about tragicomedy is that the two parts
that make up the generic “third species,” comedy and tragedy, cannot be
separated, just as the mule cannot be turned back into a horse and a donkey. This is “the difference between a mixed being and a composite being.
In the former, the parts lose their form, and form a third thing quite different,” whereas anything that is merely composed is simply a conjoining of
the two in which each part can still be distinctly perceived. Again invoking
the gendered and sexualized aspects of this mixing that Pollard highlights
in The Winter’s Tale, Guarini writes: “The first can be compared to the
fabled Hermaphrodite ... The second is like a man who hugs a woman, and
thus after their embraces they each return to their own form.”15
Do Shakespeare’s late plays conform to Guarini’s fully theorized
understanding of tragicomedy? To me, they seem closer to John Fletcher’s
more humble remarks to the reader of The Faithful Shepherdess: “A tragiecomedy is not so called in respect of mirth and killing but in respect it
wants deaths, which is inough to make it no tragedie, yet brings some
neere it, which is inough to make it no comedie: which must be a representation of familiar people, with such kinde of trouble as no life be
questiond, so that a God is as lawfull in this as in a tragedie, and meane
people as in a comedie.” Fletcher knew Guarini’s treatise, and he likewise
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stressed the mixed nature of tragicomedy against the merely composite
nature of a play that simply alternates between scenes of “mirth and killing” or features characters “sometimes laughing together, and sometimes
killing one another.”16 We do not know if Shakespeare read Guarini, but
plays such as The Winter’s Tale, Pericles, and The Tempest—as well as The
Merchant of Venice and Measure for Measure earlier—are largely in accord
with Fletcher’s simple definition of the genre, if not always with Guarini’s
more classicized strictures. But Shakespeare does not quite conform even
to Fletcher: poor Mamilius is brought near death, and then he actually
dies.17 And to the extent that we can speak, as Pollard does, of the two
“halves” of The Winter’s Tale—the tragic half in Sicilia and the comic half
in Bohemia—then the play certainly fails Guarini’s test, looking more like
the man and woman embracing than the fabled hermaphrodite.
We still have a blind spot for tragicomedy in Shakespeare’s work, I
think. Since Edward Dowden popularized the term “romance” for these
plays, we have, often grudgingly, used this categorization, which emerges
out of a biographical framework that sees Shakespeare mellowing in old
age after the harshness of his great tragic period. Dowden is an easy target for critique, although our own evaluations of Shakespeare’s plays often
depend just as much, if in a more submerged way, on the chronology of
their writing, with its inevitable link to biography. 18 The “word which
interprets Shakespeare’s latest plays,” for Dowden, is “reconciliation.”19
Pollard’s essay draws our attention to the less resolved aspects of these
plays—the failure to recognize kinship in gens and genre, the “mongrel
literary kind that the play embodies.” What of our own mistaking of kind?
What do we miss when we think of Shakespeare’s plays as somehow of a
different kind than other Jacobean tragicomedies?
Part of what we miss, I think, is just the kind of promiscuous mixture that, as Pollard shows, was at the heart of the genre of tragicomedy,
and that (not coincidentally) provided Guarini with many of his key
metaphors. The mixture here is of Shakespeare with his theatrical world, a
world in which tragicomedy was the coming genre, in which playwrights
such as George Wilkins and John Fletcher were establishing themselves on
the scene (the latter with more success than the former), and in which collaborative playwriting was normal. Of the great collaborators Beaumont
and Fletcher, Aubrey famously wrote that they “lived together ... lay
together ... had one wench in the house between them, which they did so
admire; the same cloathes and cloake, &c., between them.” Here too a gendered and sexualized mixing stands in for the mixing of literary kind, the
“wonderfull consimility of phansey” that Aubrey saw in the playwriting
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couple.20 Rather than imagining a serene Shakespeare who, “whatever his
trials and sorrows and errors might have been ... had come forth from them
wise, large-hearted, calm-souled,” we might imagine him reenergized by
new collaborations and new genres.21 Shakespeare the tragicomedian is a
playwright who seeks out younger men to whom he can apprentice himself, seeing in Wilkins an up-and-comer with a good tale in Pericles, and
learning from Fletcher, already emerging as the master of the genre, in The
Two Noble Kinsmen. This is a Shakespeare who—at what would turn out
to be the end of his career (whether or not he knew it at the time)—finds
a rejuvenated creativity in mixed authorship, mixed forms, mixed genres.
The First Folio’s “Catalogue of the seuerall Comedies, Histories,
and Tragedies contained in this Volume”—already an antiquated generic
taxonomy—cannot (or refuses to) account for this creative mixing, dispersing The Winter’s Tale, The Tempest, Measure for Measure, and Merchant
of Venice in the comedies and Cymbeline in the tragedies, and omitting
entirely Pericles and Two Noble Kinsmen. The mixtures of genre and of collaborative authorship are a blind spot in Heminges and Condell’s vision
of Shakespeare, a foundational unknowing of kin and kind that persists
in often submerged ways in our own work. Did they simply not recognize
these plays as tragicomedies, or Shakespeare as a tragicomedian, blinded as
they may have been by the brilliant work in this genre of their current inhouse dramatist Fletcher? Did they already view Shakespeare as belonging
to an earlier era of theater, one significantly different from the 1620s when
tragicomedy as practiced by Fletcher and Massinger and others was well
established on the English stage? 22 Or did they instead think that the
modern mixed genre was not sufficiently serious and elevated to justify
inclusion in this monumental volume of their beloved (and best-selling)
author? Whatever the reason for the exclusion of tragicomedy from the
First Folio, it has helped to ensure that the recognition scene that Pollard
sees at the end of The Winter’s Tale—not the recognition of kin that takes
place onstage but the recognition by the audience of the play’s mixed
genre—is one that we need to continually restage.
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Difficult Loves: A Response to
Tanya Pollard
Aveek Sen
Tanya’s fine piece on “parental misrecognition” in The Winter’s Tale made
me reread the play and its source text, Greene’s Pandosto, after a long time.
But, more importantly, before going back to the books, I closed my eyes
for a while and thought about my memory of the play across a “wide gap
of time.” I remembered how moved I was every time I studied the play
more than three decades ago, and what a high I got during my student
years while watching it on stage, or even fragmentarily on television. In an
obvious way, the statue scene—with its transcendent trickery—dominates
those memories. But I also recalled another reaction—a very particular
kind of disappointment—that I would feel, inevitably, at another muchanticipated moment in the play. It was a romantic, almost Elian, sense of
anticlimax when no theatrical realization quite matched up to the fleeting yet bottomless complexity of what reading never failed to conjure up.
This is when Florizel presents Leontes with Perdita in Act 5 as the girl
Florizel loves but cannot marry, because she appears to be a shepherd’s
daughter. Leontes, of course, does not yet know that Perdita is his daughter, although he knows, and recognizes, Florizel as Polixenes’s son because
the young man so closely resembles his father. It is all happening in the
presence of Paulina, in whose gaze the full range of the drama of this cognitive error is being played out.
Even as Leontes finds Polixenes in Florizel’s every feature, thus
legitimizing Florizel’s birth and rectifying his own earlier error of parental misrecognition, Shakespeare weaves into these moments a parallel
story of potentially errant precognition in Leontes’s response to Perdita’s
beauty. Paulina is quick to point out that the older man seems to be getting improperly aroused by the sight of the girl. “Sir, my liege, / Your eye
hath too much youth in’t,” Paulina tells Leontes, “Not a month / Fore your
queen died, she was more worth such gazes / Than what you look on now”
(5.1.224–27). Leontes is duly chastised by Paulina’s sharper-than-playful
reprimand. “I thought of her / Even in these looks I made,” he admits to
Paulina (5.1.227–28).
So many, too many, things are going on here, telescoped within a few
seconds of playing—though not reading, remembering, and imagining—
time. A kind of paternal blindness is getting unwittingly corrected into
the fleeting risk of another, more terrible, filial mistaking. And for the

Difficult Loves  137

audience or reader who knows Greene’s Pandosto, the memory of how
Greene’s narrative ends with incestuous lusting and suicide, “clos[ing] up
the comedy with a tragical stratagem,” opens up a corridor of allusive time
that is both literary-historical and psychosexually mischievous. Earlier,
Leontes had described Paulina as the keeper of “the memory of Hermione”
(5.1.59). So, even before bringing Hermione back for Leontes, Paulina
skirts the edges of the perverse by presenting Perdita as a visual pre-echo
of her mother, the effect of which on Leontes she firmly tries to, yet cannot fully, regulate. Although Greene’s ending is invoked and averted,
something unspeakable, but not entirely unspoken, has been planted in
our imagination and in the play’s textual unconscious. So, later when we
hear from the Third Gentleman about Leontes “worr[ying] his daughter
with clipping her,” exclaiming “O thy mother, thy mother” in his unhinged
joy-mixed-with-grief (5.2.57, 55), some primary innocence of feeling and
action seems to have become irremediably complicated. Nothing can be
quite as simple or “lawful as eating” any more (5.3.147).
This took me back to another strange, and easy to miss, father–
daughter moment in Othello—the tragedy that The Winter’s Tale revisits
as tragicomedy. Desdemona’s father, Brabantio, has been roused from
sleep and pulled out of bed by Iago to be told that “your daughter and
the Moor are now making the beast with two backs” (1.1.114–15). And
the outraged Brabantio declares, “This accident is not unlike my dream, /
Belief of it oppresses me already / Light, I say, light!” (1.1.140–41). 23
What has Brabantio been dreaming of before he awakes to find it true?
His language here takes me to Hermione’s words to Leontes during her
trial: “You speak a language that I understand not. / My life stands in the
level of your dreams, / Which I’ll lay down” (3.2.81–82) “Your actions
are my dreams,” Leontes answers (3.2.82). A few lines later, Hermione
puts herself again at the heart of a conjugal nightmare that plays itself out
somewhere between sleep and waking: “if I shall be condemned, / Upon
surmises, all proofs sleeping else / But what your jealousies awake, I tell
you / ’Tis rigour and not law” (3.2.111–14).
At these moments, Shakespeare is opening up a space, at once terrifyingly inward and helplessly public, that is, quite literally, dreamlike in
its power to distort and determine forms of consciousness, expression, and
action. It is a space of fantasy that is at once real in its oppressiveness, yet
difficult to translate into the language of theatrical representation or neutralize through the rational operations of justice. Hence, these moments
happen more successfully in our imagination as we read the plays, but elude
a satisfactory realization on stage, or feel overstated when described in
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pieces of interpretive writing. We have to allow ourselves to be slightly sick
in our heads and hearts to grasp what Shakespeare is saying, or not saying,
about the murkiness of “natural” human relationships at such moments,
making it impossible to keep ourselves apart, imaginatively and therefore
morally, from the “sickness” of a Leontes, a Brabantio, or an Othello.
Shakespeare, like Leontes at the end of the play, was almost fifty
when he wrote The Winter’s Tale. Thomas Mann—whose notebooks scrupulously record the amoral, desiring gaze he focused upon his own growing
boys—gave himself a fiftieth-birthday present, in 1925, in the form of a
story called “Disorder and Early Sorrow.” It is about the disconcertingly
“conservative” and possessive tenderness that a forty-seven-year-old professor of history finds himself feeling for his infant daughter, “his little
Eve,” as she falls into a sort of infantile infatuation for her much older
sibling’s male friend: “This [i.e., the professor’s love for his daughter] was
love at first sight, love everlasting: a feeling unknown, unhoped for, unexpected—in so far as it could be a matter of conscious awareness.” “But he
understood more,” Mann continues:
He knows ... that there is something not quite right about this
feeling, so unaware, so undreamed of, so involuntary ... There is
something ulterior about it, in the nature of it; that something is
hostility, hostility against the history of today, which is still in the
making and thus not history at all, on behalf of the genuine history
that has already happened—that is to say, death. ... His devotion to
this priceless little morsel of life and new growth has something to
do with death, it clings to death as against life; and that is neither
right nor beautiful—in a sense.24

Is not Shakespeare’s death-and-time-haunted family romance poised on
the threshold of a similar consciousness? It is an emotion that Leontes
could never articulate to himself in the way Mann’s professor of history
would, and must therefore be left for us, today’s hapless historicists, to feel
and try not to put in so many words in what we then go on to write about
these beautiful plays, these difficult loves.
NOTES
The Winter’s Tale, 5.2.7. All references to Shakespeare’s plays, unless otherwise stated, will be to the Riverside Shakespeare, ed. Evans.
2
See Kitch, “Bastards and Broadsides in The Winter’s Tale”; on this trope
more broadly, see Brooks, Printing and Parenting in Early Modern England.
1
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On problems of knowledge in the play, see especially Cavell, Disowning
Knowledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare.
4
See the Oxford English Dictionary, online, “know,” viewed February 28,
2017.
5
I base my word counts on MIT’s online Shakespeare.
6
Germanic cousins include Old Frisian kin, ken, kon, Old Saxon kunni,
Middle Dutch kunne, konne, Dutch kunne, Old High German chunni, Middle
High German künne, kunne, Old Norse kyn, Danish, Swedish kön, and Gothic
kuni; see Oxford English Dictionary, online, “kin”.
7
The Oxford English Dictionary’s etymological entry for “kin” notes that,
“In the Germanic word, as in Latin genus and Greek γένος, three main senses
appear, (1) race or stock, (2) class or kind, (3) gender or sex; the last, found
in Old English and early Middle English, but not later, is the only sense in
modern Dutch, Danish, and Swedish.” English kin and kind, that is, have
developed different aspects of this linguistic family than have some of their
Germanic cousins.
8
This number includes references to gentlemen in speech prefixes and stage
directions.
9
This is a Shakespearean record; runners-up include The Taming of the Shrew,
with 55 instances of gentle, and Two Gentlemen of Verona, with 54.
10
See Findlay, Illegitimate Power, and Neill, “‘In Everything Illegitimate.’”
11
On the word’s development, see the Oxford English Dictionary, online,
and McDougall, Royal Bastards, esp. 44–48. As McDougall discusses, the notion
of bastards as base-born is complicated by the surprisingly extensive history of
bastards who attained royalty, most notably William the Conqueror, regularly
dubbed “bastardus.”
12
Later lexical developments have added to these meanings. Definitions in
the Urban Dictionary include “child born out of wedlock” but focus primarily on
the broader derogatory sense of “A person that is irritating or annoying” and heavily feature “A person that has killed Kenny in South Park” (41; also see 2, 6, 20,
25, 28, 37, and sample sentence: “You killed Kenny, You Bastard!!!,” 25).
13
See, for example, Wilson, “‘Nature and Art’ in Winter’s Tale.” On the play’s
interweaving of botany, fertility, and female bodies, see Tigner, “The Winter’s
Tale.”
14
I quote from the edition bound with (but bibliographically independent
from) Guarini, Il Pastore Fido, sig. A4v: “non sono elleno due distinte spezie
quella del Cauallo, & quella dell’animal indiscreto? Certo si: Et pure d’ambedue
loro se ne fa la terza del Mulo, che non è ne l’uno, nè l’altro. Il medesimo si può
dire della Licisca, di Lupo nata & di cane, che non è ne lupo, ne Cane.”
15
Guarini, Il Pastore Fido, sig. A3v: “la differenza dell’esser misto, all’esser
composto. ... Il primo si può paragonare al fauoloso Ermafrodito. ... Il secondo
è simile ad huomo, che s’abbracci con Donna, sì che dopò gli abbracciamenti,
ciascuno torni nell’esser suo.”
3
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Fletcher, The Faithfull Shepheardesse, sig. ¶2v. Compare Guarini’s comment
that tragicomedy takes from tragedy “il pericolo, non la morte” (Compendio, sig.
A6v).
17
On Fletcher’s definition in relation to Shakespeare’s plays, see Zucker, “Late
Shakespeare,” 352–70, 354–55.
18
See McMullan, Shakespeare and the Idea of Late Writing, esp. 54: “despite
the various critiques that have been offered of it, Dowden’s basic understanding of
the late plays has continued to underscore readings of those plays right up to the
present”; on the importance of establishing the chronology of the works, see de
Grazia, Shakespeare Verbatim.
19
Dowden, Shakspere, 361.
20
Aubrey, Brief Lives, chiefly of Contemporaries, 1. 95–96; see Masten, Textual
Intercourse.
21
Dowden, Shakspere, quoted in McMullan, Shakespeare and the Idea of Late
Writing, 53.
22
For the idea of Shakespeare (and other turn-of-the-century dramatists) as
embodying a “golden age” or earlier moment in theatrical history, see Farmer and
Lesser, “Canons and Classics.”
23
Whereas all references to The Winter’s Tale, as in Tanya Pollard’s essay, are
to the Riverside Shakespeare, all references to Othello are to the Arden edition, ed.
Honigmann (2016), in line with other references to that play in this volume.
24
Mann, “Disorder and Early Sorrow,” 574–75.
16
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Chapter 6

The Epistemology of Violence in
The Comedie of Errors
Stephen Spiess

E. Dro: Say what you wil sir, but I know what I know,
That you beat me at the Mart I haue your hand to show;
If ye skin were parchment, & ye blows you gaue were ink,
Your owne hand-writing would tell you what I thinke.1

L

ET US BEGIN IN language, bracketing, however momentarily,
Shakespeare’s rich and allusive dialogue from its contexts in performance. Indeed, when the Ephesian Dromio reunites with his master at the
outset of Act III, he distinguishes the aural signifier from the imprinted
sign, suggesting that this owner’s “hand-writing”—those incessant “blows”
inked upon his “skin”—exceeds all speech, providing the truest register,
the authentic record, of this slave’s reality at the “hand[s]” of a sadistic
superior. It is not the first time that he construes their lingua franca in such
terms: speaking with Adriana in an earlier exchange, Dromio cites violence
as Antipholus’s preferred language, a mode of communication that both
conveys and confuses “meaning”:
Adr:
Say, is your tardie master now at hand?
E. Dro:	Nay, hee’s at too hands with mee, and that my two eares
can witnesse.
Adr:
Say, didst thou speake with him? knowst thou his minde?
E. Dro:	I, I, he told his minde vpon mine eare,
Beshrew his hand, I scarce could vnderstand it.
Luc:	Spake hee so doubtfully, thou couldst not feele
his meaning.
E. Dro:	Nay, hee strooke so plainly, I could too well feele his
blowes; and withall so doubtfully, that I could scarce
vnderstand them. (TLN 319–30)
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As literal and metaphorical significations collide, this master’s “blowes”
express/impress such potent meanings that his slave can barely “vnderstand them”: not only comprehend them, that is, but withstand or stand
under their affective force. By the start of the third act, Ephesian Dromio
apparently has given up trying to “know” his owner’s “minde,” and instead
confirms his own reality, as felt and experienced, through a moving assertion of what we might now call standpoint epistemology: “I know what I
know ... the wrongs I suffer, and the blowes I beare” (TLN 629–35).2 How
we interpret such knowledge claims—how we entertain, disown, and/or
laugh at them—informs the play’s comedic and cultural work.3
Dromio of Ephesus’s dignified avowal, however subtle, proves
especially poignant as a precursor to the scene’s famed lock-out exchange,
arguably the play’s preeminent depiction of urban disorder.4 Here, elite
masculine rage again emerges as a putatively humorous response to problems of signification. Barred entry to his house, Ephesian Antipholus
first slanders and threatens his kitchen maid, then pledges to “break ope
the gate” that impedes his progress (TLN 729).5 As scholars have long
argued, this mise-en-scène conjoins spatial dynamics to sexual symbolism: locked out of his house and his wife’s company, Antipholus fears
that he has lost control of Adriana’s enclosed body.6 While Balthasar calls
for “patience” and prudence (TLN 746–49), Antipholus immediately
rejects such counsel, suggesting that his dwelling has become a brothel,7
his wife a whore. He then threatens to destroy the former and, in a later
scene, to disfigure the latter: “Dissembling harlot ... with these nailes,
Ile plucke out these false eyes, / That would behold in me this shameful sport” (TLN 1389–93). It is a visceral, horrifying charge, perhaps all
the more unsettling to playgoers who know that the play’s manifold misrecognitions, doublings, substitutions, debts, and “blowes” are, of course,
erroneous: not only mistaken, that is, but wandering—moving beyond the
mark to encompass alternative bodies and unintended meanings.8 When
Adriana adopts this hostile idiom moments later, castigating Dromio as a
“prating pesant” and “slaue,” then pledging to “breake thy pate a-crosse”
(TLN 354–57), audiences are reminded not only that the languages of
Ephesian violence incorporate a range of speakers and addressees, but
comprise a plethora of diverse marks, utterances, and actions including,
but not limited to, the application of physical force.9 How such violence
signifies, to whom, and in what contexts, is what interests me here. While
scholars have long insisted that such aggressions not only are funny, but
must be so, I adopt an alternative standpoint, one that reads the play’s
aggressions not simply as a mark of dramatic farce, but also as a trace of, and
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expected reply to, problems of signification and sexual knowing in the age
of Shakespeare. Pursuing such an inquiry will take us from the houses of
Ephesus and pages of scholarly criticism to the streets and brothels of early
modern London and back again. What, I ask, are the relations of violence,
signification, and (un)knowability in The Comedie of Errors? What is at
stake in preserving or confronting the insignificance of the play’s manifold
“blowes”? What does such violence render legible when allowed to signify
as aggression or suffering? What might it suppress or conceal?
For some scholars, to begin in this manner signals my own erroneous
misrecognitions, an absurd misreading of genre and performance history.
The Comedie of Errors is, for Russ McDonald, “a superlative example of
dramatic farce, a simple form of comedy designed chiefly to make an audience laugh.”10 Its “laughter,” Harold Bloom contends, “is always benign,”11
and to “misread [the play’s] genre,” for John Creaser, “is to misread the
work completely.”12 I thus risk appearing foolish—“analyz[ing ] delicate
sentiments while the characters knock heads”13—or worse yet, puritanical,
in pursuing this line of inquiry: “the principle vice” within a farcical universe, Creaser argues, “is to lack a robust sense of humor” and forget that
these “simplified characters are scarcely touched by moral or even physical
pain” (83, emphasis added). To know and understand this particular play,
therefore, seems to require a willing suspension of horror, if not also an
affective break between playgoers and players: one must not identify with
the stricken Dromios, the threatened Adriana, or the beaten maids (TLN
1643).14 One must look past the violence: see it as insignificant, meaningless, or, at best, as meaning something other than the type of felt, injurious
“hand-writing” that Ephesian Dromio so vividly describes.
Such displacements extend to scholarly accounts that purport to
take the play’s violence seriously. While Douglas Lanier reads The Comedie
of Errors’s many “marks and rituals–faces, clothing, beatings, warts and
moles, meals, rings and gold chains” as troubling contemporary ideologies of essentialist or authentic identity,15 his insights nevertheless conflate
the material gift with the delivered blow, evacuating the corporeal consequences of “breaking” into another’s body or domestic space (TLN 730)16:
wounds or fractures emerge as simply one of many means through which
various characters materialize their socioeconomic statuses and relations.
Working in another hermeneutic tradition, Barbara Freedman insists that
the play’s “aggressive impulses” are central to its “characteristic humor,”
contending that “the key to farce ... is that we laugh at violence.”17 Yet
Freedman’s psychoanalytic approach likewise displaces attention from the
violence staged, locating its meanings in alternative bodies and identities.
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The play’s manifold beatings, she argues, function as a type of screen fantasy that cloaks the true object of aggression: Egeon, that wandering father
whose primal transgression (failure to fulfill his marital debt) is denied in
the drama’s manifest content and paid out in “random acts of punishment”
bestowed upon other heads and bodies.18
This inexorable movement away from the play’s onstage aggressions
permeates even performance studies, where scholars have long recognized,
and productively troubled, the hostilities and coercions staged in other
early modern comedies, most notably The Taming of the Shrew. 19 But
critics who foreground such “serious” concerns in The Comedie of Errors,
according to Robert S. Miola, “ever run the risk of overreading and of wandering far from the theatrical experience of this bright and lively play.”20
Allowing certain meanings to signify in this play, we are told, not only
threatens theatrical pleasure but incurs unnecessary interpretive labor: the
over-reading scholar as comedic trope. At the same time, however, such
prescriptions both assume a unified audience “experience” of, and response
to, onstage confrontation,21 and elide the critical maneuvering necessary
to bypass or explain away their unpredictable resonance(s). Thus, where
McDonald insists that “meaning comes about in farce ... [through] what
an audience sees and hears in the main action,”22 his farcical reading of
the lock-out episode circumvents bodies and actions staged to secure
meaning by way of the scene’s rhetorical structure: the episode “depends
for its hilarity on the stichomythic exchanges between those outside ...
and those inside” the enclosed house (86). Along with an antanaclasic
exchange between Adriana and the Syracusan Dromio, such linguistic
play, McDonald argues, supersedes embodied action as guarantor of its
farcical tone. Why does language supplant the signifying body here? And
in what ways? While privileging the dialogue’s formal structure, that is,
McDonald concomitantly overlooks its content, including dialogue that,
we shall see later in this essay, discloses alternative understandings of what
such confrontations might signify or render visible.
My purpose here is not to dismiss some of the play’s most influential
studies, but rather to consider how an epistemology of violence understands The Comedie of Errors, including its significance within the scholarly
tradition. As I have begun to suggest, such an epistemology (what is known
or knowable about its violence, how this knowledge is produced, through
what categories, and by whom it is accepted) is ineluctably linked to those
material processes through which early modern meanings are made to signify (and not signify) in particular discursive contexts. Such processes,
Valerie Traub reminds us, encompass our own hermeneutic practices and
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decisions, as do assumptions regarding what can be known or discerned
through that which appears insignificant, absent, or unknowable in early
modern England.23 Farce and psychoanalysis, for example, offer particularized signifying frameworks that structure what can or cannot be detected
within, and known through, the mistaken blows of The Comedie of Errors.
But violence, as Dromio of Ephesus reminds us, possesses many marks
and connotations, dependent in part upon one’s own situated experiences
and subjectivities. With what remains, therefore, I trace out one such
experience, encoded within the lock-out exchange, that encourages consideration of how violence connects to problems of sexual knowing on the
streets and stages of early modern London. My intention here is neither to
privilege the contextual above the theatrical, nor to elevate a materialist
approach over other methodological investments; rather, I hope to suggest
how thinking of humorous violence as a problem of, and as a response to
problems of, signification and knowability might reframe what can be seen,
heard, known about, and known through this early modern play. I thus ask
not whether the play is funny, but what kind of cultural and epistemological work is performed by violence that audiences are encouraged to see as
ordinary, insignificant, and indeed laughable.

***
For all its apparent excesses, farce has long been associated with those most
basic, recognizable, and even banal aspects of everyday life. Far from the
exceptional or extraordinary worlds of Shakespearean tragedy, for example, comedies such as Errors, according to Harry Levin, derive much of
their energy from the productive proximity of the ordinary to the absurd.
Revisiting Philip Sidney’s famous contention that comedy provides “an
imitation of the common errors of our life,” Levin suggests that hilarity
originates in our partial recognition of onstage error: our sense that “all this
has happened before, and may happen again ... [for] patterns of behaviour
are predictable.”24 We laugh, he intimates, because staged mishaps so closely
parallel those confusions common to everyday life. If farce amplifies such
uncanny play,25 its meanings nonetheless depend, potentially all the more
so, on the representation of familiar routines and rituals: dining with one’s
spouse, purchasing gifts, paying debts, fretting over misplaced affections
or infidelities, speaking with family members, dealing with jealousies both
petty and profound, serving one’s social superiors, and beating one’s subordinates.26 Roman New Comedy, moreover, provided a basic urban and spatial template for these anamorphic renderings of daily life, situating a range
of familiar social types (senex amans, adulescens, virgo, matrona, meretrix)
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within a typical municipal setting. 27 Framed by an often rudimentary
scaena (two or three doorways associated with purportedly distinct social
spaces, such as a citizen’s house, priory, and brothel), city figures would
navigate their identities and relations partly by way of their spatial practices
or transgressions.28 Whether in Plautine Rome or on the Elizabethan stage,
theatrical meanings thus depended partly on playgoers’ ability to recognize
the presumed social and symbolic import—the “proper” significations—of
such stock components, so as to fully appreciate their subsequent distortions, misrecognitions, or resignifications. What might early moderns have
seen or heard in the spaces, rituals, and misunderstandings of Shakespeare’s
Ephesus? How did these scenes signify, to whom, and in relation to what
problems of knowledge or knowability?
If we cannot account for all playgoing perspectives, we do know, at
very least, how Dromio of Syracuse recognizes disorder at the gate. When
his Ephesian counterparts, twin and master alike, threaten to “beat the
doore down” of their newly inaccessible domicile,29 this substitute servant is charged by Adriana to identify “who ... keeps all this noise?” By way
of response, he declares her “towne is troubled with vnruly boies” (TLN
703–9). Misreading Ephesian Antipholus, that citizen, husband, and
master of the house, as an “vnruly” adolescent, Syracusan Dromio’s short
rejoinder provides a comedic frame for the confrontation in progress. But
this response likewise encodes more troubling connotations, accessing a
long-standing cultural practice fueled by precisely the spatial, sexual, and
gendered anxieties on display in Antipholus’s confused fury.
Among the many ritual disorders of England’s festive calendar, perhaps none proved as dangerous and potentially destructive as London’s
so-called “apprentice misrule”: urban disturbances that “occurred,”
according to Paul S. Seaver, “almost as regularly as the seasons.”30 Roger
Manning, for example, posits “at least 96 insurrections, riots, and unlawful assemblies [occurring ] in London between 1517 and 1640,” with
35 such “outbreaks of disorder” taking place in the final two decades of
Elizabeth’s reign. 31 Although the most notorious of these revolts took
place in 1517 and 1617, such uprisings were especially prevalent in the
early 1590s, including skirmishes significant enough to draw the Lord
Mayor’s attention in 1590, 1592, 1593, and 1595. 32 Social and gender
historians have long debated the causes, aims, and demographics of these
insurrections, but it is clear that such rioters, overwhelmingly male, predominantly vented their ire upon persons (aliens, foreigners, servingmen,
pages, women, prostitutes, and actors) and spaces (brothels and theaters)
that threatened social distinction.33
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These practices extended to university and college towns, including Cambridge, where a small but, for our purposes, salient confrontation
took place in 1594, sometime before the first known performance of The
Comedie of Errors at Gray’s Inn, London, on December 28 of that year.34
In that case, a group of young gentlemen—“a motley crew of students
and marginal inhabitants of the town”—were accused of despoiling and
flogging an unnamed woman, whom they had encountered at night,
alone, and “hiding under a hedge.” 35 Suspecting the woman was a prostitute, the men escorted her to Smoke Alley, a disreputable part of town,
in an apparent effort to verify her illicit sexual status. Failing to secure
any such confirmation, they then dragged her into a nearby field, debated
her punishment, concluded that “shee should be whipt,” tore her clothes,
flogged her with a belt, and besmirched her with dirt—perhaps even
feces. Recounting this episode in her study of early modern masculinity, Alexandra Shepard focuses on the men’s assumption of extra-juridical
power: the manner in which they appropriated “the regulative stance of
those in authority” and “mimicked [authorized] forms of judicial punishment designed to shame and humiliate disreputable women” (98).
Although I concur with this reading, I am more interested here in the
episode’s epistemological, rather than socio-symbolic, inflections: in the
men’s (failed) attempt to ratify their counterpart’s sexual status prior to
exacting “popular justice.” Why the detour to Smoke Alley? What, precisely, did the men hope to secure there? Would the episode have turned
out differently, had they elicited that desired speech act—that evasive
locution, which haunts the court record as an (absent) guarantor of
the woman’s socio-sexual identity? Perhaps not, but in this remarkable
account, one point appears indisputable: the men’s violent attack upon,
and degradation of, this unknown woman is inextricably linked to their
desire—and failure—to resolve her sexual status.
Such links between masculine violence and sexual unknowing
proved all the more conspicuous by the turn of the seventeenth century,
when London apprentices began ritualistically attacking the (supposedly
unmarked) houses of prostitution they patronized.36 Traditionally occurring on Shrove Tuesday, and thus directly preceding the onset of Lenten
temperance, these “brothel house riots” often mixed symbolic renunciation with “ritualized yet very real violence,” as “windows were smashed,
houses were invaded, and their occupants assaulted.”37 Civil authorities,
who had long overlooked this “ancient administration of [popular] justice
on Shrove Tuesday,” were thus forced to prosecute what traditionally had
been accepted as licensed expressions of festive abuse.38
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Given their powerful spatial, gendered, sexual, and moral connotations, these practices captured the imagination of a range of early modern
writers, including Thomas Dekker,39 John Webster (with Dekker),40 Sir
Thomas Overbury, 41 Thomas Middleton, 42 Ben Jonson, 43 Shackerly
Marmion, 44 and Francis Beaumont and John Fletcher, who explicitly
linked the destruction of “houses of iniquitie” to the “boies [of ] merry
London.”45 John Taylor, for example, paints a frightening panorama of
unruly violence in Iack-a-Lent, an early seventeenth-century pamphlet
that describes “youths arm’d with cudgels, stones, hammers, rules, trowels,
and hand-sawes,” who “put Play-houses to the sacke, and Bawdy-houses to
the spoyle, in the quarrell breaking a thousand quarrels (of glasse I meane)
making ambitious brickbats breake their neckes, tumbling from the tops
of lofty chimnies, terribly vntyling houses, [and] ripping vp the bowels
of feather-beds.” 46 Although Taylor is perhaps best known as a satirist,
his description largely parallels that offered by Edward Sherburne, who,
in recounting the infamous 1617 riot—which included an attack on the
newly assembled Cockpit playhouse (theaters were another favored target
of the rioters)—noted:
The Prentizes on Shrove Tewsday last, to the number of 3. or
4000 committed extreame insolencies; part of this number, taking
their course for Wapping, did there pull downe to the grownd 4
houses, spoiled all the good therein, defaced many others, & a
Justice of the Peace coming to appease them, while he was reading
a Proclamacion, had his head broken with a brick batt. Th’ other
part, making for Drury Lane, where lately a newe playhouse is
erected, they beset the house round, broke in, wounded divers of
the players, brokes open their trunckes, & whatt apparell, bookes,
or other things they found, they burnt & cut in peeces; & not
content herewith, got on top of the house, & untiled it, & had not
the Justices of the Peace & Sherife levied an aide, & hindred their
purpose, they would have laid that house likewise weven with the
grownd. In this skyrmishe one prentise was slaine, being shott
through the head with a pistoll, & many other of their fellowes
were sore hurt, & such of them as are taken his Majestie hath commaunded shal be executed for example sake.47

Whether instances of festive abuse, subcultural rites of passage, or, later in
the century, concentrated expressions of political discontent,48 such riots
were undeniably hazardous; as social historians have long acknowledged,
the symbolic dimensions of any such ritual, even when framed within
the temporal bounds of festivity, did not preclude “real and sometimes
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irreparable damage.”49 Symbolic violence, furthermore, enacts a form of
social discipline, even and perhaps especially when construed as frivolous
or insignificant. As Keith Thomas notes, although licensed misrule offered
“a safety-valve for the release of accumulated tensions,” it also operated as a
mechanism for reasserting traditional hierarchies through focused expressions of violence against particular subjects.50
Did such violence also serve to navigate, if not resolve, unsettling knowledge relations in the era? Following the suppression of legal
prostitution in London by royal proclamation in 1546, such a ritual
demarcation of illicit sexual identities and spaces encourages consideration of how acts of physical, emotional, and symbolic violence emerge
to mediate problems of sexual knowing.51 Whereas the conspicuous visibility of the Bankside brothels enabled a sense of social and geographic
containment, however illusory, prior to suppression, the Henrician
proclamation altered the material and linguistic signs by which London
prostitution had been and could be known. Beforehand, “allowed stewhouses had signs on their fronts, towards the Thames, not hanged out,
but painted on the walls.” What happened when these signs were painted
over and “this row of stews in Southwark was put down by the king’s commandment”? 52 As I argue elsewhere, without the clear signs and white
walls of Southwark, all London buildings became potential sites of sexual
commerce, including the Royal Exchange, Westminster, and St. Paul’s
Cathedral.53 The violent marking of illicit spaces and personae, therefore,
may have emerged as a mechanism for addressing, if not resolving, the
epistemological quandaries of early modern whoredom: how does one
know a whore is a whore? That one’s wife is not whore, nor their house
a brothel? Thus, while London’s brothel house riots arguably post-date
The Comedie of Errors,54 the play can be seen as participating in a larger
history of (in)significant English violence, even anticipating how such
riotous discontent would morph and evolve into the type of focused,
domestic assaults that would come to characterize seventeenth-century
apprentice misrule. As historical analogues, furthermore, the anxieties
and practices mapped above assume heightened significance in the contexts of a Shakespearean play permeated by the languages of “harlotry,”55
and one that derives much of its dramatic energ y from the incessant
unsettling of conventional identities, boundaries, and spaces.
Ephesian Antipholus encounters precisely such a crisis of signification when he returns home to find another man in his stead. Calling for
“an iron Crow” at the frenetic apex of the lock-out exchange (TLN 745),
he presumably intends to use this crowbar to “break ope” his door, not
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his wife—but the object of this warring blow remains unstated in the dialogue. Although the dynamics of the scene urge us to move on, to look
past the unsettling possibilities at play here, we might benefit precisely
by resisting that call. What kinds of knowing and unknowing, we must
ask, are necessary for this scene to work? What kinds of knowledge did
the various wives, servants, husbands, apprentices, and harlots in attendance bring to such an exchange? What did they know about insignificant
violence—domestic and theatrical, sexual and spatial—and how did the
relations between such knowledges inform their affective responses to
these staged confrontations? Playgoers have already heard Adriana declare
that, should her husband “but heare I were licencious,” he would “spit at
me, and spurne at me, / And hurle the name of husband in my face, / And
teare the stain’d skin of my Harlot brow” (TLN 526–31, emphasis added).
When he threatens to blind his wife, moreover, audiences are reminded
that Antipholus of Ephesus certainly is capable of such brutality, however
displaced onto other bodies or objects: revisiting their earlier lock-out,
Ephesian Dromio recalls that his “bones” bore “witnesse” to, and “felt the
vigor of,” his master’s subsequent “rage” (TLN 1364–65). If early moderns
laughed here, what might such affective responses signify?56 What would
they render knowable or unknowable? What kind of cultural work would
they perform?
My intention here is not to resolve the epistemology of violence
in The Comedie of Errors, but rather to offer a preliminary sketch that
might prompt discussion of how such an epistemology operates within
and beyond this particular early modern play. What, the play urges us to
ask, are the relations of unknowing and humorous violence? What is our
role, as present-day critics, in accounting for the cultural work of these
(im)material blows? What might we learn by (mis)recognizing their theatrical significance? That audiences are encouraged to laugh at violence
in The Comedie of Errors, indeed that we likely to do so, I want to suggest,
is neither erroneous nor insignificant; rather, the sights and sounds and
furies of humorous violence may prove all the more meaningful because
they seem to insist, indeed to depend, upon their own meaninglessness.
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What Does the Slave Know? A Response to
Stephen Spiess
Supriya Chaudhuri
At virtually any time in The Comedy of Errors, a slave is being beaten.
Violence is a language, written on the victim’s body, and, through this
urgent and moving set of reflections, Stephen prompts us to think again,
and differently, about the play. “I know what I know,” says Ephesian
Dromio: “That you beat me at the Mart I haue your hand to show; / If ye
skin were parchment, & ye blows you gaue were ink, / Your owne handwriting would tell you what I thinke” (TLN 629–32).57 Despite Dromio’s
“spelling out” of the metaphor of beating as writing, the assertion is full
of difficulties, and I take my cue from Stephen in pausing for a moment
to consider them. The slave’s knowledge of his master’s abusive violence is
absolute, and implicitly subjective and inalienable: “I know what I know.”
Philosophically, we might describe such knowledge as rooted in qualia,
the phenomenal properties of pain. But Dromio is not willing to hold
this knowledge as private and nonrepresentational. Rather, he sees it as
expressed in visible inscriptions, readable by others. If the marks left on
his body by Antipholus’s beatings had been a text bearing a distinctive
signature, his master would have recognized his own hand, and—by an
epistemological leap—learned what is in the slave’s mind, what he thinks.
How could the master’s handwriting “tell” him this? Dromio stops short
of saying that Antipholus would have shared the knowledge he claims for
himself as the prerogative of the beaten slave, but he does assert that the
author of the text grasps its meaning for the recipient. Does this follow?
Only if—and this would be an argument rooted in the epistemology of
violence—we claimed that to know what the slave thinks is no more than
to know that he suffers. The abuser recognizes his hand by its inscription
but also by its effect: what the abused body thinks is the pain it feels.
But, in another sense, Dromio knows “wrongly,” as the handwriting on his body is not that of his master Antipholus of Ephesus, but that
of Antipholus of Syracuse. Does violence have a signature? Although
Ephesian Dromio is regularly beaten (“I haue serued him from the houre
of my Natiuitie to this instant, and haue nothing at his hands for my
seruice but blowes”; 1311–13), he is hard put to understand the blows
he has just received. For his master “strooke so plainly, I could too well
feele his blowes; and withall so doubtfully, that I could scarce vnderstand them” (328–30; also meaning that he was nearly knocked over).
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This failure of understanding afflicts Syracusan Dromio as well. When
asked whether he knows why he is beaten, he responds “Nothing sir, but
that I am beaten” (436). As Elaine Scarry argues, intense bodily pain has
the power to obliterate all other feelings and sensations: it presents the
here-and-now of existence in the body, requiring the minute-by-minute
acknowledgment that “I am in pain now.” But this acknowledgment
is not a statement or representation, as such pain involves, so Scarry
argues, a “shattering” of language: it cannot be expressed except in inarticulate cries. 58 Even Wittgenstein, who is the author of a considerable
excursus on pain, and whether we can experience the pain of others, says
in the Blue Book: “The difference between the propositions ‘I have pain’
and ‘he has pain’ is not that of ‘L. W. has pain’ and ‘Smith has pain.’
Rather, it corresponds to the difference between moaning and saying
that someone moans.” 59 What then do the Dromios know ? What kind
of knowledge is proposed through the use of that subjunctive construction (“if/then”), with its jumps and elisions? If violence were writing, the
author would be a reader: does it follow, then, that he could read not just
the body but the mind of the slave? For the writing is his, not the slave’s:
what does it tell him?
I found this problem so compelling that I could scarcely tear myself
away from it. I recalled, too, that in “A Writing Lesson,” Lévi-Strauss had
read writing as a form of violence, a tool of forced enslavement—an argument elegantly countered by Jacques Derrida, more or less to the effect that
violence was already a kind of writing.60 But the point at issue here is surely
not this metaphysical coincidence. Rather, as Stephen brilliantly urges, the
point is an epistemological one. The question of what the slave knows is
necessarily succeeded by: what do we know? In a play about error, we constantly run the risk of knowing wrongly: specifically, of reading violence
wrongly. The standard interpretation reads it as laughable, comic violence,
its excess and unreason generically linked to farce, and specifically to the
Plautine source. In fact the beaten slave is more a feature of the Amphitruo
than of the Menaechmi: we might recall the wordplay on “verbero” (I
beat) when Mercury threatens to beat Sosia, and Sosia takes the word as
a substantive meaning “a whipped slave, a scoundrel.” 61 If Mercury’s violence is commonly read as an instance of robust Plautine humor, so too, as
Stephen documents, we are repeatedly told by editors and commentators
that to identify with “the stricken Dromios, the threatened Adriana, or
the beaten maids” would be to misread Errors completely, by missing its
humor and “wandering far from the theatrical experience of this bright
and lively play.”62
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Is the play’s violence then only a violence of the letter? Displaced
onto language, violence becomes no more than a rhetorical effect, a gesture
towards genre. Both Dromios, skilled punsters and quibblers, appear to be
fully conscious of the extent to which language can absorb the physical
energies of an exchange, often deflecting their masters from the physical
realm to the verbal, from the application of the hand to the use of the
tongue. Unfortunately, the reverse holds true as well, especially in a play
where the main characters are prone to using their hands before they use
their heads. There is desperation in Dromio of Syracuse’s efforts to jest his
way out of trouble after having been beaten by his master for jesting out
of turn: “Thinkst yu I iest? hold, take thou that, & that” (418). Dromio of
Ephesus, beaten by the wrong Antipholus and threatened by his mistress
at home, also bears witness to this usurpation of the tongue’s function by
the hand: “so that my arrant due vnto my tongue, I thank him, I bare home
vpon my shoulders” (348–50).
Stephen suggests that we are encouraged to laugh at these critical
moments of miscommunication by the play’s own investment in the epistemic work done by violence in early modern England, from brothel house
riots to everyday domestic abuse. Violence signifies by forcibly putting its
signature on what cannot be known, but is simultaneously unauthorized
and disowned. Still, it leaves its marks behind, as, however much we might
try to dematerialize it, to convert it into language, it remains stubbornly
material. This led me back to that initial problem of knowledge: who
knows what the slave knows? The “readability” of texts turns out to be
betrayed, not just by the prevalence of error, but by the fact that language
does not do the work it promises. At the heart of The Comedy of Errors is a
dense unknowability: violence inscribes its marks everywhere, but leads us
astray, or misses its object. Laughter is an uncertain, “unsettling” reaction
to the fact that the other cannot be understood.
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Narrating Violence: A Response to Stephen Spiess
Adam Zucker
It might be useful to see violence as an epistemological black hole: a powerful point in space and time that organizes vast clouds of matter and
energy around it. The closer you get to the black hole of violence, the more
the fabric of your own experience shifts or is warped by it. Touching it
might destroy you entirely. But, like the swirling arms of a galaxy, productive and sometimes beautiful reaches of time and space extend outward
from a violent act. We do our best to ignore that distant, dark singularity at the center of the Milky Way, and we can easily believe ourselves to
be untouched or unaffected it. But rest assured: everything we currently
know will vanish into a black hole, eventually. The beatings doled out in
farce and life will capture us all. A great deal of believable comedy rests in
the error of imagining otherwise.
The older critics Stephen (gently) takes to task in his essay for
ignoring the darker ramifications of the beatings in The Comedy of
Errors would disagree with me. Farce, they would claim (begging the
question of the play’s genre), demands a kind of lighthearted acceptance of abusive acts. And, I confess, there are times that I see things
their way, especially when it comes to the comedy of my contemporaries. I have laughed at South Park, Archer, and many, many other
comic depictions of things that, if they were really happening, would
be appalling. But I think Stephen is absolutely right in this case to draw
our attention to the empty places of meaning that violence fills up, but
never explains, in Shakespeare’s play. The beatings in The Comedy of
Errors (both threatened and delivered) have always horrified me. They
carry a pathetic excess or difficulty of signification along with them
that can be hard to sort through, especially at our historical remove. As
Stephen’s work on the resonance of apprentice attacks on brothels in
Tudor and Stuart London demonstrates, one way to solve this problem
is to tell our own stories about the kinds of violence we know occurred
in Shakespeare’s home. Narrative—on stage, in criticism, in the classroom—might help us decide how we ourselves want to make meaning
out of an unknowable force.
With that in mind, I want to turn briefly to an easily accessible
archive of violent narratives from Shakespeare’s London, the Middlesex
Sessions records, which can be found either in print or online, where
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they are keyword searchable.63 A cursory, fairly haphazard glance at one
sliver of them reveals the ubiquity of criminalized and juridical violence:
in a fortnight, between April 19 and May 3, 1613, the court handled
actions pertaining to three stabbings, a shooting, two physical assaults
upon constables, and, perhaps most pertinently for Stephen’s work (to
say nothing of the Allwits in A Chaste Maid in Cheapside), the carting
and whipping of William and Thomasine Barnewell, a husband and wife
team accused of running a clandestine brothel out of their own home in
the parish of St.-Giles-in-the-Fields.64
Fair enough. But, if beatings (major and minor), riots (small and
large), and corporal punishments (fatal and non-) were clearly a part
of ordinary life in the London of Shakespeare and his contemporaries,
their emplacement in entertainment, that is, in ostensibly pleasurable
texts and performances, shades into the difficult workings of ideology
and human sociability. Telling stories, even funny stories, to one another
about violent acts creates the cosmic lightshow around the hurt and
anger of a lashing or a stabbing. Levin, McDonald, and others who rely
on the genre of The Comedy of Errors as they make sense of its rough play
do not want to peer past the glowing plasma, as, they believe, it is the
entire point of the thing. But, to understand how violence works at the
center of drama and history, we should, I think, ask ourselves questions
about the interplay between its performance and its surrounding, defining narratives. What is the process through which fights or whippings
turn into and color entertainment?
One way to work through this problem is to be as explicit as possible about what we are doing when we transform the bare-bones facts
of historical violence into our own critical narratives. Stephen’s essay,
for example, made me want to know more about the intimacies shaped
by early modern sexual commerce and community policing, especially
in the context of a play that works so hard to disrupt and recompose
fraught familial bonds. The Comedy of Errors is a play about brothers
who are not quite brothers beating each other up in ways that are not
quite fraternal. Antipholus and Dromio (both the Ephesian and the
Syracusan pairs) grew up together from infancy. Lacking their twins,
they had each other. Their simmering frustrations and sudden outbursts
will be familiar to anyone who grew up with a sibling close in age, though
the distributions of power often shaped by birth order are transformed
(both by Plautus and by Shakespeare) into the master–servant pairings
of New Comic slavery.
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What does all this have to do with the whipping of bawds and
whores and the destruction of whorehouses? Inspired by Stephen, I
have used the term “intimacy,” above, to help clarify my own sense of the
epistemological difficulties. It could serve as a keyword in a discussion
of the propensity for violence to cause instructive problems of meaning
for those who experience it. What, for example, would it feel like to be
William and Thomasine Barnewell, who, the Sessions Records Calendar
reports, were “to be openly whipped at a cart’s tail from the prison to
their own house in the parish of St. Giles’ aforesaid, and there remain
for some space to the end the inhabitants may take notice of them, and
from thence to the prison again”?65 What would it feel like to be their
neighbors, taking notice of the couple being whipped together in front
of their house?
I have neither the space nor the imaginative capacity to answer
those questions in useful ways, but I would love to read the work
of someone who does. Critics of sloppy historicism have, for years
now, complained about its tendency to move too quickly in an argument from the details of a local experience to the broadest conclusions
about historical process. But the anecdotal narrative of the classic New
Historicist might usefully be understood as formally analogous to the
comic or farcical dramatic script. It works on us for a reason. What if
we see the archive, as Ellen MacKay has recently suggested, as a performance enacted by our encounter with it?66 Instead of asking whether or
not the violence in The Comedy of Errors is meaningful in a serious way
(it is!), what if we brought the fact of its creation to bear on the stories
we still tell about violence?
NOTES
The Comedie of Errors, TLN 629–32. All citations drawn from Shakespeare,
M . William Shakespeares Comedies, Histories, & Tragedies, and refer to that
edition’s through-line numbering (e.g., TLN 222). In using the Folio, I aim to
supplement and, to a limited degree, illustrate and perform this essay’s governing
argument regarding the epistemological and affective dimensions of early modern
signification, both in that era and our own. Put differently, I hope that readers
will consider their own affective responses to these potentially confusing, alienating, and/or estranging formulations, as well as to the desires—for stability, clarity,
legibility, and “correction”—that such affects may foster. An exception has been
made for the long and short “s,” which are translated in modern type. My thinking
in this regard is especially indebted to Masten, Queer Philologies.
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Developed primarily by feminist philosophers in the social sciences, standpoint epistemology examines how one’s epistemic perspective (what one knows,
how one knows it, what one accepts as knowledge, one’s access to knowledge,
one’s ability to advance truth claims, etc.) relates to, and is informed by, one’s particular experience as a sexed, gendered, classed, and racialized subject. For a useful
overview, see Harding, “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology.” See also Collins,
Black Feminist Thought, 201–38.
3
On the interrelations of violence, epistemology, signification, and embodiment in The Comedie of Errors, see also Akhimie, “Bruised with Adversity.” While
our anaylses share much in common, Akhimie demonstrates how the play’s various somatic “marks” can be read to illuminate the “physical and epistemological
violence that racial ideology effects” (187), while I connect them to problems
of sexual knowing and unknowing. These perpsectives, I submit, are not incommensurate; rather, and in conjunction, they urge attention to the complex cultural work performed by comedic violence, both in this particular play and early
modern England more generally. Furthermore, both essays suggest that the experiences, meanings, and (in)significances of early modern violence were informed
by multiple axes of identity, including but not limited to those of race, class, age,
gender, and sexual practice.
4
On the lock-out scene as apogee of the play’s subversive energies, see Levin,
“Two Comedies of Errors,” 128–29; Miola, Shakespeare and Classical Comedy,
19–38.
5
Citing Nell/Luce as a “minion” and “baggage,” terms that suggest her subordinate and potentially illicit sexual status, Ephesian Antipholus promises “You’ll
crie for this,” e.g., for failing to let him inside (TLN 691–702).
6
Candido, “Dining Out in Ephesus”; Miola, Shakespeare and Classical
Comedy, 29–30. On conceptual homologies between women’s chastity and
domestic enclosure in early modern England, see Stallybrass, “Patriarchal
Territories”; Parker, Literary Fat Ladies; Boose, “The Taming of the Shrew.” As
Traub notes, although the “body enclosed” aptly “encapsulates the prescriptive power of patriarchal doctrine” in early modern England, it nonetheless
“fails to capture the ways that women asserted their desires and will—their
agency—within such ideological constraints” (“Gender and Sexuality in
Shakespeare,” 131).
7
Speaking with the Duke in the denouement, Ephesian Antipholus laments
“This day (great Duke) she shut the doores vpon me, / While she with Harlots
feasted in my house” (TLN 1680–83).
8
On error and errare in the play, see Miola, Shakespeare and Classical Comedy,
19–35.
9
On violence as a “pervasive means of wielding power, preserving order,
controlling behavior, and resolving conflicts” that included, but was not
restricted to, acts of physical aggression in the period, see especially Dolan,
2
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“Household Chastisements,” citation 204. See also Boose, “Scolding Brides
and Bridling Scolds” and “The Taming of the Shrew”; and Detmer, “Civilizing
Subordination.”
10
McDonald, “Fear of Farce,” 80.
11
Bloom, Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human, 26.
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Creaser, “Forms of Confusion,” 93. See also Coleridge’s famous contention that “farces commence in a postulate, which must be granted” (Coleridge’s
Shakespearean Criticism, 99). On The Comedie of Errors as a merger of the “seemingly incompatible genres” of romance and farce (48), and how this intersection
informs the play’s representation of subjectivity, see van Elk, “This sympathizéd
one day’s error.”
13
McDonald, “Fear of Farce,” 80.
14
Cf. Detmer, “Civilizing Subordination,” 274, who argues that plays such as
The Taming of the Shrew encourage, perhaps even coerce, viewers to identify with
onstage aggressors: “to enjoy the comedy of the play, readers and viewers must
work to see domestic violence from the point of view of an abuser—that is, they
must minimalize the violence and, at the same time, justify its use.”
15
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16
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rather than as a transhistorical lesson in the pitfalls of reading for mastery or a
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19
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and Dolan’s Bedford/St. Martin’s edition, Shakespeare, The Taming of the Shrew.
20
Miola, “The Play and the Critics,” 13.
21
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Broken English: A Dialogue
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“To sleep, maybe to dream” and Other Encounters
with a Trained Machine
Michael Witmore
Shakespeare’s plays and poems have been translated into numerous
languages, including Klingon. In the middlebrow world of Star Trek,
Shakespeare survives far into the future as an exemplar of high culture.
A made-up language, sprung from the corner of a twentieth-century television series, becomes yet another conduit for Shakespeare’s words—one
fiction finding its future in another. Perhaps it is equally impressive that
a machine can now “translate” Hamlet into and from any of more than
one hundred languages. The popular online translation utility Google
Translate will take any text—including lines from Shakespeare—and put
them into any number of natural human languages. Now one can claim
to find Shakespeare better in Finnish, even if there are more than enough
Finns who can read Hamlet in the original.
Machine translation, which is what Google offers to millions of
users a day, has come a long way in the last two years. In late 2016, the
New York Times reported that Google Translate had made a sudden and
unprecedented leap in ability.1 The jump was due to Google’s implementation of a neural network—a branch of artificial intelligence that trains
a computer to recognize patterns without supplying the machine with a
symbolic “map” of how those languages work (grammars, dictionaries).
The Times story, which aimed to present artificial intelligence, or in this
case “machine learning,” to a popular audience, describes how a native
Japanese speaker achieved surprisingly good results when he fed his own
Japanese translation of several sentences from Hemingway into the utility
and found they could be serviceably translated back into English. Reading
the article several months ago, I couldn’t help but wonder: Would it work
on Shakespeare?
Whenever someone creates a new media form or communications
technology, chances are someone will try it on Shakespeare. Although
Klingon is not an option on Google Translate (yet), I was intrigued enough
with the reports to try the utility out for myself. I pasted the “To be, or not
to be” speech into the input window and indicated that I wanted to see it
rendered in German. The machine returned the following:
Sein oder Nichtsein—das ist die Frage:
Ob es adliger in den Geist zu leiden
Die Schlingen und Pfeile des unverschämten Reichtums,
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Oder Waffen gegen ein Meer von Schwierigkeiten zu
nehmen
Und indem ihr euch widersetzt, beendet sie. Zu
sterben, zu schlafen—
Nicht mehr—und schlafen gehen wir zu Ende
Die Kummer und die tausend natürlichen Schocks
Dieses Fleisch ist Erbe—es ist eine Vollendung
Devoutly zu wünschen. Zu sterben, zu schlafen –
Zu schlafen, vielleicht zu träumen. Ay, es gibt die
reiben,
Denn in diesem Schlaf des Todes können Träume
kommen,
Wenn wir diese sterbliche Spule abgeschliffen haben,
Muß uns Pause geben.

My German is passable enough to know that the translation is very
uneven. “Tausand natürlichen Schocks / Dieses Fleisch ist Erbe” is laughably bad. And what about “Devoutly”? The great Romantic philologist
Schlegel added a crucial contrastive particle in his translation of the
second clause, “das ist hier die Frage,” and this too is missing. Out of
a perverse desire to see how these differences might be compounded,
I fed this first effort back into the machine to have it rendered back
into English:
To be or not to be—is the question:
Whether it is more noble to suffer in the mind
The snares and arrows of the insolent wealth,
Or take weapons against a sea of difficulties
And by opposing you, she ends. To die, to sleep—
No more—and we go to sleep
The grief and the thousand natural shocks
This meat is inheritance—it is a consummation
Devoutly wish. To die, to sleep—
To sleep, maybe to dream. Ay, there is the rub,
For in this sleep of death dreams can come,
If we have abraded this mortal coil,
Must give us a break.

Weirdly echoing the now absent original, this double translation shows an
algorithm struggling with everything from basic syntax to idiom. There is
a big difference between “give us pause” and “give us a break.” One would
have to look to Breton for something like “This meat is inheritance.” And
what about the flatness of, “To sleep, maybe to dream.”
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An intriguing feature of the new machine learning techniques is
that no one, not an English professor at Princeton nor a Stanford artificial intelligence (AI) researcher, can peer directly into the black box
that produces the nifty results. Because neural networks simulate the
accumulation of synaptic links occurring in our brains from childhood,
an engineer from Google can only point to the gigabytes of “training”
data that were used to train the network if he or she wants to explain
the results. The so-called “hidden layers” in the system that translate
stimuli into responses—here, virtual arrays of neurons that can be trained
to “fire” in response to different inputs—are unavailable for inspection in any human-readable form. This is often the case with the work
of algorithms: their results can be judged good or bad by a human. The
mechanism itself, however, defies representation or narrative. All one can
do is recite the recipe itself (the code) and the data on which the network
or model was trained.
When we try to understand algorithms, it is easy to be disappointed
with explanations of how they work. Critics of machine learning point out
that there is a “something for nothing” quality to the way the new neural networks work. Boosted by faster processing and more training data,
a trained network can intuit features that can be used to classify images,
texts, sounds—anything that contains a pattern. Computer scientists
debate the scientific and practical value of the new techniques, although
the tide seems to be turning in the direction of “unintelligent” neural networks that train on lots of data when it comes to translation and speech/
image recognition. Machine learning techniques work well in situations
where there is a lot of variety in the input, where a finite set of rules fails
to map the things that need to be discriminated. Why create a dictionary
of images, why simulate a natural grammar, if an algorithm can produce
reasonable results without one?
Although the efficiencies are impressive, they are in some sense
beside the point when it comes to our curiosity about how language
works and the ways in which it can be used. We may want to use such networks to classify certain texts, showing for instance that Shakespeare is a
more likely author of a given piece of writing than some other early modern author. But the techniques being tried now raise questions that go
beyond those of how to reliably divide texts into recognizable classes. If
machine learning works well for certain tasks such as translation—works
without our knowing why—we glimpse some of what is behind our persistent desire to understand the power of language and the distinct things
that it can do. A literary critic may look at this situation and, ignoring the
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questions of accuracy, say, “What I want is a representation of what the
code does with the data, not a recipe for how it was done.”
All of this raises interesting questions about how we might be “flying blind” in the brave new world of machine learning and how, more
specifically, some of the human behaviors that we associate with our
greatest freedoms and creativity are predicted or modeled by a machine.
Consider yet another Shakespearean example. Prior to the moment when
Shakespeare wrote his “To be, or not to be” speech (around 1600), it is
highly unlikely that anyone—given only that famous phrase—could accurately predict what words would follow. Give a researcher a time machine,
endless computing power, and a complete corpus of written and spoken
English prior to Shakespeare’s Hamlet, and she would find this a challenge. The difficulty is that the training data are insufficient for such a
predictive task. What comes next after “To be, or not to be?” Should it
be the phrase “That is the question,” or “Ay, that’s the point,” which is the
way the speech reads in the earlier quarto edition of Shakespeare’s play? To
say what Shakespeare is going to do, you need to have a lot of examples of
Shakespeare using words in a Shakespearean way. And, prior to Hamlet,
there are not enough examples.
But consider now what kind of evidence or training data is available to the Google team and other researchers. As Shakespeare becomes
the national poet of England, and as his phrases are repeated thousands,
then millions, of times, it becomes almost impossible to hear “To be, or
not to be?” and not find “That is the question” nearby.2 This particular
sequence has been repeated, not only in English, but in the other languages into which Shakespeare has been translated. Translators, in fact,
have been attracted to this speech as a crown jewel of Western introspection. Wilhelm Schlegel’s “Sein oder Nichtsein; das ist hier die Frage”
is repeated many times as his translation of Hamlet enters the canon of
German Shakespeare. An algorithm trained on the post-1600 corpus gets
to train on better data, both in English and other natural languages. Who
knows, perhaps Google Translate will at some point add Schlegel’s “hier”
in “das ist hier die Frage,” even if it is blind to the contrastive emphasis of
the additional word.
If you are training a translator with a neural network, the slow
accumulation of such parallel instances is crucial, which is why it is not
surprising that, when one feeds “To be, or not to be” into Google’s tool
and double translates it back into English, the opening lines of Hamlet’s
soliloquy are almost always right. Here are some examples of the results in
several languages:
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English–Javanese–Javanese–English:
To be or not to be, that is the question > Dadi utawa
ora dadi, sing pitakonan
Dadi utawa ora dadi, sing pitakonan > To be or not to
be, that is the question

English–Arabic–Arabic–English:
To be or not to be, that is the question >
question

> To be or not to be, that is the

English–Finnish–Finnish–English:
To be or not to be, that is the question > Ollako vai
eikö olla, että on kysymys
Ollako vai eikö olla, että on kysymys > To be or not to
be, that is the question

Now look at a few double translations of less famous parts of that
speech:
English–German–German–English:
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune > Die
Pfeile und Schleudern des wütenden Geschicks
Die Pfeile und Schleudern des wütenden Geschicks >
The arrows and slings of furious fate

English–German–German–English:
The heartache and the thousand natural shocks
That flesh is heir to >
Die Kummer und die tausend natürlichen Schocks
Dieses Fleisch ist Erbe
Die Kummer und die tausend natürlichen Schocks
Dieses Fleisch ist Erbe >
The grief and the thousand natural shocks
This meat is inheritance

The initial translation task, starting with “To be, or not to be,” is less likely
to be garbled. This is a very famous line (quoted frequently in the corpus)
and is relatively straightforward syntactically, lacking figurative substitutions. But the phrase “That flesh is heir to” is a very unusual formulation
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which few machines can handle. I doubt even an inept human translator,
supplied with a profusion of dictionaries, could come up with “This meat
is inheritance.”
Google Translate stumbles on Shakespeare, who might be taken as
an exemplar of poetic unpredictability. (How could a person this creative be predictable?) There is nevertheless something impressive about
the results here. The Googlers have found an interesting way of formulating the problem of predictability and, indirectly, the question of what
makes different types of language (or language use) distinctive. The team
first approached the problem by thinking about recognizing entities in
images—things such as cats or faces. Quoc Le, a member of the team,
asked, If I throw away a portion of an image and ask a machine to reconstruct the original only from what is retained, how long will it take that
system to learn what the best (most predictive) elements of images are that
lead to good reconstructions?3 How, without being told in advance, can
a machine select the features of an image that recur? As results of every
reconstruction effort can be compared for similarity to the original image,
which is retained, there is an inbuilt way of experimenting or cycling
through random “subtractions” in order to learn which are most predictive. This approach is representative of the so-called anti-symbolic school
of AI: the machine is not looking to build a map of the things it encounters so that it can navigate the world as we navigate using the symbolic
contents of our knowledge. It simply looks to predict what will happen
based on what it has already “seen.”
One can think of this same process, which the Google team
applied to images and languages, being applied to Shakespeare. Given
the complete works of one of the most creative individuals ever to have
used the language, what words, phrases, or sentences could be used to
reconstruct the text if others went missing? A deep-learning algorithm
begins to recognize a cat in millions of YouTube videos because it sees
cats often. The evidence of thousands of images helps the machine guess
which features—eyes, mouth, tail—and in what configuration tend to
get repeated and, crucially, form together into a distinct and repeatable
whole. So, if Shakespeare writes, “to sleep, perhaps to dream,” the full corpus of English print might help the machine to guess, “Aye, there’s the
rub,” even if it has no idea what those words mean.
These techniques are making their way into literary studies. Some
of the same thinking that informed the translation and image recognition
work at Google led to the creation of the “word embeddings” algorithm
known as Word2Vec.4 Word2Vec grabs short sequences of words from
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collections of texts and, using machine learning to train a model, maps
how collocates (words that appear near each other) are distributed in the
corpus. The technique builds on an idea made memorable by John Firth,
who said that “you shall know a word’s meaning by the company it keeps.”5
What is particularly interesting about Word2Vec is that a model trained
with this algorithm seems to encode cultural bias or directionality. Every
word is represented by a vector or string of properties that locates it in a
finite number of dimensions. The vector can be described, geometrically,
as an arrow leaving the origin in a three-dimensional space and pointing
to a particular word. Other words sit nearby and can themselves be identified by their own respective vector arrows. The number of dimensions in
which words are “arrayed” here tends to be much greater than three, which
means that the model itself cannot be visualized directly. But there are
ways of looking at neighborhoods of words that result, and, within these
neighborhoods, there appear to be directionalities: some parts of the cluster will “lean” male, others female. Animals might have associations with
particular religions or geographies. There can be obvious moral or gendered directionalities attaching to clusters of words associated with traits
or behaviors.
One can sample millions of ten-word sequences of text in the full
corpus of EEBO-TCP and create a model that captures dynamics that we
would recognize as gender, social class, and geography. No one tells the
algorithm to look for those things, but the “space” in which words get
arranged in the model—a model no one can inspect—cannot help but
register the biases and “predictabilities” that the historic use of our language encodes. If you are talking about a “king,” you are also likely talking
about a “male.” By a trick of something called “vector addition and subtraction,” you can traverse the direction from “male” to “female” and then
backtrack (or subtract) the arrow you first traversed from “king,” and you
will arrive at “female.” The names of literary characters, some with names
often repeated in this corpus, will also acquire neighboring associations.
If you use the word “Iago,” you are likely talking about someone who is
“evil”: they are neighbors. And, if the word “evil” is often used around the
word “subtle” in early modern English—as it is—Shakespeare’s formulation, “subtle Iago,” may be more predictable than we might think hundreds
of years later.
I do not want to dwell here on how machine learning finds predictability in different domains. To the extent that anything has features that
co-occur—semantic patterns in sentences or cat eyes in video frames—
there are ways a machine can learn to isolate and predict those features.
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When the techniques are applied to a training corpus of translations, a
machine can recognize the language in which a text is written, even if it has
never seen that text. Similarly, a machine can guess which cognate words,
phrases, or sentences in a target language correspond to those found in the
initial text. Set aside for the moment the fact that these “translations” are
often infelicitous or plain wrong. They are significantly better than random guesses, to the point where millions of human beings rely on Google
Translate every day. The fact that this tool has become indispensable does
not mean that literary language, or literary translation, is about to be
sidelined. From the standpoint of a reader, I see no substitute for a good
translation by someone who is also a compelling stylist in the target language. If I want an English translation of Anna Karenina, I will still reach
for that of Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky.6 But, if I am translating a Russian news source, I might be willing to start with a machine.
Machine learning may tell us very little about the complexities we
prize in literary language of the sort we associate with Shakespeare. But
what if we turn our attention to a more personal case? Suppose an algorithm inspects every sentence I have written over the course of my adult
life; it takes these “training data” and compares them with another corpus
of sentences written by every other English speaker. All of my telegraphic
text messages (“K, see you soon”) are included. So too are my notes to
self (“Examine title page of F2 for Thursday”) and all of the sentences in
the books I have written. On the basis of these labeled data, a machine
might learn to guess correctly whether a new sample of text originates
with me. Indeed, some future version of Google Translate might be able to
take any sentence written by someone else and rewrite it in my own style,
as if my style were another one of Google Translate’s “target languages.”
What would my Hamlet look like? What would I want to know about any
machine that could produce this result?
I would want to know, first and foremost, what a machine had to
learn in order to sound like me. I would want to discover something about
myself—via my style—that I could never intuit or predict, precisely because
I cannot know all of the features that make my writing my own. I doubt
that an algorithm could produce a satisfying Hamlet in my own voice, and
I recoil at the idea of reading it. I doubt, too, if that translation would teach
me what I want to know. For, if one opens up the black box of the algorithm and inspects the training data, one would find only a recitation of
every datum the algorithm encountered and the iterative re-weighting of
the neurons that those encounters produced. There is a great difference
between seeing what a machine did and saying what all of that means.
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To get at the latter, I need a representation of the process—something
more than a digest—that exemplifies the blindingly fast sequence of
events that I do not yet understand. But here, precisely because I have
entrusted the process to a machine whose operations defy symbolic representation, I come up empty handed. Machine translation becomes
practical when it avoids the symbolic representation of language, for
example by abandoning the creation of a grammar or master set of
dictionaries. Leave behind symbolic representation, and you get functionality, perhaps even precision. But I am looking for something else.
Would it not be easier to give a sample of my writing to a stranger and
ask, What do you notice about this person’s writing?
The thought experiment points to an unintended effect of our
desire to know what we are giving away of ourselves when we speak or
use language. That desire is a desire to grasp what we know but cannot
describe about our distinctive uses of language; the desire aims at the
blind spot where a literary or linguistic self hides. Faced with a machine
that has become the perfect mimic, we would find little to satisfy what you
might call the humanistic drive. Correctly identifying a set of instances of
this or that class of symbol use—personal style, genre, register, language—
only deepens our curiosity about what makes any such class distinctive.
When I ask what makes a given language behavior recognizable, I want
an answer that is itself symbolic, a description that references some picture of the world. The prize here is a map of the territory and the writer’s
place within it. I might indeed learn “something new” from machine
learning and the weird mirror it holds up to life. That mirror is not so
much a reflection of “what I actually do” when speaking or writing, but
a reflection of what I want from any description that makes those actions
intelligible to me or others. Understanding that desire and the conditions
under which it might be satisfied is itself a worthy task, even if machine
translation remains an amusing goad to literary life.
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The Inheritance of Meat
Jonathan Hope
We are not looking at ourselves when we try to understand how we use
language. We want to understand more of “what is really there” when
someone uses language, and there are many sources of insight into that
problem. The fact that sometimes a machine can help does not change the
nature of the insight.
In the series of experiments above, Mike argues that just because
machines can become good at picking out and so translating words from
one language to another does not mean they understand what makes those
words distinctive. When we look at the points at which machine translation breaks down—insolent wealth, or the inheritance of meat—maybe
we become aware of what “distinctive” might mean in relation to language.
It strikes me that the point, however, is that we are the ones who have to
say that this or that set of features contributes to the distinctiveness of
a text, and the fact that a machine helps does not invalidate the result.
There are some things that, once seen, can then be described, and this represents an advance in knowledge—even an expression of what Mike calls
the “humanistic drive.”
Consider the situations in which scholars try to identify the features that make Shakespeare’s texts “distinctive.” This might be literary
scholars seeking to describe his characteristic use of images or experiments with genre, or it might be attribution scholars seeking “tells”
which allow us to identify the author of a text. These are not really different activities, as they each posit a “distinctive” Shakespeare which can
be isolated from a context: despite the hostility that has often existed
between “traditional” and “attribution” literary studies, they are in fact
both solidly Romantic in their attachment to the unique, identifiable
author, using language in a way qualitatively different from “the rest.”
Only Shakespeare would use metaphor this way, only Shakespeare uses
these n-grams. Only Shakespeare.
Yet this focus on qualitative difference, instantiated as it is in school
and university curricula where Shakespeare—only Shakespeare—is typically studied in isolation, and conferences and subject organizations where
“Shakespeareans” meet to talk to other “Shakespeareans,” is not only a false
representation of how literature works: it also misunderstands language.
The inheritance of meat is the point where we see the system of language
functioning: synonyms, polysemy, which makes alternates available on the
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paradigmatic axis, but also context, the syntagmatic, which makes some
of the choices impossible, or unlikely. Because the real, the interesting distinctiveness about Shakespeare is not qualitative: it is quantitative. He is
distinct not by kind, but by degree.
In our work together, Mike and I collaborated with a computer
scientist who used machine learning techniques to identify the words
that best distinguish Shakespeare from his peer playwrights. The starting question was not, “Which words make Shakespeare special?” It was,
“Which words, if I find them present or absent from a text, give me the
best indication that that text is by Shakespeare?” The results were interesting. If a play is written by Shakespeare, it will, in comparison with those
of any of his peers, contain relatively more of the words “say,” “speak,”
“go,” and “did.” Conversely, a play by Shakespeare will use relatively fewer
of the words “can,” “only,” “hope,” “may,” “sure,” “first,” “all,” “must,” “yes,”
“yet.” A machine learning technique created a classifier for Shakespeare—
essentially, a weighting of certain words (in abundance or deficit) that
predicts whether or not Shakespeare wrote a particular text. We could ride
“shotgun” alongside the algorithm to see how the many different scenarios
or weightings it had to consider before arriving at this high-performing
set of feature weights. Why would we want to, though? The point of the
exercise is not that we can say what the algorithm means, but to justify
its findings based on its known successes in other contexts. Once that is
done, we can contextualize the results in whatever more or less humanistic
way we want. There are two ways we can go with this: we can speculate
on why Shakespeare is, relatively, more fond of imperatives that his peers;
and/or we can think about the fact that the thing that is distinctive about
Shakespeare is a set of relative shifts in the frequencies with which he uses
a common set of words.
These are both interesting things to think about: maybe the first is
the beginning of an explanation for why so many people (us included) are
convinced that Shakespeare is “better” than any of his contemporaries—
and “better” by some considerable margin. Maybe the second thought,
though, is more important in its implications: whatever the margins of
“better,” Shakespeare is using the same language—because language is very
exactly a shared system, not a set of unique practices found in one user. To
take a slight tangent for a moment, the Romantic, qualitatively distinctive
account of Shakespeare has delivered us into the hands of the “Shakespeare
as word-coiner” myth, which takes first citations in the OED as evidence
of first use and holds Shakespeare up as world-champion inventor of
words. The deep desire here is for Shakespeare to be free of the system of
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language—so free he creates his own words. Of course, this is to ignore the
fact that word-coining obeys systemic laws of morphology, never mind
the fact that almost all of the words claimed for Shakespeare can be found
in writings earlier than his. Fundamentally, the attraction of this myth is
the way it sets Shakespeare apart: qualitatively different from the drones
who just use the words he mints. He produces value; we circulate it.
A Marxist critique of this “economy” of new words would point
out that in fact Shakespeare simply “owns” the means of distribution.
He is not a champion producer of words, but a very efficient circulator
of them—taking the products of the system and boosting their visibility.
Turning a profit. What we want to be a qualitative difference is in fact a
quantitative one.
I have my own history with do. In my first book, The Authorship of
Shakespeare’s Plays, I used this feature and others to identify Shakespeare
as the author of certain portions of Pericles (and his contemporary John
Wilkins as the author of others). Because Shakespeare learned English in
the 1560s and 1570s, he favored a certain set of uses of do as an auxiliary
verb. For example, he, relatively, is more likely to produce sentences such
as “I do believe” or “I did say” than those born later in the century (or us
today). In modern English, we no longer use this construction, preferring
“I believe” or “I said.” When I see that a new machine learning classifier
identifies a feature—“did”—as a predictor of Shakespeare, I can confirm
from my own experience that this is an important insight. I had to discover Shakespeare’s distinctive use of this feature the hard way, counting
all instances of auxiliary do in Shakespeare’s plays by hand. Based on that
confidence, I am more receptive to the other findings: that Shakespeare
favors words such as “say,” “speak,” and “go” in a similar way. And because
I came to this historical difference through the theories of historical sociolinguistics, I was interested in it as a quantitative difference expressed
across the linguistic system, rather than as a qualitative difference expressing Shakespeare’s distinctiveness.
With that fuller picture in place, I can begin to think about the distinctive scenarios in Shakespeare’s plays that may require a character to
speak these words, or to leave out others. Why does Shakespeare fail, relative to others, to use the words “can,” “only,” “hope,” “may,” “sure,” “first,”
“all,” “must,” “yes,” and “yet” as frequently? We can say that, at the level
of the 500+ plays we have studied as representative of the early modern
dramatic corpus, the differences we observe are “because” the text is by
Shakespeare—and we can hypothesize that the systemic differences are
produced by the context: Shakespeare’s place of birth, his gender, his age,

182   Jonathan Hope

all features which affected the precise version of English he acquired as a
child. But, of course, the systemic “explanation” does not explain everything. It sets up the parameters within which Shakespeare works—and,
yes, limits him in as much as it sets some things beyond his “natural”
language and places other things inside it. We are all “prisoners” of the
linguistic system, though most of the time we are unaware of the boundaries, as it is a large prison, and the walls tend to be transparent. When we
come up against something like the “the meat is inheritance,” we suddenly
see that there is a wall where we had not previously thought of walking—
and the wall might tell us something about the structural principles of the
enclosure itself.
NOTES
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Chapter 8

Conscience Doth Make Errors:
The Blind Spot of Shakespearean
Quotation
Zachary Lesser

O

N THE WEBSITE “YAHOO! Answers,” people can post questions about anything and receive answers from anyone. Some questions are about Shakespeare, and not surprisingly some are riddled with
errors, such as the one from “Michaela” shown in Figure 8.1.
Here, both Michaela and “ConcernedCitizen” get quite a bit wrong.1
Michaela claims that the quotation “is from Macbeth,” and Concerned
Citizen agrees with her. At a deeper level, many scholars have insisted
(although we may not agree with them) that “conscience” in this line does
not have the familiar moral-religious meanings that ConcernedCitizen
assumes it has, but rather means, in the words of E. K. Chambers, “the exercise of conscious thought, speculation on the future.”2
But Michaela makes another mistake, one that is more interesting
to me because it occupies a scholarly blind spot: she misquotes Hamlet’s

Figure 8.1 A question and “best answer” from a Yahoo website.
https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20110306135138
AAf7vmH, accessed 11 January 2019.
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line, substituting doth for does. Perhaps you knew this immediately, perhaps you did not. It is in the nature of blind spots, after all, that they are
perspectival: if you drive my car, your blind spot will differ from mine, as
your height, your angle of vision, and your positioning of the mirrors differ. I suspect, however, that many readers will not have spotted Michaela’s
error, because great Shakespeareans have not always remembered the line
any better than she has. We typically imagine quotation and misquotation
as opposed poles, but in fact we misquote far more often than we realize. And when we correct others’ misquotation, we often create further
problems, as I hope to show here with an examination of two common
(mis)quotations from Hamlet. Misquotation is a scholarly blind spot for
another reason: once we have unmasked it as error, we tend to look no
futher. In doing so, however, we fail to see what misquotation can show us;
in our eagerness to demonstrate others’ errors and our own correctness, we
often misrepresent the nature of Shakespearean textuality.
To return to Michaela: she is clearly a novice Shakespearean, but Figure
8.2 shows Samuel Johnson, perhaps the most acute reader of Shakespeare of
the eighteenth century, making the same error in his 1765 edition:

Figure 8.2 Samuel Johnson, ed., The Plays of William Shakespeare, 8 vols.
(London: J. and R. Tonson et al., 1765), 7.209.
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And Figure 8.3 shows how the most influential early editor of
Shakespeare, Edmond Malone, quoted the line in his landmark 1790
edition. At least Malone did get the line right in his edition of the play
itself, unlike Johnson. But his error in the apparatus here shows that, in a
more offhand moment, when he was likely recalling the line from memory,
Malone instinctively thought it read “doth” instead of “does.” When he
was quoting rather than editing, we might say, Malone was misquoting.
Malone and Johnson are not alone. Laurence Olivier can be clearly
heard saying doth in his 1948 film; so can Kenneth Branagh in 1996.
Other legendary Shakespearean actors such as John Gielgud and Richard
Burton have done the same, as have notable academics from John Crowe
Ransom to Judith Butler. 3 And more broadly, since 1800, the misquotation rivals the correct quotation in appearances in the Google Books
corpus, as shown in the graph in Figure 8.4, where the line that is initially
higher represents the correct does, and the initially lower line the incorrect doth.4 Here we can see that, especially in the late nineteenth century

Figure 8.3 Edmond Malone, ed., The Plays and Poems of William Shakspeare,
10 vols. (London: J. Rivington and Sons et al., 1790), 10.669.

Figure 8.4 Graph of correct and incorrect quotation of the line,
created through Google Books.
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and the first half of the twentieth, the line was being misquoted almost as
often as it was being quoted correctly.
Another way to visualize the evidence is to graph the proportion of
all quotations of the line that are erroneous (see Figure 8.5).5 We can now
readily see that the error consistently composes about a third and often
close to half of all the quotations of Hamlet’s line in Google Books.
It is difficult to perceive any trends here: the proportion remains
relatively constant. On both graphs, the error seems to be diminishing
(because of the ready availability of e-texts of Hamlet, making it easier to
check?), but we cannot really tell yet; the apparent downward trend may
soon be reversed, as has happened in the past. In the larger perspective,
the most salient fact about the error is its persistence. It seems clear that
this is one of the more frequently misquoted Shakespearean lines.6 Both
graphs yield important information. The second shows that the error has
been made consistently and frequently over the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, while the first helps us to isolate a particular period—the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—when the error appears to have
been significantly on the rise.
Why do so many people get this line wrong? The error crosses the
divides between professional Shakespeareans and lay readers (and quoters);
between the nineteenth century and the twentieth; between text and performance, print and digital.7 One explanation has to do with the history
of the third-person singular verb ending. In the early modern period, both

Figure 8.5 Percentage of instances of the line in the Google Books
corpus that are erroneous.
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the -s form (does, goes, says, etc.) and -th form (doth, goeth, sayeth, etc.)
were available. According to Merja Kytö, “the -S ending remains very rare
until 1590. In the 1590s, the -TH and -S endings co-occur in a number
of texts, but after 1600 the regular ending tends to be -S.” By the end of
the seventeenth century, “the receding variant form -TH was used only in
biblical, liturgical, and other highly formal contexts.”8 The verbs have and
do “tended to retain the -TH ending long after other verbs had adopted
-S,” however, probably owing to their frequent use.9 Shakespeare himself
used the -th ending more frequently than most of his contemporaries,
especially in hath and doth, because of his age and because of the language
patterns of his native Warwickshire. The difference is pronounced enough
that, according to Cyrus Hoy, it is “the most effective linguistic evidence
for distinguishing the work of Shakespeare and Fletcher” in their collaborations; MacDonald P. Jackson agrees.10
What can we learn if we explore this misquotation rather than
simply correct the error and look away? What we can see at work here,
I think, is an unconscious desire for a Shakespeare who sounds appropriately “Shakespearean.” Subsituting doth for does in this line makes Hamlet
speak not only in a more “old-fashioned” manner, but also in a more formal, elevated register. And it makes Shakespeare appear, in the paradoxical
phrase used to describe “the warlike Harry,” more “like himself ” (Henry V,
Pro. 5), as it forces him to use the -th form that he used with a frequency
exceptional among contemporary dramatists—but not, in fact, in this particular line.
This desire for a “Shakespearean Shakespeare” can already be seen
in Johnson’s 1765 edition, indicating that even by the middle of the eighteenth century doth had become somewhat antiquated. 11 This archaic
quality of doth, and its association with “biblical, liturgical, and other
highly formal contexts”—and perhaps, in particular, with the King James
Bible—seems likely to have driven the late nineteenth-century rise in the
misquotation. In this period, a minor publishing industry developed in
what we might call “Shakespearean piety,” books that packaged bits of
Shakespearean verse alongside other uplifting and spiritual quotations to
impart religious lessons. As the pastor of the Methodist Episcopal church
in Kansas City, Missouri, wrote in “The Cowardice of a Guilty Conscience”
(1910): “We have all had on our lips at one time or another those words
of Hamlet in which he declares that ‘Conscience doth make cowards of
us all.’”12 And the line does indeed appear in the works of numerous ministers: for instance, the fourth volume of The Homiletic Quarterly (1880),
a crib book for preachers, treated conscience in its section on “Rough
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Materials: or, Texts and Topics”; after giving the etymology of the word,
it gave definitions from well-known theologians, relevant biblical passages, and a few literary quotations, including “Conscience doth make
cowards of us all.”13 The Religious Tract Society’s Sunday at Home Family
Magazine for Sabbath Reading offered “Proverb Lore” compiled by “the
Rev. T. F. Thiselton Dyer, M.A.” among its poems, biblical extracts, and
instructive stories; Dyer told readers, “How many are the advantages and
blessings which belong to a good man,” but “How different is it with the
person who has an evil conscience, for when that is so, ‘Conscience doth
make cowards of us all.’”14
There is a clue here that we can trace in the large data set offered by
Google Books. In each of these cases, the line is extracted beginning with
Conscience rather than quoted in full. If we examine only those instances in
the Google Books corpus in which Conscience is capitalized, the erroneous
quotation outpaces the correct one for much of the period, again with a
sharp rise in the late nineteenth century.15
As you will recall, in the early texts of Hamlet, the word conscience
does not begin the line. Q2 has “Thus conscience dooes make cowards”
(sig. G2v), and the Folio reads, “Thus Conscience does make Cowards
of vs all” (sig. 2o5r). The Folio capitalization is part of its broader project of capitalizing certain abstract nouns, according to emergent fashion
in 1623. But the vast majority of quotations in the Google Books corpus are not following Folio capitalization; they are undoubtedly quoting
either from a contemporary edition of Hamlet, from memory, or from

Figure 8.6 Graph of correct and incorrect quotation of the line, with initial
capitalization, in Google Books.
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a compendium of memorable quotations. In other words, it is exceedingly unlikely that the Folio typography is influencing the capitalization
of these quotations, whether erroneous or correct.
What is influencing that capitalization, I think, is the extraction of
only part of the line as a proverb to be compiled in collections of quotations. In these commonplace compendia, as in the examples above, the
initial Thus of Q2 and F’s line is omitted as part of the process of removing the line from its original context (where Thus refers to the preceding
portion of Hamlet’s speech) for suitable reuse in new contexts. The capitalization of Conscience, in other words, is a marker of commonplacing
and thus a marker of exactly what Malone was doing when he got the line
wrong in his apparatus: quoting from memory and from a storehouse of
proverbial wisdom and Shakespearean “beauties.” In the late nineteenth
century, this commonplacing was part of the broader impulse to make
Shakespeare teach religious and moral lessons, to make the national poet
accord with the Bible. In recalling the line with doth instead of does, these
writers align Shakespeare with the Bible not only spiritually, but also linguistically, in the usage of the third-person singular verb ending.
As with the play as a whole, Q1 offers an intriguing counterpoint to
this line.16 Although Q1 has generally been imagined as more antiquated
than the modern philosophical version of the play embodied by Q2 and F,
in this line the first quarto is decidedly more modern: “O this conscience
makes cowardes of vs all” (sig. E1r).17 The line sounds more contemporary
because it lacks the now-archaic “unregulated auxiliary ‘do’,” a construction
that Jonathan Hope has shown is a favorite of Shakespeare’s.18 Modern
usage prefers auxiliary do only in interrogatives (“Does conscience make
cowards?”), emphatic statements (“Yes, conscience does make cowards”),
and negatives (“No, conscience does not make cowards”). Linguists call
these usages “regulated,” whereas non-standard forms are “unregulated”:
the use of do in positive statements (“Conscience does make cowards”),
and the lack of it in negatives (“Conscience makes not cowards”) or interrogatives (“Makes conscience cowards?”). Already in the 1750s, Samuel
Johnson disparaged “unregulated” auxiliary do in positive statements: “Do
is sometimes used superfluously, as, I do love, I did love; simply for I love,
or I loved; but this is considered as a vitious mode of speech.”19 Perhaps
precisely because he considered unregulated auxiliary do as an outmoded
and superfluous construction, Johnson unconsciously associated it with
another archaic linguistic form, printing doth instead of does in this line.
By attending to this misquotation rather than dismissing it, we can
see how it is informed both by the growing canonization of Shakespeare as
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a writer of quasi-sacred texts and by the increasing sense that the language
of those texts was archaic. Indeed, as the parallel with the King James Bible
reveals, the two trends are intertwined. Furthermore, this misquotation
draws our attention to Shakespeare’s texts in their multiplicity: it is not
quite right to say that the “correct” reading is “Thus conscience does make
cowards of us all.”20 Although it is true that, allowing for modernization of
spelling, this is the reading in the Folio, Q2 omits “of us all,” and Q1 has
another variation altogether. Editors have not always agreed on which version of the line is the one that Shakespeare “actually” wrote. Correction in
this case involves oversimplification of the textual situation.
To explore more fully the relationship between popular misquotation, scholarly correction, textual variation, and Shakespearean editing,
I want to look at another, better-known misquotation from Hamlet:
“Methinks the lady doth protest too much.” Although this misquotation seems no less widespread than Conscience doth make cowards, it does
not, to my knowledge, appear in any scholarly editions of Shakespeare.
Whereas Hamlet’s line about conscience clearly crosses the divide
between professional and amateur Shakespearean, Gertrude’s line has
been far more perceptible as a “popular” error. Perhaps for this reason, it
has gained far more currency as a misquotation, one that people on the
Internet take special pleasure in correcting. Gertrude’s “methinks” appears
on Wikiquote’s “List of misquotations,” a page dedicated to “things that
many people think are correct quotations but are actually incorrect,” and
numerous other sites such as “Top 10 Shakespeare Misquotes.”21 The latter
site informs us that, “This is probably one of the most commonly heard
misquotes of Shakespeare” and gives us the “Actual Quote: ‘The lady
doth protest too much, methinks’.” Wikiquote gives the same line as the
“Correct quote.”
But in fact both “Top 10 Shakespeare Misquotes” and Wikiquote
are miscorrecting : “The lady doth protest too much, methinks” is not
“actual” or “correct” according to any of the three early texts of Hamlet.
Q2 comes the closest with “The Lady doth protest too much mee thinks”
(sig. H2v), but note that it treats me thinks as two words. Meanwhile, the
Folio has “The Lady protests to much me thinkes” (sig. 2o6v), and Q1
prints even more simply: “The Lady protests too much” (sig. F3v). The
focus on misquotation creates a blind spot about the text itself.
The Folio and Q1 versions of this line again raise the question of the
use of the unregulated auxiliary do. Both of these texts sound more modern
than Q2 in omitting the auxiliary, and Q1 goes even further in modernizing by omitting “methinks.” This now-archaic form was still widely in
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use in the early seventeenth century but may already have become somewhat obscure in its syntax, in which me functions as an indirect object of
the impersonal (it) thinks in rough parallel with the still-current phrase
“it seems to me.” The transformation of me thinks, as Q2 reads, to the single word methinks, as we find in all modern editions and in the Internet
versions of the “actual” and “correct” quotation, itself testifies to the archaicization of this syntactical form. As can be seen in the graphs from the
EEBO-TCP Ngram Browser in Figures 8.7 and 8.8, the single-word form
became more common in the latter half of the seventeenth century, as the
two-word form began to fade from use.22
Although modern editions almost always favor the Q2 version of
the line, with doth protest instead of protest, this was not always the case.
In the early twentieth century, the New Bibliographers revolutionized
the editing of Hamlet by arguing persuasively that the copy underlying
Q2 was Shakespeare’s authorial manuscript, leading most subsequent editors to base their text on that edition. (The Oxford Shakespeare, edited
by Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor, was a notable exception, as it broadly
preferred Folio readings in its effort to reconstruct the texts of the plays as
they were performed.) But most of the major eighteenth-century editors
preferred the Folio reading, including Rowe, Pope, Theobald, Hanmer,
Warburton, Johnson, and Capell. Malone’s emphasis in his 1790 edition
on returning to the early quartos led him to print doth protest, and a number of nineteenth-century editors followed him, but by no means all.

Figure 8.7 Occurrence of methinks as a single word in the
EEBO-TCP corpus.
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Figure 8.8 Occurrence of me thinks as two words in the EEBO-TCP corpus.

As late as 1877, the Variorum Hamlet edited by Horace Howard
Furness printed the Folio version as its base text. The eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century rationale for choosing protests over doth protest was not
merely a general preference for the Folio over Q2, however. The only commentary note that Furness provides for this line is Hiram Corson’s remark:
“The familiar ‘protests’ is better here than ‘doth protest.’”23 This comment
epitomizes the kind of “eclectic” editing that the New Bibliographers
would soon condemn as mere belletrism: the editor simply chooses the
variant that seems “better” according to his personal aesthetic taste. The
New Bibliographic movement led to the adoption of the principle of copy
text, to the idea that individual choices of variants should be guided by
a broader understanding of the nature of the copy underlying the multiple editions of Shakespeare’s plays, and in this case to the choice of Q2’s
doth protest as part of a larger preference for Q2 as closer to Shakespeare’s
hand. But, as numerous critiques of the New Bibliography have pointed
out, in practice there was still a great deal of aesthetic preference at work
in twentieth-century editing. In his landmark New Bibliographic edition
of Hamlet for the Arden Shakespeare, for example, Harold Jenkins repeatedly prefers “an obviously superior F reading,” even though he follows Q2
as his copy text, because the word “is in Shakespeare’s finest manner, both
inventive and exact.”24
If Corson argued for protests over doth protest because it was “better” (more “familiar,” more direct and immediate), and if Jenkins chose
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F’s “fretfull” rather than Q2’s “fearefull” porpentine because it was “obviously superior,” how different is this scholarly editorial practice from the
misquotation of Gertrude as saying, “Methinks the lady doth protest
too much,” or of Hamlet as saying, “Thus conscience doth make cowards
of us all”?
This is not to say that there is in fact no difference between misquotation and editorial emendation—far from it. Bibliographic analysis
can indeed teach us a great deal about the printing and publication
of Shakespeare’s plays, literary and stylometric analysis can illuminate
Shakespeare’s (and other dramatists’) habits, and that knowledge can
and should influence our attempts to reconstruct the texts of those plays
from their extant witnesses. But this evidence is not generally as straightforward as we might wish. We could note, for instance, that Q2’s version
of Gertrude’s line is a perfect iambic pentameter, whereas F’s “The Lady
protests to much me thinkes” is half a foot short and metrically awkward.
(Q1’s version appears not to be in verse.) By contrast, with Hamlet’s line
about conscience, it is F’s version that is metrically perfect, whereas Q2 is
a short line as it lacks “of us all,” and I find Q1’s “O this conscience makes
cowardes of vs all” extremely hard to scan. In each case, the syntactically
more “modern” version, without auxiliary do, makes the line metrically
difficult and seems therefore somewhat less likely to be Shakespearean,
but the two lines point to different texts, Q2 in one case and F in the
other. Metrical analysis is thus not particularly helpful here, and larger
stylometric studies, by their very nature, will not be able to resolve such
fine-grained questions as which variant to choose in each of these cases.
We could fall back on the New Bibliographic principle of choosing a
copy-text based on a broader understanding of the nature of the texts and
sticking with it in ambiguous cases, but most editors will want to choose
F’s “Thus Conscience does make Cowards of vs all” alongside Q2’s “The
Lady doth protest too much mee thinks.” If we resolve the problem by
arguing that Q2 omits “of us all” owing to a compositor’s error (which I
happen to think likely), are we actually answering the question here, or
are we simply begging it? Shakespeare certainly wrote plenty of metrically
short lines for dramatic emphasis, after all, and one could argue that “Thus
conscience dooes make cowards” is one of them, that it is more “familiar”
and hence “better,” as Corson would say, just like F’s metrically deficient
“The Lady protests to much me thinkes.”
In these two cases, we see a similar pattern. The misquotation
(whether “popular” or “scholarly”) favors the “old-fashioned” form, preferring a Shakespeare who sounds quaintly archaic, like the mock-Tudor
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houses that can be seen throughout Stratford-upon-Avon. Pushing
“methinks” to the initial position emphasizes that distinctly early modern
word, adding to the “Shakespeareanism” of the line; the choice of “doth
protest” over “protests” or “conscience doth” over “conscience does”
works along the same lines. Meanwhile, in each case, the correction overcorrects and misrepresents the textual variation around each line. And, if
both of these misquotations reveal an unconscious expectation for how
Shakespeare “should” sound—a desire for an “old-timey” Shakespeare
that is easy enough to ridicule—editors and critics have probably been
too complacent about our own investments in, and dependence on,
similar expectations that Shakespeare must have sounded “like himself.”
Recent work in stylometrics has shown that individual authors have distinctive stylistic “signatures,” certainly, but these typically operate below
the level of conscious thought, in deeply engrained sytactical habits
rather than in particular vocabulary or turns of phrase. In other words,
Shakespeare probably had no idea what he sounded like, on this level,
and we are probably less able to hear that distinctive style than we think.
If we approach editorial decisions with the idea that Shakespeare should
sound “like himself,” we need to do so with an awareness of our blind spot
around (mis)quotation, or we may run into the same kinds of error as
Samuel Johnson, Edmond Malone, and Michaela.
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On Not Knowing Shakespeare: A Response
to Zachary Lesser
Tanya Pollard
“Brush up your Shakespeare,” Cole Porter promises us, “and they’ll all
kow-tow.” 25 Mysteriously, and disappointingly, this does not always
prove true in practice, but many of us continue to identify Shakespearean
knowledge with at least some degree of authority. It is both disconcerting and intriguing, then, to learn from Zack’s wonderful and wide-ranging research not only that most of us could do with more brushing up,
but that even those steeped in an awful lot of Shakespeare have recurring
blind spots.
The impressively persistent tradition of quoting “Conscience doth
make cowards of us all” highlights the power of authoritative misreadings to
perpetuate themselves. When a phrase is endorsed by the likes of Johnson,
Malone, Olivier, Gielgud, and Branagh, it takes on a familiarity that many
will accept unquestioningly, despite its departure from Shakespeare’s
original texts. As Zack shows, though, the recurring persistence of “doth”
suggests investments beyond the simple tendency to repeat the words of
apparent experts. Even for readers and audiences oblivious to scholarship
on Shakespeare’s habitual linguistic patterns, the plays themselves can
instill an instinctive preference for the characteristic “doth.” The word’s
regular Shakespearean appearances prompt, as Zack points out, “an unconscious desire for a Shakespeare who sounds appropriately ‘Shakespearean.’”
If Shakespeare’s authority rests in significant part on his plays’ perceived
status as archaic, quasi-sacred texts, there are cultural stakes in maintaining
a Shakespeare who uses “doth” as an auxiliary verb, and maybe even a certain felt virtue in correcting him when he fails to do so consistently.
Patterns of misquotation, though, raise questions and problems
beyond wanting Shakespeare to sound “like himself.” As Zack also points
out, other recurring misquotations, such as “The lady doth protest too
much, methinks,” respond at least in part to textual indeterminacy. If
three “original” Shakespeare texts offer three different versions of this line,
how do we decide what Shakespeare sounds like? The problems of locating Shakespearean authority—and with it, of establishing Shakespearean
knowledge—multiply with recent arguments for expanding the canon of
Shakespeare’s collaboratively written plays. If plays that we have understood as Shakespeare’s turn out to include contributions from others—and,
by the same token, if plays that we have attributed to others turn out to
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include contributions from Shakespeare—we find other, larger challenges to identifying a consistent Shakespearean voice. When we explore
Shakespeare’s habits of imitating and quoting other writers, moreover, as
well as the ways that others were moved to imitate and quote him, the possibility of distilling stylistic purity recedes even further from our grasp.
Recognizing Shakespeare’s responsiveness to his immediate theatrical milieu similarly raises the specter of more expansive and indirect
forms of extratextual influence. If the improvisations of Shakespeare’s
clowns and/or the distinctive forms of charisma associated with his betterknown actors made their way into Shakespeare’s lines, either directly or
through permeating his imagination, do the resulting inflections represent
Shakespeare, or someone else? And, if attending to these likely direct and
indirect debts suggests that Shakespeare’s plays have always been at some
level collectively constructed, are modern alterations—by editors, directors, actors, and/or the memory-challenged among us—intrinsically less
valid than those that might have taken place more than 400 years ago?
As Zack points out, it is not intellectually useful to lump together
different approaches to reworking Shakespeare: misquotations reflect very
different kinds of principle from those involved in editorial or directorial
decisions, and some Shakespeares are demonstrably more authentic than
others. The persistence of blind spots that recur across these categories,
though, underscores the degree to which we all rely on our instincts about
what is authentically Shakespearean. Probing these instincts, similarly,
reminds us that, however well informed they may be, they are all bounded
by the limits of what we know, and what we can know, about a writer
whose words reach us filtered through the distorting media of time, variant texts, and uncountable losses. In “On Not Knowing Greek,” Virginia
Woolf—whose Greek was very good—wrote that “it is vain and foolish to
talk of knowing Greek,” but that the idea persists regardless. “All the more
strange, then,” she observed, “is it that we should wish to know Greek, try
to know Greek, feel for ever drawn back to Greek, and be for ever making
up some notion of the meaning of Greek, though from what incongruous odds and ends, with what slight resemblance to the real meaning of
Greek, who shall say?”26 Happily, we are on firmer territory in knowing
Shakespeare than antiquity—we have the benefits of more linguistic and
chronological proximity and a sturdier paper trail—but the difference is
of degree rather than kind. Zack’s essay, like Woolf ’s, reminds us to be cautious about assuming our familiarity with the foreign country that is the
literary past, and prods us in particular to keep an eye on what we can
learn from our own blind spots.
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The Food of Points: A Response to
Zachary Lesser
Adam Zucker
Given this collection’s interest in discussing unknown or unknowable subjects in Shakespeare studies, I may as well begin this response with a quick
story about my long-standing friendship with Zack, which began during
our first year as undergraduates. He and I shared serious and probably
predictable academic interests and advisors at the time, but, more importantly for this story, we also both loved pinball. We would spend hours
crammed into the small game room of our university’s student center, too
clueless at age nineteen to realize that the plexiglass window that put our
pinball obsession on display day after day to the many other students walking past might damage our chances at winning the kinds of game that were
being played out in the hall and elsewhere on campus. On this particular
day, I was killing it, again, on the Star Trek machine, while Zack waited
patiently for my turn to end and his to begin. The machine chittered and
blooped in its song of a billion warp-speed points, and Zack, already proficient in the ways of Shakespeare, was ready with a quotation. “If music be
the food of points,” he said, “Play on.”
I had no idea what he was talking about, and I told him so. I was
impressed when he told me it was the first line of Twelfth Night, not least of
all because Shakespeare seemed to be weirdly tuned in to pinball aesthetics of the early 1990s. For all time, indeed. It was not until I read the play
several months later that I learned that Zack had misquoted the line. For
a measurable chunk of my undergraduate career, I thought Shakespeare’s
music was the food of points.
I am writing this twenty-five years later, but I am still learning about
misquoting Shakespeare from Zack. And, although the situation in the
game room differs greatly from the scenario he has shown us in his essay
here, the central premises of both are similar. Given the right authorities,
the difference between “wrong” Shakespeare and “right” Shakespeare is
very difficult to discern. And perhaps more to the point, the text we see
before us in our minds when we imagine a “correct” Shakespearean script
can be shaped by influencing authorities we will never entirely recognize,
even as we pronounce some of the most famous lines in the plays.
Those authorities are not always pinball-playing friends with a better grip on the canon than oneself. I freely confess that “Thus conscience
doth make cowards of us all” sounded absolutely right to me before I read
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this essay. More strangely, even now that I know it is wrong, it still sounds
entirely right to me. The authority of presumptively archaic Shakespearean
style, an authority that has overwhelmed the memories of Malone, Olivier,
and Branagh among others, plays a role in my own mind-edited text of
Hamlet. There is no single work of criticism or scholarship that has made
me feel this way. Some internal instinct, an instinct upon which I rely too,
too frequently to respond to questions posed by text, is completely misinforming me. I have never noticed its presence before.
The blind spot of knowledge explored by Zack, then, might best be
understood as a space of unanalyzed influence not just on “Shakespeare,”
but on the performance of the Shakespearean text in editorial scholarship,
on stage, and in classrooms. The force of this influence can move along
many different vectors laid out by the histories of textual performers themselves. Was Shakespeare, for a hypothetical speaker, teacher, or editor, a
naturalized, ever-present companion in educational contexts, as he often
is or has been in the UK? Was Shakespeare a facet of an occupying power
building school curricula or bringing its foreign culture to bear in a colonial administration, as he once was in India and throughout the British
Empire? Was Shakespeare, as he was for me, a compelling poet who gave
an independent voice to the son of an aspiring, heavily-accented immigrant? These kinds of frame for the feeling of the Shakespearean could
be multiplied many, many times over, each one of them potentially nudging text into different configurations. The pathways that lead Shakespeare
to “sound like himself,” as Zack puts it, sometimes turn back in on themselves, and they sometimes span the globe.
I am not sure we can ever perfectly identify the forces that lead
groups of knowledgeable people to make the same mistake over and over
again. The panoramic perspective I have hinted at above would encompass
an infinity of unseen forces, and, although Zack’s survey of nineteenthcentury moralizing Shakespeare quotation collections gives us one
potential method for locating cultural momentum, the blind spot here is
perhaps too protean to be clarified entirely. But we can always be aware of
the diversity of formal or structural authorities underpinning any given
Shakespearean line. Editorial glosses and emendations, to name the most
obvious, are influential simply because we have gotten very used to granting the editor her in-text power. The sound of an actor’s voice in a canonical
performance will easily make us believe in an extra “doth” or two. And
even here, in a collection of essays and responses, the form of print and
scholarly affiliation can make incorrect things seem to be authentic. Take
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this short essay, for example. I confess, here at its conclusion: Zack never
said that thing to me in the game room at university. We did play quite a
bit of pinball, but I made up the entire story simply to make a point about
the formal contexts for authority. Did the framing of this book and the
trust you have been trained to place in it make the Zuckerian anecdote
ring true? Did you suspect from the outset (maybe because you have met
me) that it was complete bunk?
We should always try to discern the force of authority in textual
matters and otherwise. When we lose track of it entirely, it doth make
cowards of us all.
NOTES
https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20110306135138AAf7vmH.
Shakespeare, Hamlet, edited by Chambers, 183. As I show in Hamlet After
Q1: An Uncanny History of the Shakespearean Text, ch. 4, Chambers was the first
major editor to gloss the word in this way, but it soon became dominant; but perhaps ConcernedCitizen is right?
3
Gielgud in an audio recording of three of Hamlet’s soliloquies: www.
youtube.com/watch?v=BCyjXJ9oogg (no longer available); Burton in the
famous 1964 Broadway simulcast in theaters, directed by Gielgud: www.youtube.
com/watch?v=lsrOXAY1arg. See also Christopher Plummer in a version for the
BBC: www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Ay2I7py3Og. Among recent productions,
Mel Gibson, Ethan Hawke, and David Tennant all speak the line correctly with
does. See Ransom’s “Communications: On Shakespeare’s Language” and the title
of Butler’s “Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us All.”
4
For ease, I have removed the labels on the Y-axis, which run from 0.0% to
0.00000240% of the GB corpus. The graph is case-insensitive and so will capture
any form of the text string.
5
To do this, we graph instances of “conscience doth make cowards” as a percentage of instances of either “conscience doth make cowards” or “conscience does
make cowards,” with the formula conscience doth make cowards / (conscience doth
make cowards + conscience does make cowards). Unfortunately, Google Ngrams
cannot combine formulae like this one with case-insensitive searching. The graph
for Conscience with a capital C in each case results in a somewhat higher error rate.
Owing to OCR problems, however, the actual results include numerous examples
of the lower-case conscience as well. Running the search with “Thus conscience”
at the start—to capture the entire line as it appears in most modern editions—
results in a somewhat lower error rate, perhaps because the line is being quoted in
full and more attentively. But nonetheless, the misquotation generally makes up
between 20% and 30% of all instances.
1
2
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There is an important discrepancy between the two graphs. The first shows
that, in the late nineteenth century, conscience doth was rising significantly relative
to conscience does, but the second does not show a concomitant rise in the percentage of all quotations of the line that are erroneous. This is mathematically impossible and probably points to a problem with the use of OCR in Google Books.
As noted above, the second graph is necessarily case-sensitive, whereas the first
was case-insensitive; the discrepancy between the two ways of visualizing the data
likely derives from difficulties with the OCR recognition of the phrase when it
is variously capitalized. There is clearly a problem with case-sensitivity in Google
Ngrams and Google Books, one that is currently impossible to diagnose clearly,
let alone correct. To make matters more complex, apparently Google Books and
Google Ngrams have different ways of handling case-sensitivity in searches and
may return slightly different results. At the large scale of the arguments in this
paper, however, this should not matter much.
7
An odd digital example: typing Schlegel’s German translation of the line
(“So macht Gewissen Feige aus uns allen”) into Google Translate yields a retranslation into English as “Thus conscience doth make cowards of us all.” As the algorithms underlying Google Translate do not use the archaic doth, this line must
have been coded as a unit into Translate by a human, probably using the “Suggest
an edit” function.
8
Kytö, “Third-Person Present Singular Verb Inflection in Early British and
American English,” 115.
9
Kytö, “Third-Person Present,” 121.
10
Hoy, “The Shares of Fletcher and his Collaborators,” 74; see Jackson,
“Looking for Shakespeare in Double Falsehood,” 140.
11
Lucy Munro traces the related process of self-consciously archaizing language in Archaic Style in English Literature, 1590–1674.
12
Banks, “The Cowardice of a Guilty Conscience,” 302.
13
The Homiletic Quarterly 4, 556.
14
The Sunday at Home Family Magazine for Sabbath Reading 1487, 683.
15
The differences here seem stark enough that they are unlikely to be
accounted for by OCR problems with capitalization.
16
On the ways in which the discovery of Q1 in 1823 has influenced our
understanding of the play and of Shakespeare more broadly, see my Hamlet After
Q1.
17
On constructions of Q1 as antiquated, “barbaric,” and retrograde, see
Hamlet After Q1.
18
See Hope, The Authorship of Shakespeare’s Plays, and Munro’s analysis of
Fletcher’s use of archaic style in The Faithful Shepherdess (Munro, Archaic Style,
175–77).
19
Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, via Eighteenth Century
Collections Online, image 46, accessed July 27, 2016.
6
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The only scholar I have found who (briefly) draws attention to this misquotation is Callagahan, Hamlet, 32. Callaghan smartly locates the misquotation in
the context of the three texts of the play.
21
https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/List_of_misquotations; http://listverse.
com/2008/09/15/top-10-shakespeare-misquotes
22
EEBO N-gram Browser, developed by Anupam Basu, http://earlyprint.
wustl.edu/eebotcpngrambrowser.html, accessed July 21, 2016. I use the regularized spelling function.
23
Shakespeare, Hamlet, edited by Furness, 254.
24
Shakespeare, Hamlet, edited by Jenkins, 59–60.
25
Cole Porter, “Brush up your Shakespeare,” Kiss Me Kate (1948).
26
Woolf, “On Not Knowing Greek,” 23.
20
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